Moral Philosophy 

COPPENS 



B, 2>. <5. 



A BRIEF TEXT-BOOK 

OF 

Moral Philosophy 



BY 

REV. CHARLES COPPENS, SJ. 

Author of "A Brief Text-Book of Logic and Mental Philosophy," "A Prac- 
tical Introduction to English Rhetoric" and "The Art 
of Oratorical Composition." 



TO WHICH HAS BEEN ADDED 

A" CATHOLIC SOCIAL PLATFORM 

BY 

REV. JOSEPH HUSSLEIN, S.J. 



''The rule and measure of human acts is reason." — St. Thomas. 



NEW YORK 
SCHWARTZ, KIRWIN & FAUSS 
42 Barcl\y Street 



1 9 2.0 



Copyright, 189S, by 
CATHOLIC SCHOOL BOOK COMPANY' 



Copyright, 1920, by 
SCHWARTZ, KIRWIN & FAUSS 



JUL 1920 . 

g)CiA570825 

^0 i 



PREFACE. 



This "Brief Text-Book of Moral Philosophy " is a com- 
panion volume to the author's " Brief Text-Book of Logic 
and Mental Philosophy," lately pubhshed and already exten- 
sively used in Academies and other educational institutions. 
The author's aim is to present to students and readers — to 
such, especially, as are unfamiliar with the Latin language — 
a brief yet clear outhne of the system of Ethics taught in 
CathoHc Colleges, Seminaries and Universities. This system 
is based on the philosophy of Aristotle. 

Questions of Ethics, which in former times were left to the 
close scientific treatment of speciahsts, are at the present day 
freely discussed among all classes of society — in newspapers 
and popular magazines, in the workshop and in the parlor. 

Extravagant notions of individual and social rights are 
circulated, while the rash speculations of so-called scientists 
are sapping in many minds the very foundations of morality. 
Never before has there been a more urgent call on the part 
of the people for the lucid exposition and the correct appli- 
cation of sound moral principles. 

In this sad confusion of thought, no small utihty will be 
found in a clear, simple, systematic explanation of the ethical 
doctrines taught by the greatest minds of the past ages, and 
lately most highly recommended by our Supreme Pontiff, the 
illustrious Leo. XI IL Such an exposition the author has 
endeavored to present in this little volume. 

The Author. 

Creighton University, Omaha, Neb. 
March 12, 1895. 



PREFACE TO NEW EDITION 



The importance given by the Holy See and the Bishops 
of all countries to the social problem, no less than the 
author's own conviction that this subject may not be over- 
looked in our classrooms at the present time, has led to the 
insertion of an edition of Father Husslein's "A Catholic 
Social Platform," expressly prepared for the present volume. 
The references which accompany this concise expression of 
Catholic social principles will afford abundant opportunity 
for as extensive a study of our vital social problems as any 
class may be prepared to undertake. The fact that the ref- 
erences are made to but two volumes by this same authority 
on social matters will the more greatly facilitate the use of 
this Platform. 

"Father Husslein," says the Ecclesiastical Review y 
"speaks, as everybody knows, with expert knowledge on 
social problems." 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



PAGE 



Introduction, 7 

BOOK I— DIRECTION OF HUMAN ACTS. 

Chapter I. The End to which Human Acts are to 

be Directed : . . . .11 
Article I. Ends in General, . . . .11 
II. The Last End of Man, ... 13 
" III. The Attainment of the Last End. . 20 
Chapter II. The Morality of Human Acts : . . 27 
Article I. The Essence of Morality, ... 27 
" II. The Determinants of Morality, . . 33 
" III. AccountabiUty for Moral Acts, . . 36 
" IV. Circumstances that Lessen Account- 
ability, 39 

" V. The Passions, 42 

" VI. Virtues and Vices 45 

Chapter III. Law, the Rule of Human Acts: . . 49 

Article I. The Moral Law, .... 49 

" II. Conscience, ..... 57 

III. Sanction of the Moral Law. . . 63 

BOOK II.— INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES. 

Chapter I. Rights and Duties in General. . . 69 
Chapter II. Our Duties to God : . . . .74 

Article I. Adoration, 75 

^' II. Faith in God, ..... 77 

" III. Love of God 84 

Chapter III. Our Duties to Ourselves. ... 86 

5 



Contents, 



PAGE 

Chapter IV. Our Duties to Other Men : . . .89 

Article I. Duty of Love to Others, ... 89 
II. Duties Regarding the Minds and Wills 

of Others, . . , . • 91 
** III. Duties Regarding the Lives of Others, 95 
" IV. Duties Regarding Honor. ... 99 
Chapter V. Rights of Ownership : . , . .102 
Article I. Validity of Titles to Ownership, . 102 
" II. Violations of Ownership, . . , 109 
" III. Various Modes of Acquiring Property, no 
** IV. Transfer of Property by Contract, . 112 
V. Wages of Laborers 114 

BOOK III.— SOCIAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES. 

Chapter I. Society in General 119 

Chapter II. Domestic Society : 123 

Article I. Nature and Purpose of Domestic So- 
ciety, 123 

" II. Unity and Indissolubility of Matri- 
mony, 125 

" III. Parental Authority — Education. . 130 

Chapter in. Civil Society: 139 

Article I. Nature and Origin of Civil Society : . 139 

$ I. The End of Civil Government, 139 
§ 2. The Units that Compose Civil 

Society, . . . .141 
$ 3. Civil Authority, . . .141 
§ 4. Means Employed by Civil Au- 
thority 145 

Article II. The Functions of Civil Government : 146 

% I. Legislation, .... 147 

% 2. The Judiciary, , , . 149 
$ 3. The Executive. . . •153 

Chapter IV. International Law. . . . • 155 



INTRODUCTION. 



1. Moral Philosophy is the science of the moral order, or 

of the right and wrong of human acts. It is called Ethics 
from the Greek word iffir], which, like the Latin word mores, 
signifies morals. Since its object is not merely speculative 
knowledge, but the true direction of human acts, Ethics is 
also styled Practical Philosophy. 

2. Ethics, we say, directs human acts. However, not all 
the acts of a man are called human acts, but only such as are 
under the control of his free will. Whatever he does neces- 
sarily — <f., whatever he cannot help doing — results from the 
physical laws of nature, and, as such, is willed and directed 
by the Author of nature. For instance, a man may fall like 
a stone, or grow like a plant, or perceive a sound like a brute 
animal, without any power on his part to prevent himself 
from falling or growing or hearing, if the required conditions 
are present. These are acts of the maft, but they are not 
acts of what is distinctively human — namely, his intellect and 
his will. The term human act is restricted in Philosophy to 
those acts which a man does knowingly and willingly — which 
he has the power either to do or not to do. 

3. To be qualified for the direction of human acts. Phi- 
losophy must derive its conclusions by reasoning from first 
principles; it must take into account the nature of man, and 
the natures of all the causes that influence human action. 



8 



Introduction. 



Much of this we have considered in Metaphysics, or Mental 
Philosophy. Ethics is thus founded on Metaphysics : Moral 
Philosophy assumes as its principles the conclusions estab- 
lished in Mental Philosophy. 

4. To explain the object of Moral Philosophy, which we 
have declared to be the true direction of human acts, we shall 
treat in Book I. of the direction of human acts in general; in 
Book II., of the special duties and rights of meji viewed as 
individuals; and, in Book III., of the rights and duties of men 
viewed as members of society. 



BOOK I. 



THE DIRECTION OF HUMAN ACTS 
IN GENERAL 



5. In order to treat of the true direction of human acts, 
we shall examine in Chapter I. the end or term to which 
such acts are to he directed; in Chapter II., the morality of 
human acts; and, in Chapter III., the rule by which they are 
to be dii-ected to their end. 



9 



CHAPTER I. 



THE END TO WHICH HUMAN ACTS ARE 
TO BE DIRECTED. 

In the present chapter we shall consider : i . Ends i7i gen- 
eral, 2. Our last end. 3. The attainment of our last end. 

Article I. Ends in General. 

6. We mean here by end the purpose for which a thing 
exists ; the end of an act is the purpose for which that act is 
done. For instance, some may read a certain book for 
pleasure ; others for instruction, others again to practise obe- 
dience : the act is the same, the ends are various. 

7. Every human act is done for an end. For a human 
act is an act of the will, and the will cannot act unless the 
intellect proposes to it something to which it may tend, 
/. (?., something good. The will is only another name for 
the rational appetite — that is, the power of tending to a good 
which the intellect proposes to it. The good intended is the 
end of the act. Hence, every act is done for an end. You 
may object that you have no special intention, e. g., in read- 
ing; that you read merely to kill time, to be busied with some- 
thing, etc.; nevertheless, you act for an end or purpose, the 
end in this case being to kill time or to find occupation. 

8. We do not say that the end intended is always a tn^e 
good, but only that it is always good after a manner ; that it is 

II 



12 Direction of Human Acts in General. 



at least an apparent good, and aimed at because apprehended 
as good. It may be conceived as good in itself, worth tend- 
ing to for its own sake, or as a means conducive to some other 
good. No man, however, intends e\dl for the sake of evil, 
but only because he sees something good and desirable in 
what he wills or in its result. A man may do evil to another 
for the sake of revenge, and thus do what is morally bad ; he 
may do evil to himself — he may even kill himself ; yet he can- 
not do so except for a purpose which he apprehends as good 
in some respect — for example, to be freed from trouble. No 
will can possibly act without aiming at something that has 
been apprehended as in some way desirable. 

9. We must distinguish the nearest or proximate end, the 
farther or remote end, and the last or ultimate end, beyond 
which the agent does not look and in which his desire rests. 
Thus a student may exert himself in order to win a prize, 
because, by gaining the prize, he will please his parents, and 
by striving to please his parents he will please God. In this 
act of the student the prize is the nearest end, his parents 
a farther end, and God the last end. 

Perhaps he does not think of God, but aims at pleasing his 
parents so as to receive a promised sum of money, wdth which 
finally he intends to buy some sweetmeats for the gratification 
of his palate. In this act he makes the enjoyment he derives 
from the gratification of his palate the last end. 

10. In the example just given, the sweetmeats constitute 
the objective end; the enjoyment of them is the student's sub- 
jective end. The objective or material end is the object 
aimed at ; the subjective or formal end is the attainment of 
that object. 

11. We must also distinguish the eiid of the work from the 
end of the workman. A watchmaker, e, constructs watches 



The End to which Human Acts etc, 13 



in order to earn a living. The end of the work, the watch, is 
to mark the time; the end of the workman is to earn a living. 

12. An end is said to be (a) actually intended, if at the 
time of the act it is thought of and aimed at ; (b) virtually 
intended, if the act is influenced by a former intention to at- 
tain an end, though that end is not thought of at the time of 
the act; (c) hahitually intended, if a former intention has 
not been retracted, yet does not for the time being affect the 
act ; (d) interpretatively intended, if the act was not really 
intended, but would have been so intended, if the case in 
hand had been foreseen. Let us take an example. A boy is 
sent by his father to assist a distressed family.' He sets out 
with the actual intention of fulfilling this commission. While 
walking along, he is occupied with other thoughts and is un- 
mindful of his message, yet he directs his steps aright in vir- 
tue of his former intention — that is, with a virtual intention. 
He may delay for hours at a friend's house, totally uninflu- 
enced by the purpose for which he started out ; nevertheless, 
as that purpose has not been given up, it remains as a habit ; 
it is habitual. At last he reaches the distressed family, and 
finds them in such want that he feels confident that his father, 
if he knew the circumstances, would wish him to give a larger 
alms than the sum appointed. Accordingly he gives this 
larger alms, acting on his father's intention as he interprets it. 
This is the father's i7iterpretative intention — /. e., what he 
would have actually intended if he had known the facts. 

Article II. The Last End. 

13. The last end, as stated above (No. 9), is that object 
in which the agent's desire rests. If in his act the agent ex- 
cludes all reference to any further end, the end is positively 



14 Directio7i of Htman Acts hi General. 



last; if such exclusion is not made, the end is negatively 
last. By the absolutely last end we mean that object which, 
by its very nature, requires that all action be subordinated to 
it, and that in it all desires shall rest. 

14. The first principle of Moral Philosophy is this: 
Thesis I. God is the absolutely last end of all things. 
Proof. Such an end we have defined to be an object which, 

by its very nature, requires that all action be subordinated to it, 
and that in it all desires shall rest. Now God alone can be 
that object. For all things except God are contingent or un- 
necessary, (?., they have not in themselves the principle of 
their own existence (Ment. Phil. No. 104), but they exist only 
because and in so far as God gives them being (Ment. Phil. No. 
220), and preserves them by His will and power (No. 263). 
Hence God possesses entire and perfect dominion over all 
things, and in the creature there is nothing that is not de- 
pendent on God. He^has therefore the right to make all 
things tend to Himself and to rest in Him as in their last end. 
Moreover, He is bound to do so by His own perfections. 
For, since He is infinitely wise (Ment. Phil. No. 253), He must 
direct all things to an end worthy of Himself. Now, God 
alone is worthy of God. Consequently, God must require 
that all things tend ultimately towards Himself, and that in 
Himself all desires shall rest. Therefore God is the last end 
of all things. 

15. But how do all things tend ultimately to God? We 
affirm that they must tend towards Him with their whole 
being ; because God has made their whole being, the essence 
and the attributes of each, and all their powers. Now what- 
soever He makes. He must direct ultimately to Himself as 
being the only end worthy of His action. Therefore all 
things must tend towards God with their whole being. 



The End to which Huma^t Acts etc. 15 



16. The direction which God gives to things is not a mo- 
mentary extrinsic impulse, such, e. as a musket-ball gets 
from the exploding powder; nor simply a continued extrinsic 
management, such as the leading of a horse by the bridle ; 
but it is an impulse intrinsic to every creature, which is not 
distinct in reality from its very essence or nature and its pe- 
culiar tendencies. Hence, every action that the creature 
performs in accordance with its nature is towards that end 
for which it was created, namely, towards God Himself. 

17. Of course, we do not say that every being tends imme- 
diately towards God. This can be said of intelhgent beings 
only; yet all other beings tend mediately towards Him. 

There is a broad truth in the saying, " Order is Heaven's 
first law." God's direction, which cannot fail to be wise, is 
ever appropriate to the nature of the thing directed. Hence, 
everything is so constituted as to tend towards that which is 
suited to its nature and is for its good ; plants perform just 
those actions which are good for them, and this their own 
nature makes them do. By so acting they elaborate from the 
inert clod food for the animal kingdom. Animals perceive 
by their senses what is good for them, and are led by their 
appetites to appropriate that good. Man, finally, whom all 

material things subserve, tends by the faculties peculiar to 

himself, his intellect and will, to the knowledge and love of 

God, and is fitted and prompted by his rational nature to 
direct the material creation to the glory and service of his 
sovereign Lord. 

18. As the inert clod supports vegetable life, as the vege- 
table is for the animal, and as the brute animal, together with 
all inferior things, is for man ; so in man himself the lower 
powers are to subserve the higher powers, which are his intellect 
and will. Though each faculty has its own specific tendency to 



1 6 Direction of Human Acts in General. 



its own specific good, still man is not a bundle of independent 
faculties ; but he is a person, essentially one, fitted by nature to 
employ his faculties for the attainment of what is good for 
him in his specific nature as man. If, therefore, as it often 
happens, an inferior faculty craves what hinders rather than 
promotes the proper action of a higher faculty, reason then 
requires that such a craving be suppressed, in accordance 
with this principle of order : the lower faculties are to be con- 
trolled by the higher. The good craved in this case is not 
a real good for the person, but rather a real evil (Ment. Phil. 
No. 44). The intellect and will, when perfectly controlling 
the inferior faculties, are in a fit condition to follow up their 
own specific tendencies toward their proper objects, which are 
truth and all good worthy of man. 

19. Good worthy of man is called becoming, fit or proper. 
In its strict meaning it is moral good— that good, namely, 
which is conformable to reason regulating free acts; in a 
wider meaning, it includes natural or physical good — that is, 
whatever perfects the nature of man, as health, knowledge, 
etc. Good viewed as conducive to the attainment of another 
good is styled useful ; viewed as capable of giving satisfac- 

1^- tion or pleasure to an appetite it is named pleasurable. The 
useful and pleasurable, when they are embraced by the will 
according to the right order of things and in a manner worthy 
of man, share in the nobility of moral good. Thus the 
pleasure which a dutiful son finds in making his parents com- 
fortable and happy is morally good; and all the just and 
indifferent means used to promote this end are in the right 
order of human acts, and are therefore morally good. 

20. Since God is the last end of all things (No. 14), He is, 
therefore, the last end of our highest powers, the intellect and 
will. But there is this difference between the tendencies of 



The End to which Human Acts etc. 17 



our higher powers and the tendencies of other things : that, 
while the latter tend to God only mediately^ our intellect and 
will tend to Him immediately ^ and do not find rest until they 
repose in Him as in their last end. When a brute animal has 
eaten and drunk what its appetite craves, it rests in the satis- 
faction of its animal desires, and longs for nothing beyond 
this. But our understanding and will can find rest in nothing 
short of the knowledge and love of God. 

21. Thesis II. By our intellect and will we inust tend to 
God as our last end. 

Explanation. Of course, we do not say that it is wrong 
for man to love created things; but right order requires that 
we should make all these so many stepping-stones, as it were, 
to the higher plane of the knowledge and love of God. In 
this proposition, then, we maintain that the last end of man's 
intellect and will, that, namely, for which these faculties were 
given to him, is to know and to love God. We can prove 
this proposition in two ways : first, by considering the matter 
in the light of God's nature ; and, secondly, by considering 
it from the standpoint of man's nature. However, we shall 
confine ourselves at present to the first consideration, which 
demonstrates that God is the objective end of man's highest 
powers; the second aspect we shall present .further on in 
connection with man's subjective end (No. 32). 

Proof. God is the absolute ultimate end (Thesis I.), the 
Supreme Good to which man is bound to tend. This tend- 
ency must be through faculties or activities by which he can 
apprehend the Supreme Good. He cannot do so by any 
organic faculty, because God is a pure spirit, and, conse- 
quently, not the object of organic perception. It must, there- 
fore, be through his imjnaterial faculties, the spiritual activities 
of his soul, his intellect and will. Man's intellect, by its 



1 8 Direction of Human Acts in General. 



nature, is able to know God, and his will is able to love what 
the intellect knows and proposes as worthy of love. There- 
fore, by our intellect and will we must tend to God as our 
last end. 

2 2. Thesis III. God created all things for His own ex- 
trinsic glory. 

Explanation. Honor is the recognition of worth; when 
expressed in words, it is called praise. Glory is the praise of 
exalted merit, and in its full acceptance implies love as well 
as knowledge, together with the manifestation of the same by 
many persons as a tribute of homage that is due to the person 
glorified. The knowledge and love which God possesses with 
regard to Himself is His intrinsic glory ; the homage of 
praise and love that creation renders to God is His extrinsic 
glory. 

Proof I. We have seen that God is the absolute ultimate 
end of all things ; or, in other words, that all things must tend 
to Him as to their last end. Since this tendency is some- 
thing willed by God, it is something good. Yet no good can 
be added to God intrinsically, because He is Himself the 
Infinite Good: it can, therefore, be added to God only extrin- 
sically. God has no need of any extrinsic good ; yet, if He 
creates at all, He must necessarily require that creatures 
shall proclaim Him as their Creator, and thus render Him 
the glory which is His due. Hence, the end God had in 
creating all things was His own extrinsic glory. 

Proof 2. Man in particular, we know from thesis II., is 
bound to tend to the Supreme Good, his last end, by his in- 
tellect and will — that is, by knowing and loving God ; but in 
these very acts of man consists the extrinsic glory of God. 
Therefore, man in particular was created for the extrinsic 
glory of God. 



The End to which Human Acts etc, 19 



Objections. 

1. Irrational creatures cannot praise and love God. 
Answer. They cannot love God, it is true ; nor can 
they praise Him directly : nevertheless, they praise 
Him indirectly, by displaying God's power, good- 
ness, wisdom, beauty, etc., to the intelHgent crea- 
tion, thereby serving to inspire and increase the praise 
and love of God on the part of man. 

2. God cannot fail of His purpose, but He fails to 
receive the praise and love of the wicked. Therefore, 
He did not create them for that end. Answer. 
Though the wicked refuse God the homage of their 
love and voluntary praise in this life, they still serve 
to proclaim His praise. For in the next life they 
glorify His justice by their punishment, and even in 
the present life they make manifest His mercy and 
longanimity. 

3. It would be unworthy of God to promote His glory 
by the misery of His creatures. Answer. To create 
man for misery would be unworthy of God, yes ; we 
are maintaining that God, on the contrary, created 
all men for happiness, but on the condition that they 
shall render Him due service. When the wicked 
voluntarily turn away from their destined bhss by 
refusing to do their duty, they must necessarily incur 
a just punishment. The solution of this and similar 
difficulties will be better understood after we have 
treated of the sanction of the natural law (No. 107 
et seq.). 

24. As we remarked above (No. 10), the object aimed at 
or intended is the objective or material end, and the attainment 
or enjoyment of the object is the subjective or formal end. So 



20 Direction of Hitman Acts in General. 



far we have proved that God is the objective end of all things 
and particularly so of His rational creatures ; we have ex- 
plained, also, the manner in which all things tend to God by 
fulfilling the purpose which He had in view when creating 
them. We shall next consider the subjective end of man, 
i. e., his attainment of his objective end. 

Article III. The Attainment of Our Last End. 

25. A man can labor for very different objects — now for 
honor, now for wealth, again for the pleasure of eating or 
drinking, or for the performance of duty, etc. Yet there is 
one thing common to all his objects, or ends, or purposes — 
namely, a desire of well-being, of happiness. All men desire 
happiness, but they often differ widely concerning the object 
in which they expect to find their happiness. 

" Oh, happiness, our being's end and aim ! 
Good, pleasure, ease, content, — whate'er thy name." 

26. Not only do all men desire happiness, but they also 
desire perfect happiness or beatitude. Beatitude may be 
defined as that state in which man is made perfect by the 
possession of all good things. It implies endless duration 
and the full satisfaction of all desires. Is such a state attain- 
able by every man ? 

27. Thesis IV. Every man can attain perfect happiness. 
Proof. If a certain good is found in all men, it must be 

part of man's nature, and hence it proceeds from the Author 
of nature. Now, there exists in us all, as v/e know by our 
consciousness, a desire of perfect happiness; and this desire 
is good, for by it we are impelled to perfect ourselves. There- 
fore, this desire proceeds from the Author of nature. But 



The End to which Hmnan Acts etc. 21 



vjod could not have implanted such a desire in our nature 
unless he gave us the means to satisfy it; because to allure us 
by a desire and a hope which He had destined to disappoint- 
ment would be opposed to God's infinite goodness and truth- 
fulness. Consequently, God has given us the means whereby 
every one of us can attain perfect happiness. 

28. But here a difficulty presents itself. We often experi- 
ence contradictory desires; a man, e. g., may love peace, yet 
when provoked by an insult he feels inclined to break the 
peace. It is evident that perfect happiness cannot exist 
where desires are in conflict. How, then, can the conflict be 
made to cease ? Clearly, not until the lower cravings of our 
complex nature cease to war against reason. But as this 
never comes to pass fully in this life, the logical inference is 
that beatitude is not attainable in this life. Yet we have 
proved it to be attainable ; it follows, therefore, that we can 
gain perfect happiness in a future life. 

29. At this point another question arises : Is man to be 
made supremely happy by being deprived of half his nature ? 
Shall the soul be beatified alone, and the body moulder into 
dust ? You may reply, there will be a resurrection by 
which all things will be made right. In that event, full 
gratification will be given to man's desires, among which 
there will never more be strife; for the faculties of his lower 
nature will be in perfect subjection to the spirit. This is the 
answer of Father Costa-Rossetti, S.J. and others, who main- 
tain that in a purely natural order of things the soul cannot 
attain beatitude without the body. In the state of separation, 
they say, the soul would feel a longing to be reunited to the 
body, which nature intended for it, and with which it formed 
one person. Nothing prevents us, they continue, from sup- 
posing that a future resurrection belongs to the order of 



2 2 Direction of Human Acts in General. 



nature, in this sense : that, as God gave us a natural desire for 
perfect happiness. He thereby pledged Himself to procure the 
realization of that desire for those who obey the laws of 
nature. 

30. Most philosophers, however, consider the resurrection 
as entirely supernatural, and in no sense due to our nature, 
and they maintain that the soul can be perfectly happy with- 
out the body. To prove this point, they reason thus : The 
lower powers of man exist to subserve his higher powers in 
this life. When the soul possesses in the next life the full 
knowledge and love of God, it no longer needs the body or 
the lower faculties, and consequently it will have no desire for 
reunion with its inferior companion. 

The authorities and arguments for both opinions are suffi- 
ciently weighty to warrant the student freedom to accept 
either. Whichever opinion be adopted, every objection 
against the attainment of beatitude can be satisfactorily 
answered. 

31. Thesis V. No created object can make man perfectly 
happy. 

Proof. Man is distinctively man chiefly by his intellect 
and will; hence no object can make him perfectly happy, 
unless it fully satisfies his intellect and will. This, however, 
no created object can do. Such objects are riches, honors, 
pleasures, human science and virtue. But as none of these, 
nor all of them together, can satisfy man's intellect and will, 
it is clear that no created object can make man perfectly 
happy. 

I. Not riches^ which are only a means of providing 
other good things. At their best they cannot last 
beyond the present life, and they do not perfect the 
intellect and will. 



The End to which Human Acts etc. 23 



2. Not ho7ior. For honor, whether viewed as the esteem 
which others have of us or as the outward manifesta- 
tion of this esteem, cannot perfect our intellect and 
will. It generally has uncertain existence when it is 
obtained, and it cannot be obtained by all. Besides, 
honors are often bestowed upon the undeserving and 
denied to those who are most worthy of them. 

3. Not sefisual pleasures, which certainly cannot perfect 
our higher faculties. On the contrary, the pursuit of 
sensuahty degrades man to the level of the brute ; and 
surely it is absurd to say that man's perfect happiness 
consists in self-degradation. 

4. Not the human sciences. Since human nature is essen- 
tially the same in all men, the perfect happiness of the 
human species must be the same in kind for every 
individual, and hence within the reach of all. But 
science is not within the reach of all, because many 
persons have not sufficient ability to acquire it. Being, 
moreover, something finite, science can neither satisfy 
the intellect, which is always reaching out for unhm- 
ited knowledge, nor the heart, which is capable of 
loving and, therefore, desiring the Infinite. 

5. Not virtue, which consists in a habitual tendency to 
perfection. Virtue is consequently not the ultimate 
object of desire, but only a means to attain that 
object (No. 72 et seq.). 

6. Not all these united. For they are all confined to 
the present life, and they cannot satisfy the desires 
of a being that longs for everlasting happiness. 
32. Thesis VI. God is the only object that can make man 
perfectly happy. 

Proof I. Every man can attain perfect happiness (Thesis 



24 Directio7t of Human Acts iJt General. 



IV.); therefore an object must be attainable that can make 
every man perfectly happy. But no created object can do 
this (Thesis N .). Therefore the Creator is the only object 
that can make man perfectly happy. 

Proof 2. Man's perfect happiness supposes perfect satis- 
faction for his highest powers — /. e.^ his intellect and will; but 
no object can give such satisfaction to these two powers ex- 
cept perfect truth and perfect goodness. For his intellect 
ever seeks to know the causes of things and the causes of 
these causes ; nor can it ever rest content until it understands 
the First Cause. As the First Cause contains all good, the 
human will cannot help loving and desiring it when it is once 
known. Therefore the perfect or infinite truth and goodness, 
which is God, is the only object that can make man per- 
fectly happy ; in other words, the possession of God is our 
subjective last end. 

33. Man's ultimate beatitude, as Philosophy treats it, view- 
ing the subject by the light of reason alone, does not include 
the intuitive knowledge of God, the beatific vision, which we 
know from revelation to be really in store for us. The beatific 
vision is not due naturally to man or to any other creature; 
it is a supernatural gift. A soul in a state of natural beati- 
tude would know God in a manner proportionate to its 
nature ; it would understand the perfections of the Creator 
by reasoning from the knowledge it possesses of itself and 
other creatures. This knowledge of God, though abstract 
and not intuitive, would not be a cold speculation ; on the 
contrary, in such a knowledge of a Being all good, all beau- 
tiful, all amiable, the soul w^ould enjoy all perfection. Thus 
the primary element in natural beatitude would be the perfect 
knowledge of a perfect object. Yet, consequent on that 
knowledge and inseparable from it, as an attribute or even an 



The End to wfiich Human Acts etc, 25 



essential part of perfect happiness, would be the love and 
enjoyment of that object on the part of the will. 

34. No one pretends that perfect happiness, as here de- 
scribed, can be attained in this hfe. The nearest approach 
to it possible on earth lies in the right ordering of our facul- 
ties towards the attainment of our last end. Indeed, from 
the nature of things and from the laws of harmony which an 
all-wise Creator has established in the universe, the happiness 
of a being is proportionate to that being's perfection. Hence 
the more perfect we become, the happier we shall be. 

35. Moreover, we may distinguish three kinds of perfec- 
tion ; (a) Physical perfection, which supposes the possession 
of all the faculties required for the "acts of the man;" (b) 
Moral perfection, which regards our human acts as properly 
directed to our last end; (c) Final perfection, which consists 
in our attainment of that end. Possessing then the physical 
perfection of human nature, we must, to attain higher moral 
perfection, so order our faculties by the practice of virtue, 
that : 

1. Our lower powers shall aid and never impede the 
proper action of the intellect and will. This implies 
that we must restrain and control our passions, and 
suppress all inordinate desires for bodily pleasures, 
riches, honors, and power. By so doing we shall live 
free from contention, impatience, restless ambition; 
from intemperance and lust, with their attendant deg- 
radation of body and soul. 

2. Our higher powers^ the intellect and will, shall tend 
to ennobhng objects which bring us nearer to God. We 
ought to study His perfections. We should endeavor 
to appreciate His constant care for us, and to under- 
stand His supreme right to manage the whole course 



26 Direction of Human Acts in General. 



of our lives. In this way we shall acquire an humble 
resignation to God's sovereign will, and a loving trust 
in His fatherly providence — dispositions which secure 
us in peace against the passing ills of life. Thus, un- 
like the Stoics of old, who vainly strove to imagine 
that there were no ills for the just on earth, we must 
accept, as men of sound common sense, the sufferings 
of this time in confidence and love, as purifications 
through which we are to pass to the full possession of 
eternal happiness in God. 
3. Of the goods of earthy which are needed for our 
bodily life, we shall exert ourselves to obtain a suffi- 
ciency. Accordingly, a man should from his youth 
qualify himself for some respectable pursuit, in order 
either to procure a decent support for himself and those 
depending on him, or, if he already has the gifts of 
fortune, to enable him to pass successfully through 
possible reverses. With such an equipment, though 
his station in fife may seem ever so lowly, a man can 
enjoy deeper peace of soul and greater happiness than 
those who abound in riches and honors and the 
world's false delights. 



CHAPTER IL 



THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTS. 

36. Having discussed in the preceding chapter the end of 
human acts, we shall next proceed to study their nature. 
With this purpose we shall examine : i. The essential differ- 
ence between morally good a?td morally bad acts, or the essence 
of morality ; 2. The determinants of morality in any given 
action; 3. Accountability for moral acts ; 4. Circumstances 
that lessen accountability; 5. The passions as influencing aC" 
countability ; 6. Habits as facilitating moral acts. 

Article I. The Essence of MoRALm. 

37. Human acts are those of which a man is master, which 
he has the power of doing or not doing as he pleases. 
(No. 2. See also Ment. Phil., Nos. 194-199.) True, we are 
physically free to perform certain acts or to omit them — to do 
one thing or its contrary, to choose this act rather than some 
other ; but are we also morally free in regard to all such acts ? 
Is it right for me on all occasions to do whatever my inclina- 
tion prompts me to do ? My reason plainly answers, No : it 
is evident even to a child that some actions are good in them- 
selves, morally good, and others bad in themselves, morally 
bad. The good acts our reason commends and approves ; 
these we call right. Evil acts, on the contrary, our reason 
disapproves and blames ; these we call wrong. The ideas of 

27 



28 Direction of Httman Acts in General. 



right and wrong, like those of truth and falsity, substance and 
accident, cause and effect are " primary ideas " which are com- 
mon to all men ; hence, they are trustworthy ideas — that is, 
the distinction existing in the mind between right and wrong 
corresponds to a distinction existing objectively in human acts. 
(See Logic, Nos. 119, 120.) 

38. But though all men distinguish between right and wrong, 
it does not follow that all theorizers acknowledge the distinc- 
tion. It often stands in the way of their false speculations. 
Such writers, for instance as Huxley, Spencer and the Agnos- 
tics and Positivists generally, admit no true liberty in man, 
and therefore they cannot consistently treat of human acts as 
such : there are no human acts with them, for there are no 
acts which a man has the power to do or not to do. The 
same holds true for all Materialists, who teach that nothing 
exists but matter — acting, of course, by necessary laws. Pan- 
theists likewise, admitting no real distinction between man and 
God, cannot speak of human acts as such, and cannot there- 
fore correctly explain the difference between moral right and 
moral wrong. Nevertheless, all these false theorizers employ 
the terms " right " and " wrong " — the distinction being too 
widely accepted to be ignored. They are forced, however, by 
the exigencies of their theories to misinterpret the meaning of 
these words. Without stopping to refute their false and de- 
moralizing interpretations singly, we shall briefly explain the 
obvious, certain and common-sense distinctions between moral 
right and moral wrong. 

39. The reason why our intellect approves certain acts, 
calls them morally good and pronounces them worthy of praise, 
precisely as free acts, is because it perceives that they are 
rightly directed to their true end, suitable to and worthy of a 
rational agent, conformable to the exigencies of things, and 



The Morality of Human Acts. 



29 



therefore that they ought to be done by man : man ought to 
do what is conformable to his rational nature and conducive 
to his perfection. 

Our intellect disapproves of other acts, calls them morally 
bad or evil and pronounces them to be, inasmuch as they are 
free acts, deserving of blame, because it perceives they are di- 
rected away from their true end, are unbecoming and unsuit- 
able to a rational agent, at variance with the exigencies of 
things, and therefore not to be done by man : man ought 7iot 
to do that which is unworthy of a rational being, and which, 
instead of perfecting, debases him. 

40. The radical notion conveyed by the term " good " is 
" suitableness to an appetite or desire." Using the word, then, 
in its radical meaning, we say something is good for a being 
which that being desires — e., which is the object of its ap- 
petites. And the good is the object of the being's appetites 
because it tends in some manner to the perfection of the be- 
ing; for the wise Creator has made all things such that they 
tend to what promotes their perfection. Hence we call 
that a physical good which contributes to perfect a being 
physically — as, for example, food for the animal nature. We 
call whatever benefits the intellect, e. g., truth and science, an 
intellectual good. So, too, that which perfects a free being, as 
such, we call a moi-al good. 

41. A free being perfects itself by drawing near to its ulti- 
mate end, its supreme good, which is God. Consequently, 
those acts are morally good for man which bring him 
nearer to God, the ultimate end of his existence ; and those 
are morally bad which lead him away from God. 

42. Since there are some human acts, like blasphemy, that 
are of themselves bad at all times, and others, like reverence 
for God, that are of themselves always good, the quahty of 



30 Direction of Hitman A cts in General. 



goodness or badness must be something intrinsic to the acts 
and must depend upon their accord with or disagreement from 
the permanent natural order of things. It is clear that this 
order, with respect to human acts, corresponds to the rela- 
tions which man, as a creature, possesses necessarily towards 
God; as a social entity, towards his fellow-men; and towards 
himself as a being endowed with various faculties, sensitive and 
spiritual. These relations in turn are founded on the essences 
of things ; hence, the difference between the two classes of acts 
is an essential difference. Now the essences of things are 
modelled by the Creator upon perfections known to the 
Divine Intellect as existing in the Divine Essence ; therefore 
the morality or immorahty of a human act is determined 
ultimately by the intellect and not by the free will of God. 
As God can not contradict Himself, He can not make an in- 
trinsically moral act immoral, nor remove the immorality of 
an act intrinsically immoral. 

43. Some human acts are so disorderly as to turn a man 
entirely away from the pursuit of his true last end ; for, in 
place of God as the ultimate object of desire, these acts sub- 
stitute explicitly or implicitly something altogether incompati- 
ble with the love of God. There are other human acts, 
which, though impeding the soul's tendency towards its true 
ultimate end, do not become an obstacle to the attainment 
of that end. In this difference lies the distinction between 
mortal and venial sin. 

44. Once the true meaning of morality is grasped, it is 
easy to detect the errors of certain false theories which have 
been fabricated to explain the power residing in all men of 
distinguishing between good and evil. 

I. Some philosophers attribute this power to i?istincf. 
But instinct, in the accurate meaning of the word, is 



The Morality of Human Acts. 



31 



a blind impulse of nature, which prompts the animal 
to conduct itself in a determined manner, and thus 
to perform complex acts, without understanding their 
further purpose, for the good of the individual and 
of the species. Moral good and moral evil, on the 
contrary, are apprehended intellectually — that is, by a. 
cognitive faculty which can reflect and draw infer- 
ences ; hence, in distinguishing between good and evil, 
w]p do not act blindly, but intelligently. 



2. y Some speak of a moral se?ise. If by a moral sense 
- an organic faculty or the action of an organic faculty 

is meant, the use of the term is erroneous and mislead- 
ing; because material organism, which is required fgr 
every organic action, cannot possibly grasp the ab- 
stract immaterial relations contained in the idea of 
moral good or evil. If, however, the term is em- 
ployed to denote a certain perfection of the intellec- 
tual powers, a quickness and keenness of mind in 
detecting and judging the morality or immorality of 
"human acts, it is used correctly. 

3. Others maintain with Herbert Spencer* that this 
power of distinguishing between good and evil rests 
upon the power of distinguishing between what is 
useful and what is /mrtful to men generally in the 
present life. Whatever tends to the temporal good of 
mankind generally is morally good, they say, and 
whatever generally does injury is morally evil. Now, 

'.*•! believe that the experiences of utility organized and consolidated through 
all past generations of the human race have been producing corresponding 
modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have be- 
come in us certain faculties of moral intuition, certain emotions correspond- 
ing to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual 
experiences of utility. {Spencer's Letter to Mill.) 




32 Direction of Human Acts in General. 



it is true that moral good is ultimately useful to 
mankind even on earth, and moral evil is ultimately 
injurious. But moral good is not good because it is 
useful ; on the contrary, it is useful because it is good, 
i. e., because it tends to make man more perfect, and 
hence better fitted to attain his last end. Moreover, 
it is a part of the universal harmony which God has 
established in His creation, that the moral good of the 
individual be either immediately or ultimately bene- 
ficial to the many. In this sense, honesty is truly the 
best policy. 

4. In the theories of Hobbes, Paley, Mandeville, and 
the older English Utilitarians, regard to personal 
advantage on earth is the only motive of human 
action : that is morally good which brings me pleas- 
ure ; the " moral good " is the " useful to me person- 
ally." 

5. Finally, some in theory and very many in practice 
hold that the norma or rule of right and wrong lies in 
the opinion of men. That is right, they declare, which 
the majority of men approve. " Vox popnli, vox Dei " — 
" The voice of the people is the voice of God." But 
on many topics the opinions of men are changeful 
and often false. When, moreover, all men agree in 
calling a certain act good or evil, they do so because 
they see that in itself it is good or evil ; but it is not 
good or evil because they call it so. 

45. It may be asked whether every human act is either 
good or evil. We must make a distinction. 

I. An act considered in the abstract, /. e., apart from 
all circumstances, may be specifically neither good nor 
evil. For instance, walking, riding, reading, etc., are 



The Morality of Human Acts. 



33 



acts that in themselves do not imply a tendency to 
our last end or a departure from it. All such are 
called indifferent acts: specifically, they are neither 
good nor bad. 
2. But every moral act considered individually, i. e., as 
done in such and such circumstances of time, place 
and persons, is necessarily either good or bad. For, 
since we distinguish a good from a bad act by its con- 
formity with fixed principles known to reason, it fol- 
lows that when reason approves, the act is right; 
when it disapproves, the act is wrong. Now, in every 
individual human act, reason approves the act as a 
fit object for a deliberate choice, or disapproves it 
as an unfit object for such choice; therefore, every 
individual or concrete human act is either right or 
wrong. 

The truth of this principle is made clearer in the 
next article. 

Article II. The Determinants of Morality. 

46. To know whether an individual human act is morally 
good, we must consider it with reference to these three things 
which, because they determine the moral character of acts, 
are called the determinants of morality: ist. The object of 
the act; 2d. The end, or purpose; 3d. Its circumstances. 
That the act may be morally good, all three deterrninants 
must be without a flaw, according to the received axiom : 
*' Boniim ex integra causa, malum ex quociimque defectu," — " A 
thing to be good must be wholly so ; it is vitiated by any 
defect." 

47. I. The object of an act is the thing done. In reality, 



34 Direction of Human Acts in General. 



it is not distinct from the act itself; for we cannot act with- 
out doing something, and the something done is the object 
of the act ; say, of going, eating, praising, etc. The act or 
object may be viewed as containing a further specification — 
e. g., going to church, praising God, eating meat. Now, 
an act thus specified may, when considered in itself, be good, 
bad, or indifferent ; thus, to praise God is good in itself, to 
blaspheme is bad in itself, and to eat meat is in itself an in- 
different act. But that an individual act may be good, its 
object, whether considered in itself or as further specified, 
must be free from all defect; // must be good, or at least 
indifferent. 

48. II. The end, or purpose, intended by the agent is the 
second determinant of an act's morality. The end here 
spoken of is not the end of the work, for that pertains to the 
object, but the end of the workman or agent (No. 11). No 
matter how good the object of an act may be, if the end 
intended is bad, the act is thereby vitiated. Thus, to praise 
God is good in itself, but, if in so acting the intention be to 
play the hypocrite, the act is morally bad. And this holds 
true whether the vicious end be the nearest, remote or last 
end (No. 9) ; whether it be actually or only virtually intended 
(No. 12). On the other hand, a good end, though ever so 
elevated, cannot justify a bad act ; in other words, we are 
never allowed to do evil that good may result therefrom.* 

49. The circumstances of time, place and persons have their 
part in determining the moraUty of an individual act. The 
moral character of an act may be so affected by attendant 
circumstances, that an act good in itself may be evil when 

* The doctrine that the end justifies the means has been falsely attributed to 
the Catholic Church, and particularly to the Jesuits. No institutions in the 
world have more strenuously opposed the pernicious tenet either in their 
theory or their practice. 



The Morality of Human Acts. 



35 



accompanied with certain circumstances ; for instance, it is 
good to give drink to the thirsty, but if the thirsty man is 
morally weak, and the drink is intoxicating, the act may be 
evil. 

50. Under the head of circumstances certain effects of an 
act may be included ; not such effects as are directly willed 
or intended, for these go with the second class of determinants 
(No. 48). But there may be other effects which the agent 
foresees or can foresee so related to the act, that, though he 
does not intend them, yet he consents to their taking place, 
inasmuch as he wills the act which, to his knowledge, is the 
cause or at least the occasion of these effects. Thus, in 
ordering a city to be bombarded, a general brings about, 
however reluctantly, the death of many non-combatants. 
Such an effect, he is said to permit, or to will indirectly. 

51. If besides the good effects directly intended in an act 
evil effects are foreseen as likely to result, the act is not Hcit 
unless it fulfills the following conditions : i. That the evil 
effect be not directly intended; 2. That the good effect 
intended be not produced by means of the evil effect, for we 
are never allowed to do evil that good may come therefrom. 
The general in the foregoing example does not kill the non- 
combatants in order that by their death he may destroy the 
combatants ; 3. That the good directly intended exceed the 
evil effects. No one could licitly bombard a city for the sake 
of a sHght advantage; 4. That the doer of the act be not 
under the obHgation of averting the evil consequences in 
question. 

52. The external action commanded by the will derives its 
good or evil character from the internal, elicited act of the 
will; hence, outward action does not of itself increase the 
right or wrong of the act. Indirectly, however, it may 



36 Direction of ITiunan Acts hi General. 



readily do so ; because outward action is apt to protract or 
intensify the inward disposition of the v/ill, and thus increase 
the moral good or evil of the act. 

Article III. Accountability for Moral Acts. 

53. When I perform a free act — one which I am able to do 
or not to do, as I choose — the act is evidently imputable to 
me : if the thing is blameworthy, the blame belongs to me; if 
it is praiseworthy, I am entitled to the praise. Every human 
act, therefore, since it is a free act (No. 2), is imputable to 
him who performs it. 

54. But am I accountable for my free gx:ts — and to whom ? 
Is there any one who has the right and the power to hold me 
answerable for my moral conduct ? So far, we have not 
touched upon this question. We have simply shown that 
some acts are morally good and some are morally bad ; that 
some ought to be done, and others ought not to be done 
(No. 39) ; and we have examined into the distinction between 
these two classes of acts, or the nature of morality. Proceed- 
ing further, we are now to show that a Higher Will binds us 
to observe the moral law (which consists in doing what is 
right and avoiding what is wrong), and holds us accountable 
for our moral conduct — i. e., for our observance of the moral 
law. The Higher Will, which imposes the moral law upon 
us, is none other than the Supreme Will of God. 

55. God's right to bind us is clear from the fact that He 
is our Creator and we are His creatures. (Ment. Phil., No. 
211 et seq.) Now that w^hich is made out of nothing, or 
created, belongs entirely to its Creator ; therefore we. His 
creatures, belong entirely to God, and consequently He 
has a perfect right to the homage and service of our whole 



The Morality of Human Acts. 37 



being. In the following thesis we shall demonstrate the 
great truth that God requires of us the observance of the 
moral law. It would be absurd to say that such observance 
degrades man. One might say, just as reasonably, that sub- 
jection to the laws of civilization is degrading to a savage. 
Nor is this comparison farfetched, since the moral law is the 
central figure of civilized society. 

56. Thesis VII. God^s will imposes the law of morality 
upon us, and holds us accountable for our observance of it. 

Froof I . The Infinitely wise Creator cannot fail to employ 
the proper means to direct all things to their appointed ends ; 
hence, He directs by necessary tendencies beings that are 
not endowed with^ree will. Over these tendencies such 
beings have no control : thus He directs matter by physical 
laws ; brute animals by instincts. Free beings He must also 
direct in the manner proper to their nature, i. e., requir- 
ing them to attain their appointed end by the free choice 
of the means pecuharly adapted to this object. Now, to 
require this of us, is to impose the law of morality upon 
us, since we tend towards our appointed end by doing what 
is right, and we fail to tend towards our end by doing 
what is wrong. Moreover, if the imposition of this law is to 
be effectual, as in His Infinite wisdom He is bound to make 
it, God must hold us accountable for our moral conduct. 
(See Ment. Phil., Nos. 222, 225.) 

Proof 2. It is shown in Critical Logic (Nos. 156-164), that 
the judgments made by the common sense of mankind are 
true. Now, one of these judgments is that We are responsible 
for our moral acts to a Supreme Ruler, for this is found in 
the minds of all men who have the full use of reason; nor 
can a man rid himself of this conviction, though he may 
eagerly desire to do so. Therefore, all men are accountable 



38 Direction of Human Acts in General, 



for their moral conduct, /. e., for their observance of the 
moral law, to God, who is the Supreme Ruler, as He is the 
Creator of all things. 

57. To say that God holds us accountable for our free acts, 
implies that He will punish us if we do moral evil. We 
shall show presently that we become entitled to reward by 
doing what is morally good. A title to reward, on account 
of good actions, is called merit. The foundation of merit is 
this principle of reason, that if a person freely benefits another, 
the latter ought, i?i equity, or by way of conipeiisation, to make 
a proportionate retur?i. 

58. Merit is of two kinds. Condign merit is a strict title 
to a reward, on account either of a promise freely given or of a 
benefit received ; it, moreover, imposes an obhgation upon one 
person to make an adequate return to another. Congruous 
merit is not a strict title to a recompense, but only a matter of 
propriety or suitableness in the bestowal of a reward; hence 
there is no just claim on the one side and, consequently, no 
real obligation on the other. 

59. Condign merit demands the fulfillment of two condi- 
tions: I. The benefit conferred must be in no way due to 
the recipient ; we can claim no reward from another for pay- 
ing him a debt. 2. The person benefited must accept explic- 
itly or implicitly the service rendered, or, at least, he ought 
to accept it. If this condition were not required, I should be 
obliged to pay every tradesman that might choose to send 
me his wares. 

60. Thesis VIII. We can tnerit a reward fvm 7?ien, and 
from God also, though not in the same sense. 

Part I. Merit with regard to our fellow-??ien. Proof We 
often have the power either to confer or not to confer a bene- 
fit upon our fellow-men, according as we choose. Now, if we 



The Morality of Human Acts. 39 



freely do good to others, reason dictates that they ought to do 
good to us in return; and thus we have a title, founded on 
reason, to receive a reward from our fellow-men. This title is 
called merit. Hence we can merit a reward from men. 

Part II. Merit with regard to God. Proof. We are often 
physically free either to do a certain act, whereby we honor 
God and thus contribute to His external glory, or not to do 
the act. If we perform the act in question, we give to Him 
what is, in some manner, a benefit, and we have what is, in 
some manner, a claim to receive a benefit in return. 

Part III. The latter is not merit in the same sense as our 
merit with men. Proof. The good we do our fellow-men, in 
so far as it is not due to them, obhges them strictly to a pro- 
portionate return; but we cannot strictly give anything to 
God which is not entirely due to Him, since, as creatures, we 
belong in every way to God our Creator. Consequently, if 
He owes us a reward at ah, it is not for the benefits He 
receives at our hands ; but only because He owes it to Him- 
self to fulfill His promises of a reward. For, by implanting in 
every heart an insatiable longing after perfect happiness, He 
has implicitly promised us a reward — on condition, of course, 
that we do our part. Therefore, we can merit a reward from 
God and men : from men, by reason of that which they owe 
us; from God, by reason of that which He owes Himself. 

Article IV. Hindrances to Accountability. 

61. Since our accountability for an act is based on our 
power to control the act, whatever hinders or lessens this 
power must, to the same extent, hinder or lessen our account- 
abiUty. There are mainly four such hindrances: ignorance^ 
concupiscence^ fear and violence^ 



40 Direction of Human A cts in General. 



62. I. Ignorance is the absence of knowledge. In Ethics 
it regards two classes of objects — viz., laws and facts. If a 
man does not know that marriage between third cousins is 
forbidden, he is ignorant of the law. If he is not aware that 
his betrothed is his third cousin, he is ignorant of the fact. 
Ignorance, whether of the law or of the facts, is either vin- 
cible or invincible. When it cannot be overcome by the due 
amount of diligence, it is invincible ; otherwise, it is vincible. 
The latter is said to be gross or supine when scarcely an effort 
has been made to remove it ; and if a person deliberately 
avoids enlightenment in order to sin more freely, his igno- 
rance is affected. 

63. Thesis IX. We are free from responsibility for acts 
performed through invincible igjiorance, but ?iot for acts done 
in ignorance that is vincible. 

I Part I. In cases of invincible ignorance, we a7'e 7iot respon- 
\ sible. Proof. We are responsible for our acts only inas- 
much as they are human acts. Now an act, inasmuch as it 
is done through invincible ignorance, is not a human act; 
for, in that respect, an essential element of a human act is 
wanting, namely, knowledge. Therefore we are not respon- 
sible for acts performed through invincible ignorance. 

Part II. Vincible ignorance does not free us from responsi- 
\ bility. Proof. This ignorance could have been removed if we 
had so willed ; hence, it is voluntary As any deordination in 
the act performed is caused by our voluntary ignorance, it 
becomes voluntary in its cause. But what is voluntary in its 
cause affects the morality of the act, as was explained above 
(Nos. 50, 51), and we are responsible for the morality of our 
acts. Therefore, vincible ignorance does not free us from 
responsibility. 

64. Objections, i. Invincible ignorance is rejected when 



The Morality of Human Acts, 



41 



offered as an excuse before civil tribunals. Answer. 
Human judges, unlike the Divine Judge, cannot see 
our thoughts. They are thus forced to consider pre- 
sumptions of guilt, and it is presumed that a law duly 
promulgated is known to all. 
2. In cases of invincible ignorance, our acts are free. 
Therefore we are accountable for them. Answer. 
Though free in other respects, they are not free vio- 
lations of the law. For if I cannot know the law, I 
cannot will to violate it. 

65. II. Concupiscence is a strong impulse of the sensible 
appetite inclining the will to seek sensible good and to fly 
from sensible evil. When it arises unbidden by the will, it is 
termed antecedent; but when it arises at the command, or con- 
tinues with the consent, of the will, it is called consequent. As 
soon as sensible good or evil is perceived, the appetite gener- 
ally acts instinctively. This first impulse is not free, and conse- 
quently not imputable to us. In as far as concupiscence impels 
the will, it restrains our liberty, and thus lessens our accounta- 
biHty. Yet, unless the impulse be so violent as to deprive us 
for the time being of the use. of reason, it does not dispossess 
our will of the power to refuse consent ; hence, when the will 
yields, though its consent may be reluctant, it does so freely 
and we are responsible. Consequent concupiscence is a will- 
ful intensification of consent, which therefore increases our 
responsibihty. 

66. III. Fear arises from the apprehension of threatening 
evil, and prompts us to seek safety in flight. Our will is thus 
dragged along, as it were, and so its freedom is restricted and 
our responsibility is diminished to the same extent. Great 
fear sometimes exempts a person from acts enjoined by posi- 
tive law. 



42 Direction of Human Acts in General. 



67. IV. Violence is an impulse from without tending to 
force the agent to act against his choice. It cannot affect 
the will directly — /. e., the eHcited acts of the will — for we can- 
not will that which at the same time we do not will. But 
violence can sometimes affect our external acts. In so far as 
the violence is irresistible, we are not responsible for the ex- 
ternal act. If, however, the will yields a reluctant yet real 
consent, we are blamable, though in a lower degree than if 
there had been no reluctance. 

Article V. The Passions. 

68. We have just explained how the passions of concupis- 
cence and fear may affect our responsibility. It will be use- 
ful at this stage to consider the passions in general, the vari- 
ous kinds, the nature of each, the purpose for which they 
exist, and the use we should make of them. 

Passions are movements of the irrational part of the soul 
attended by a notable alteration of the body, on the appre- 
hension of good or evil. In the strict meaning of the word, 
passions are orgafiic affections aroused by sensible good or 
evil. As such, they are common to man and brute, but im- 
possible in an angel. Nevertheless, the names of various pas- 
sions are often used analogically to denote affections of the 
will, that are entirely, or at least chiefly, due to intellectual 
cognition, as when we are said to love science, to hate igno- 
rance, to desire honor, to enjoy a joke, etc. To this latter 
class belong the moral e??wHons, such as admiration of virtue, 
detestation of vice, etc. Owing, indeed, to the substantial 
union of our soul and body, the one cannot be strongly 
affected without, as a general rule, reacting on the other. 
For both sensitive and intellectual knowledge are accom- 



The Morality of Human A cts. 43 



panied with phantasms, by means of which the sensitive and, 
indirectly, the rational appetites are aroused to action. Be- 
sides, in man there is really only one will ; which is called 
affective to denote the impulse of the sense-faculty, and elec- 
tive to denote the free choice of the rational faculty, and it 
scarcely ever acts powerfully in either faculty without acting 
also in the other. 

69. Our passions are of two kinds, concupiscible and iras- 
cible. 

1. The concupiscible passions are those affections of 
the sensible faculties which regard their object as sim- 
ply good or evil. They are six in number : good or 
evil in general excites love or hate respectively ; desire 
is roused by good apprehended as absent, aversion by 
an approaching evil; when the good is attained, is 
excited, whilst, on the other hand, present evil causes 
sadness, 

2. The irascible passions, which are five in number, 
arise when good or evil is apprehended as associated 
with difficulties or obstacles to be overcome. Diffi- 
culty or even danger in connection with a desired 
good is not always displeasing. If the attainment 
of a desired good which is difficult to acquire is ap- 
prehended as within our power, hope is aroused; if it 
seems to be quite beyond our reach, despondency fol- 
lows. In the case of a coming evil, we are animated 
by courage if we feel that we can avert it, but we ex- 
perience fear on perceiving that we cannot easily 
escape. Anger is roused by the presence of an evil 
to which we are unwilling to submit (St. Thomas, 
I ma 2 ae, q. 23). These eleven may be called the 



44 Direction of Human Acts in General. 



primary passions. All others are modifications or com- 
binations of these. 

70. The passions are intended by the Creator to assist us 
in attaining our last end. Hence in themselves they are not 
evil, but good. Yet they must be subject to the careful con- 
trol of the will enlightened by reason. Generally their first 
impulses arise by a kind of physical necessity when the senses 
apprehend good or evil. However, as these first impulses 
are not free, they are not imputable to us. But as soon as 
the intellect perceives their presence, the will can act; and it 
must assert its control to regulate or suppress their movement, 
according as reason judges it to be right or wrong. If the 
will fails to do this, we become accountable for the conse- 
quences. The moral perfection of a man consists, to a great 
extent, in his power to control his passions and to direct their 
energies aright. Persevering efforts thus to regulate the pas- 
sions beget good habits, which are invaluable aids for attain- 
ing our last end. 

71. Zeno and the Stoics totally misconceived the relation 
of the passions to morahty; they pronounced them to be 
moral disorders, which a virtuous man was bound to uproot 
from his heart. He was not to allow the sensitive appetite 
even to stir. Now, it is impossible to suppress all movement 
of passion ; indeed, to check passion when it is conducive to 
true happiness, would be very unwise. It would make all im- 
passioned eloquence and poetry impossible ; it would cut off 
all high-spirited devotion to duty, all unselfish spontaneity, 
and banish generous pity and noble enthusiasm. The ideal 
of human nature fancied by the Stoics would be a mere cal- 
culating machine. A man's father and mother might be slain 
before his eyes, whilst he would be busy stifling his heart's 
natural impulse to fly to the rescue. The true doctrine which 



The Morality of Human Acts. 45 



we have here outlined was formulated by Aristotle and his 
followers, the Peripatetics ; but in its stead the Stoics at- 
tempted to substitute their strange misconceptions of the 
truth. 

Article VI. Virtues and Vices. 

72. Habits are defined as more or less permanent quali- 
ties which dispose a faculty to act readily and with ease. A 
habit results naturally from frequent repetition of the same 
act. Thus, by constantly restraining the passion of anger, a 
person gains facility in doing so ; or, in other words, he ac- 
quires the virtue of meekness. A habit is said to be "a sec- 
ond nature," because though not constituting nature it greatly 
facilitates certain operations of the natural faculties. Good 
habits, or those inclining us to do what is morally right, are 
called y bad habits, or tendencies to what is wrong, 
are called vices. Brute animals are incapable of moral acts ; 
hence they cannot form moral habits. Their power of imita- 
tion or the influence of pecuhar circumstances may, it is true, 
enable them to acquire ways of acting which are not ordi- 
nary, which may indeed seem unnatural ; as, when a bird is 
made to pronounce words. The power to act thus may be 
termed a habit, but, of course, not a moral habit. Man may 
also acquire habits that are more or less mechanical; but, 
besides these, he can form moral habits by the frequent repe- 
tition of free acts; and in Moral Philosophy we are concerned 
with only the latter class of habits. 

73. Certain habits may be sup ernatur ally infused into 
the soul, and in no other way can the supernatural virtues of 
Faith, Hope and Charity be obtained; so that natural acts, 
though ever so numerous, cannot of themselves produce a 
supernatural habit. Even natural virtues may be supernat- 



46 Direction of Human Acts in General. 



urally infused or strengthened by Almighty God. Philoso- 
phy, however, considers only natural virtues and the natural 
mode of acquiring and developing them, all of which depend 
on the repetition of virtuous acts. 

74. Virtue and vice necessarily imply freedom of action; 
no one is truly said to be virtuous for doing what he cannot 
help doing, nor can any one be called vicious for doing what 
he cannot possibly avoid. Now, freedom is a power belong- 
ing peculiarly to man's will ; therefore all vices and virtues 
must, in some manner, be referred to the will. Besides, the 
will can influence the intellect considerably, not in regard to 
such judgments as are immediately evident, but in regard to 
the less immediate conclusions of reasoning. In this way it 
can so bend the intellect to consider certain motives for ac- 
tion to the exclusion of other motives that, after repeated 
acts of the same kind, the intellect finds great ease in certain 
modes of action rather than in others. 

The will can also control the sensitive appetites or pas- 
sions; and, as these are of two kinds, the concupiscible and 
the irascible, the relation of the passions to the will gives rise 
to two classes of virtues and vices. Accordingly, the moral 
virtues are reducible to four heads, called the four cardinal 
virtues: namely, justice^ a habit belonging directly to the 
will ; prudence^ dwelling in the intellect ; temperance, regulat- 
ing the concupiscible passions, and fortitude, commanding the 
irascible passions. 

75. I. Justice perfects the will, inclining it to choose al- 
ways that which tends to our true good and the attainment 
of our last end. As such it is a general virtue, and includes 
all the virtues. In a more restricted sense, justice inchnes us 
to give to every one his due — to God by the virtue of religion, 
to our parents by filial piety ^ to our benefactors by gratitude. 



The Morality of Human Acts. 47 



To other men we give their due by acts of what is commonly 
understood as justice. This, in turn, is of two kinds : com- 
mtifative Justice, by which we give to other men quid pro quo, 
i.e., an exact equivalent in return for what they give us; dis- 
tributive justice, a virtue of the ruler, by which he distributes 
the honors, rewards, burdens, etc., of the community accord- 
ing to the merits and conditions of his subjects. 

76. II. Prudence perfects the intellect, directing it to dis- 
cern on all occasions what is best suited for the attainment of 
our last end. Thus defined, prudence is a general virtue, 
which includes : (a) Clear-sightedness, or a quick, accurate 
perception of the true value of means to an end ; (b) Caution, 
which bids us take time to notice difficulties and to provide 
against them ; (c) Self-distrust, which disposes us to examine 
matters with care, and to accept the advice of others, espe- 
cially if our own case is in question. 

77. When clear-sightedness is perverted to the attaining of 
a morally bad end, it degenerates into the vice of craftiness 
or cunning; when carried to excess, caution becomes timidity, 
self-distrust turns into pusillanimity, and docility is changed 
into simplicity. In these, as in other matters, it is the part of 
prudence to indicate the proper mean, or middle course be- 
tween excess and defect — " virtus in medio virtue holds 
the middle course " — the golden mean between too much 
and too little. " Avoid extremes " is an important maxim in 
moral conduct. 

78. III. Temperance governs the sensible appetites in 
the use of things that especially attract them — namely, sen- 
sible pleasures. The will can restrain these appetites and 
accustom them to follow the guidance of reason. When this 
is brought about, they are said to be well ordered, and as 
such they contribute to man's perfection. The virtue of tem- 



48 Direction of Human Acts in General. 



perance does not consist in an entire abstinence from what 
the sensible appetites crave, but rather in the golden mean of 
moderate use. A higher degree of restraint belongs to the 
virtue of mortification. Still, the golden mean of temperance 
cannot be kept perfectly without constant checks upon the 
cravings of the passions — that is, without sometimes practising 
mortification by denying ourselves allowable pleasures. Con- 
cupiscence is like a fiery horse, which must be early broken 
in and controlled ever afterwards with a firm hand. 

79. IV. Fortitude is the virtue by which the will com- 
mands the irascible passions to attempt what is lofty, though 
the means are arduous and even perilous, and to bear evils 
with composure. It thus embraces courage and patie7ice. To 
attempt what is lofty is magjianimoiis ; to contemn difficul- 
ties in the way is brave. Cowardice is the absence of forti- 
tude; but fortitude, when carried to excess, i.e., beyond the 
bounds prescribed by prudence, grows into rashness. Thus, 
fortitude, like other virtues, must adhere to the golden mean. 
In this or that person, each of these four virtues may have 
different degrees of strength; nevertheless, no virtue can be 
perfect without the companionship of the others. 



CHAPTER III. 



LAW THE RULE OF HUMAN ACTS. 

80. We have already proved (No. 56) that man is account- 
able to his Creator for his free acts; this, moreover, is a 
judgment of the common sense of mankind. Yet reason does 
not originate God's supreme control ; it does not make the 
law. But it recognizes and reveals, as decreed by the sover- 
eign will, a rule outside and independent of us, according to 
which our actions ought to be directed. Now, a rule direct- 
ive of action is called a law, the word being used m its 
widest sense. Thus the laws of physical nature are rules in 
accordance with which the actions of material things are di- 
rected. In a stricter sense, the term "law" expresses the 
direction of free acts, and, as such, it is a rule directive of 
human acts. In this last meaning only, is the word "law" 
employed in Moral Philosophy. 

Reason not only reveals to us the existence of certain gen- 
eral laws affecting human conduct, but it dictates their appli- 
cation to individual human acts. Viewed as a faculty thus 
directive of individual acts, reason is called co?iscience. 

We shall consider in the present chapter: i. The moral 
law in general; 2. The application of the moral law by con- 
science ; 3. The sanction of the moral law. 

Article I. The Moral Law in General. 

81. A law, we have said, is "a rule directive of human 
acts." Still more explicitly defined, "a law is an ordinance of 

49 



50 Direction of Human Acts in General, 



reason which is for the common good, and has been promul- 
gated by one having charge of the community." As doubt 
may sometimes arise whether a given enactment is really a 
law, and has the force of a law, a careful examination of 
every word in this definition is in order. 

(a) A law is an ordmance of reason ; it proceeds as an or- 
dinance from the will of the law-giver, after it has originated 
in his intellect. He perceives a right course of action which 
is useful or necessary, and he wills to impose an obligation, 
on those who are subject to his decrees, to follow this course 
of action. Law is distinguished from mere counsel by the 
note of obhgation. Still the law has no other binding force 
than the ruler intended. 

(b) For the common good. A law is imposed on the general 
community, not on individuals, though it does not necessarily 
affect the actions of all individuals composing the commu- 
nity, but only certain classes, e. g., merchants, lawyers, tax- 
payers, voters, etc. Nevertheless, the effect intended must 
redound to the common good. 

(c) It is manifest that a law cannot be enacted except by 
the person, physical or moral, that has charge of the whole 
community. By his position, such a one is bound to direct 
all the members of the community to their common good ; 
and as the enactment of laws is a necessary means to this 
end, he has the right — and he alone — of making laws. 

(d) Promulgation is essential for the obligation of a law, 
so that, without this, even if the lawgiver should wish the 
immediate observance of an ordinance, there is no binding 
force. The reason is apparent. A law is directive of human 
acts; but without promulgation a law cannot be the sub- 
ject of human acts, because an essential requisite, the knowl- 
edge needed for such an act, is wanting. 



Law the Rule of Human Acts. 51 



82. A law decreed by Almighty God is a divine law ; one 
established by man is a human law. Those laws for human 
conduct which God, having once decreed creation, necessa- 
rily enacts in accordance with that decree, constitute the 
natural law ; those which God or man freely enacts are posi- 
tive laws. Now, between the natural law and positive laws, 
there are these four points of difference : 

1. The natural law, unlike positive laws, does not 
depend upon the free will of God; its requirements 
flow from the intrinsic difference between right and 
wrong, which is determined by the very essences of 
things (No. 42). Hence, under this law, certain 
acts are not evil primarily because they are forbid- 
den, but they are forbidden because in themselves 
they are evil. 

2. Consequently, the natural law is the same at all 
times, in all places, and for all persons; but this is 
not true of positive laws, which may be changed with 
changing circumstances, or, if the law-giver so wills 
it, even without change of circumstances. 

3. The natural law emanates from God alone; but 
positive laws may be enacted by men. 

4. The natural law is promulgated through the light 
of reason; positive laws require for their promulga- 
tion a sign external to man. # 

83. As a consequence of the foregoing, the natural law 
may be defined as the ordinance of Divine Wisdom, which 
is made known to us by reason, and which requires the 
observance of the moral order. It may also be defined to 
be, " The eternal law as far as it is made known by human 
reason." By the eternal law we mean all that God necessa- 
rily decrees from eternity. That part of the eternal law, / 



52 Direction of Human Acts in General, 



which reason reveals as directive of human acts, we call the 
natural law. 

84. A universal formula which contains in brief an ex- 
pression of the whole natural law is this : " Keep the moral 
order," or "Observe right order in your actions." Some 
writers state it simply as, Do good and avoid evil." Now, 
the right order of human acts consists evidently in their 
proper direction to man's last end, which is, subjectively, his 
perfect beatitude and, objectively, God Himself (Nos. 40, 
41). God must direct His free creatures to their last end, 
hence He commands them to observe the moral order and 
forbids them to depart from it. 

85. Consequently, nothing can excuse us from observing 
the moral law or any part of it, though such observance be 
attended with the most distressing difficulties, and demand 
from us the most heroic sacrifices— the sacrifice even of our 
lives. 

86. We must note, however, that the affirmative precept3 
of the natural law differ, in respect to obligation, from the 
negative precepts. The latter, which forbid certain acts, 
always remain in force, so that the forbidden acts are never 
allowed. Thus no one is ever allowed to dishonor God ; this 
negative precept holds always and for all persons. Affirmative 
precepts, or those commanding certain acts, obHge only for 
certain times or occasions; the affirmative precept to honor 
God does not oblige us to worship Him uninterruptedly. 

87. By saying the natural law is immutable — not 
susceptible of change (No. 82), we mean that an act morally 
bad by its nature cannot become morally good. Nor can 
any precept of the natural law be abrogated — /. e., totally 
done away with ; nor be derogated from, by partially losing its 
binding force; nor admit of dispe?isation. 



Law the Rule of Human Acts. 



53 



Yet some acts indifferent in themselves, which derive their 
moral goodness or badness from attending circumstances, 
may seem to change their moral character. For example, 
during many ages capital was considered unproductive — 
it did not fructify, it had no market value — and hence to 
exact even moderate interest for money lent was held to be 
unjust, because, in accordance with the economic practices 
of the period, this was a demand for a recompense not 
due. But with the change of times, the methods of busi- 
ness and commerce have changed, so that now capital has 
a market value, and is said to fructify. Consequently, it 
is everywhere considered to be a productive article, for the 
use of which it is just and lawful to require a fair recom- 
pense. 

88. Thesis X. The natural law is eternal and wichange- 
able. 

^ Proof. All men have, at all times, the same essence, or 
nature ; hence they have the same ultimate end, and the same 
natural means necessary for attaining that end. These means 
the omniscient Creator knew and decreed from eternity, and 
therefore, by an eternal act of His will. He requires for all 
times the employment of these means. Now, the natural 
means necessary for man's attainment of his last end consists 
in his observance of the natural law, which is consequently 
eternal as a divine decree, and unchangeable with the un- 
changeableness of man's nature. 

89. Objections, i. God allowed the Israelites when they 
were leaving Egypt to steal the silver and gold of the 
Egyptians (Exod. xii.), yet theft is against the natural 
law. Answer. Granting, for the sake of argument, 
that this is the correct interpretation of the passage 
cited, we deny that such a permission would be 



54 Direction of Human Acts in General. 



against the natural law. Theft is the appropriation 
of what belongs to another without or against the lat- 
ter's will. Now all possessions belong absolutely to 
God, and He has the absolute right to dispose of 
them. If, then, the Israelites received from God ex- 
press permission to appropriate certain goods belong- 
ing to their oppressors, even against the will of the 
latter, they did not commit theft, since they had the 
full consent of the absolute Owner. 
2. God commanded Abraham to kill an innocent per- 
son, and murder is surely opposed to the natural law. 
Aftswer. The killing of an innocent person by pri- 
vate authority is plainly opposed to the natural law. 
But God is the supreme Lord of life, and therefore 
He can deprive His creatures of life when He sees fit, 
and in the manner He chooses, whether directly or 
indirectly — /. e., by the ministry of angels, of men, or 
of other creatures. 

90. Though the natural law is made known to us by Our 
reason, it does not follow that every person on attaining the 
full use of reason acquires a complete knowledge of the law. 
Philosophers divide its precepts into three classes: i. The 
fundamental principles immediately expressed by the uni- 
versal formula, " Keep the moral order," or " Do good 
and avoid evil." 2. Obvious consequences drawn directly 
from the fundamental principles, which are applied to par- 
ticular classes of acts; to these belong the precepts of the 
Decalogue, with the exception of the third. 3. More remote 
conclusions drawn from the fundamental principles by rather 
intricate processes of reasoning. 

91. Thesis XI. The natural taw i?i its most general 
principles and their immediate applications ^ i. <f., the first a?id 



Law the Rule of Human Acts. 



55 



second classes of its precepts, cannot be invincibly unknown by 
those who have the full use of reason. 

Proof I. God cannot, in His goodness and wisdom, leave 
a man without the means necessary to attain his last end ; 
but the knowledge of the natural law in its most general prin- 
ciples and their immediate application is a necessary means 
to this end for all men that have the full use of reason. 
Therefore, God cannot leave such men without this knowl- 
edge or at least the opportunity to acquire it. 

Proof 2. The thesis is made evident by investigating the 
nature of the precepts contained in the two classes specified. 
Those of the first class are first principles in the moral order 
and, like the first principles of the speculative order, are ad- 
mitted to be self-evident. The precepts of the second class 
forbid acts which in themselves are evil, and enjoin acts 
which in themselves are good and directly necessary for the 
attainment of man's last end. These latter precepts flow from 
the first principles of the moral order by inference so easy 
that the rudest minds are capable of performing the neces- 
sary reasoning at once and without effort. This is so true 
that some writers consider the precepts of the second class to 
be self-evident. 

Proof 3. History and observation show that, at all times . 
and in all regions of the world, men have possessed such 
knowledge. 
92. Objections. 

I. Some Indian tribes think a man has a right to kill 
his parents when they are old and infirm. Therefore 
the primary principles of the natural law are not 
known to all. Answer. These men certainly have 
given proof that they believed it wrong to slay the 
innocent. At the same time they considered that filial 



56 Direction of Human Acts in General, 



piety enjoins relief to afflicted parents. This relief 
they judged they were giving by depriving their aged 
parents of life which had become a painful burden to 
the latter. To discern, in this confusion of obligation, 
the moral evil of their act of homicide, required a 
rather intricate process of reasoning, the conclusion of 
which belongs to the third class of precepts under the 
natural law. Our thesis, however, does not maintain 
that knowledge of this kind must be universal. 
2. The Spartans of old approved in their children the 
vice of theft. Answer. Here, too, was a confusion 
of obligation. The Spartans held that the protection 
of the country was life's highest duty. Hence, though 
reprobating theft in general, they approved it in so far 
as the act was intended to develop military sagacity. 
93. Thesis XII. Hicman laws derive their bi?idi?tg force 
from the natural law, and ultimately from God. 

Explanation. We are not speaking here of every rule laid 
down by men, but of laws in the strict meaning of the term. 
Laws thus understood can be enacted by a perfect commu- 
nity only. As the State (the supreme society in the natural 
order), and the Church (which holds the same place in the 
supernatural order), are the only perfect societies, it follows 
that only the State and the Church can enact laws in the 
strict meaning of the term. 

Proof -L. The chief dictate of the natural law is that we 
should observe right order in our free acts (No. 84). Now, 
right order requires that the members of a perfect community 
should obey all those rational directions which are given by 
-him who has charge over the community — /. that they 
should obey all laws. Therefore the natural law requires the 
observance of human laws. Moreover, the natural law de- 



Law the Rule of Human Acts, 57 



rives its binding force from God ; therefore the obligation to 
obey human laws, which flows directly from the natural law, 
proceeds ultimately from the same Divine source. 

Proof 2. Once we grant that human laws can impose a 
moral obligation, it is easy to prove that their binding power 
is derived from God. For this power supposes superiority 
over the consciences of men. But whence do men derive 
such superiority ? Not from themselves, because all men are 
equal by their nature. This power, therefore, must be de- 
rived from God, who alone is the superior of all men and has 
power over their consciences. 

94. Objections. 

1 . The laws of men are sometimes opposed to the laws 
of God ; therefore human laws do not derive their 
binding force from God. Answer. Such enactments 
are not laws, and are falsely so called. A rule for 
human action which is opposed to God's law cannot 
be for the true good of the community. 

2. Sometimes the laws of the State are opposed to those 
of the Church. Therefore both cannot come from 
God. Answer. The laws of the State and those of 
the Church cannot clash if they are just. In case of 
dispute, the presumption for justness must be in favor 
of the higher community, the Church of God. 

Article II. Conscience Applying the Moral Law. 

95. Conscience is the human intellect applying the general 
principles of morals to individual acts. The term, as em- 
ployed in Moral Philosophy, means not an examination into 
one's past deeds, but a judgment on acts about to be per- 
formed. In judging whether an individual act is morally 



58 Direction of Human Acts in General. 



good or evil, the intellect forms, explicitly or implicitly, a 
syllogism, the miajor of which is a known principle of moral- 
ity, the minor a particular fact, and the conclusion a practi- 
cal judgment, which is called a dictate of conscience. For 
instance, — a lie is never allowed; but to say that I have 
never sinned would be a lie ; therefore, I am not allowed to 
say that I have never sinned. Conscience, then, may be de- 
fined as a practical judgment formed by reasoning from a 
universal principle to a particular fact, whereby I decide 
whether a certain individual act ought to be done or omitted, 
or whether it may be done or omitted, at my choice. 

96. My conscience, with regard to any particular act may 
be correct or erroneous ; its judgment may be cei'tai7i or doubt- 
ful; the doubt may be concerning a law or a fact. A doubt- 
ful judgment is called an opinion j the reasons in favor of an 
opinion constitute its probability. In matters pertaining to 
conscience, we can seldom have the strictest certitude, such 
namely as excludes all possibiHty of error. However, moral 
certitude, which excludes a prudent doubt (Log. 79, etc.) is 
Gufificient to safeguard moral rectitude. Hence, a certain dic- 
tate of conscience means a practical judgment free from a 
prudent doubt in regard to error. Moreover, it may happen 
that two honest men act in diametrically opposite ways about 
the same matter, and each may be morally certain that he is 
right. If I make a mistake through no fault of my own, 
my judgment is erroneous though it may be morally certain. 
In such a case I am said to be invi?tcibly ig7iorant of the 
truth. If, however, the error is due to my own fault, my 
ignorance is viftcible. 

97. Thesis XIII. Conscience ivhen certain must be obeyed^ 
whether it be correct or invincibly erroneous. 

Proof. We are bound to obey the law rationally — i. e.^ as 



Law the Rule of Human Acts. 59 



our intellect makes known to us the application of the law. 
But when conscience is certain, our intellect makes known to 
us the appHcation of the law with certainty, whether our 
judgment in the matter be correct or invincibly erroneous. 
Therefore, conscience when certain must be obeyed, whether 
it be correct or invincibly erroneous. 

98. Conscience is said to be doubtful, when the motive for 
believing that a particular law does not exist, or that it is not 
appHcable to the case in hand is based on an opinion more 
or less probable — e., more or less well founded. 

1 . An opinion is slightly or barely probable when it rests 
on very weak motives. 

2. It is probable, or plausible, when supported by solid 
reasons, though stronger reasons may uphold the con- 
tradictory opinion. 

3. It is equally probable with the contradictory opinion 
when both are supported by equally plausible reasons. 

4. It is more probable, when the reasons favoring the 
opinion are stronger than those opposed to it. 

5. It is most probable, when the arguments on which it 
rests are very strong, while those for the contradictory 
opinion are very weak. 

99. Doubt, as affecting conscience is either speculative or 
practical. It is a practical doubt, if it regards the formal 
liceity of a particular act which is about to be performed. 
Hence, if I act with a practical doubt, I do not know whether 
or not I am doing wrong and displeasing God ; for example : 
everything considered, I am in doubt whether I shall do 
wrong by reading a certain book which, I have reason to 
think, is dangerous to Faith. 

Doubt is speculative when it concerns the premises of a 
syllogism, the conclusion of which is a dictate of conscience : 



6o Direction of Huma^i Acts in General. 



that is, if I doubt either that a certain law exists, or, granting 
its existence, that it is appHcable to this particular case. I 
doubt, for example, whether by a law of the Church a certain 
Saturday of the year is a fast day, or, knowing that such a law 
exists, whether to-day is that particular Saturday ; or, again, 
whether I am excused from fasting to-day by present illness. 

IOC. Thesis XIV. // is never right to act with a practical 
doubt of conscience. 

Proof. To act with a practical doubt of conscience is 
equivalent to saying : " I may break God's law, and so dis- 
please Him by doing this act, yet I will do it any way." But 
this is never right, because it is a manifest proof of an evil 
disposition to do the act, even if it were known to be pro- 
hibited, and hence shows contempt for God's law. 

101. What then must we do, in order to avoid acting with 
a practical doubt of conscience ? We may abstain from act- 
ing, if the matter so permits ; or we may choose the safer 
side, that, namely, by which we fulfill the obhgation in ques- 
tion; or we may remove the practical doubt. This removal 
we can sometimes effect by a more careful examination into 
the principles or facts involved, or by inquiring from compe- 
tent authorities whether such a law exists, or whether it is 
applicable to this particular case. This would be to solve 
the speculative doubt, and is the direct method of getting rid 
of the practical doubt. But, if we are indeed so circum- 
stanced that it is impossible to make use of the direct method, 
we may, nevertheless, get rid of the practical doubt, and act 
in the matter with safety, by applying to the difficulty the 
reflex principle of moral conduct: "A doubtful law has no 
binding force." 

1 02. A course of conduct is called safe, if it excludes all 
danger of formal wrong. Yet one course may be safer than 



Law the Rule of Human Acts. 6i 



another, for we can make assurance doubly sure by avoiding 
the possibihty of even material wrong. The less safe course, 
however, must so guard me from formal wrong that I cannot 
be justly blamed for adopting it. Still, the fact that one 
opinion is safer than another, does not by itself make it the 
more probable of the two. Thus, if a neighbor has a less 
probable claim to a house in my possession, the safer course 
for me to follow, that I may avoid all possibility of doing 
him an injustice, would be to give up my claim in his favor; 
and yet, in point of genuineness, my neighbor's title is sup- 
posed to be less probable than mine. 

103. Thesis XV. When a certaifi end is absolutely io be ■ 
secured^ we must choose the safer way of securing it. 

Expla?iation. Since the end in this case is absolutely to be 
secured, I ought, if it were possible, to use means which are 
absolutely rehable or certain, for the means should be propor- 
tionate to the end. But it is here supposed that none of the 
means available is absolutely rehable, but that each is supported 
by probability only, one of the means having a higher degree 
of probability than any other. In this case, we maintain, with 
all moralists of standing, that the safer way, that, namely, which 
has the more probable opinion in its favor, must be followed 
in practice. 

Proof. If I choose the less safe way, I freely make less 
certain the acquisition of an absolutely necessary end. But 
freely to lessen the certainty of attaining an absolutely neces- 
sary end is wrong. Therefore, I may not in this case choose 
the less safe way ; on the contrary, I am bound to follow the 
safer way. 

Thus, on the principle that Baptism is absolutely necessary 
for salvation, the Church baptizes converts, if their former 
baptism is doubtful. On this principle, too, physicians are 



62 Direction of Human Acts m General, 



not allowed, if sure remedies are at hand, to experiment with 
doubtful medicines upon their patients, whose health they are 
bound by their engagements to secure. 

104. But when there is question of the mere liceity of an 
a:t am I bound to adopt the more probable opinion? In 
other words, when, according to one probable opinion, the 
law requires a certain act of me, and, according to another 
probable opinion, such a requirement does not exist, am I 
bound to observe the law which probably has never been 
enacted ? Or again, am I bound to observe an existing law 
in circumstances to which the law-giver probably never in- 
tended it to be applied ? 

On various theories various answers are given to this ques- 
tion : 

1 . Rigorists say : As long as any doubt remains that the 
law does not exist, the law must be obeyed, though, 
most probably, the law does not exist. 

2. Tutiorists say : The law must be obeyed unless the 
opinion favoring an easier course be far more probable. 

3. Probabilioi'-ists say : Obey the law unless the opinion 
favoring an easier course be more probable. 

4. Probabilists allow a free choice, provided the easier 
course has sohd probabihty in its favor, even though 
the other course has greater probabihty. 

5. Laxists permit liberty of choice even when the easier 
course is only slightly or barely probable. This last 
view, and that which requires for the liceity of an act 
certitude that it is not forbidden, have both been con- 
demned by the Church. 

105. Thesis XVI. In questions of mere liceity^ we may fol- 
low the easier course if there is a solidly probable opinio?i in its 
favor. 



Law the Rule of Human Acts. 63 



Proof. A doubtful law has no binding force. But that 
law against whose existence a solidly probable opinion mili- 
tates is a doubtful law. Therefore I am not bound to follow 
such a law. The principle, "A doubtful law has no binding 
force," which is received as an axiom, is apparent from the 
fact that such a law is wanting in an essential feature required 
for binding force, viz., full promulgation. If reasonable efforts 
have been made to remove the doubt, yet without success, we 
may conclude that the law, if it exists, has not been sufficiently 
promulgated. 

106. Objections: 

1. If the thesis is true, I am allowed to do wrong. 
Answer. We are never allowed to do formal wrong, 
i. e., what we know to be wrong; but we are not 
always forbidden to do what is materially wrong, to 
do that, namely, which we do not know to be wrong. 

2. But the law maybe certain and only the application 
of it uncertain; I know, for instance, that I must 
abstain from meat on Friday, but I do not know 
whether this is Friday. Answer. The same rule 
holds for the application of the law as for its doubt- 
ful existence. If, after trying in vain to obtain enlight- 
enment on the subject, I have a sohdly probable 
opinion that to-day is not Friday, I may reason that 
the law of abstinence as affecting this particular case 
is a doubtful one, and therefore, for this particular ap- 
plication, has no binding force. 

Article III. The Sanction of the Moral Law. 

107. The sanction of a law is the provision of reward for 
the observance of the law and of punishment for its violation. 



64 Direction of Human Acts in General. 



That sanction is called perfect, which is sufficient to make it 
a matter of every one's highest interest to observe the law. 
If the sanction falls short of this, it is said to be imperfect. 

108. Thesis XVII. The sanction appertaining to the 
natural law, though imperfect in this life, is perfect in the life 
to come. 

Part I. There is a7i imperfect sanction in this life. Proof. 
We know from the experience of mankind that the observ^ance 
of the natural law usually brings with it certain forms of hap- 
piness, such as peace of mind, friendship, honor, a fair supply 
of earthly possessions, health and longevity; and that frequent 
violation of the law entails all of life's miseries, such as dis- 
quiet of mind, dishonor, poverty, disease, and often an early 
death. Hence it is evident that the natural law has some 
sanction in this life. Yet this sanction is very imperfect. 
Oftentimes the virtuous endure great misery in this life, while, 
on the other hand, evil doers are often comparatively pros- 
perous and apparently triumphant in their wickedness. More- 
over, the perfect sanction of the law requires that the rewards 
held out for its observance should exceed as recompense all 
inconvenience and suffering that may be incurred by observ- 
ing the law, and that the penalties threatened should be greater 
than any emoluments or advantages that may be obtained by 
violating the law. Now, what reward, for example, can be 
given in this life to a man that dies for the truth? Is it the 
renown of a noble deed ? But death makes the enjoyment of 
renown on earth an impossibility for him. Or again, does 
the weak remorse of the apostate match the advantage which 
his base denial of the Faith has gained in the preservation of 
his life ? Therefore, the rewards and punishments of this life 
do not form a perfect sanction of the natural law. 

Part II, A pofect safiction in the ?iext life. Proof. Since 



Law the Rule of Human Acts. 65 



God wills the observance of the law which He has impressed 
upon the hearts of men, His wisdom requires Him to use the 
proper means to secure that observance. But the only means 
proper to secure this end without destroying human liberty is 
to propose adequate rewards and punishments, that is, to 
establish a perfect sanction of the law. Therefore a perfect 
sanction of the law exists. But since the sanction in this life 
is imperfect, it follows that there must be a perfect sanction 
in the next life. 

109. We know that all men can attain the perfect happi- 
ness for which their nature longs insatiably. (Thesis IV.) 
It is clear, also, that this happiness, our summum boniim, or 
greatest good, the possession of God Himself (Thesis VI.), is 
the chief sanction of the observance of the moral law: 
it is the highest, the most complete, the most appropriate 
reward of the virtue practised in this life. Can any form of 
happiness be higher or more complete than the everlasting 
possession of God ? The appropriateness of such a reward 
is apparent from the nature of virtue, which consists in the 
observance of the moral law, and is the direct means to the 
attainment of our last end. What then could be more appro- 
priate than that virtue's reward should be the perfect pos- 
session of that towards which its endeavors tend ? 

110. Since vice consists essentially in a willful turning away 
from our last end, it becomes evident, by a process of reason- 
ing similar to that followed above, that the privation of the 
possession of God is the natural and chief pnnishment of the 
wicked. Now, two ways are possible by which the wicked 
might be deprived of their last end, and so be disappointed of 
the only object that can satisfy the insatiable craving of their 
nature. One way is by the soul's utter annihilation after death; 
the other is by a future Hfe of despair, in which the soul must 



66 Direction of Human Acts in General, 



evermore be tormented by vain yearnings for the Good which 
it despised and rejected in the days of its trial on earth. We 
know from Revelation that the wicked who die impenitent 
shall be condemned to eternal sufferings. Natural reason, 
however, could not, of itself, give us certainty on this point. 
Yet it belongs to Moral Philosophy to show that this doc- 
trine, far from being unreasonable, is in perfect accord 
with rational principles. Omitting the arguments adduced 
in our Psychology (Ment. Phil., No. 215), we shall merely dis- 
prove the possibihty of the soul's annihilation, the only other 
way of depriving man of the last end which he has forfeited. 
If annihilation were possible, the perfect sanction of the nat- 
ural law would be impossible. A sanction is not perfect that 
does not make it every man's highest interest to choose, in 
the face of the greatest temptation, the right rather than the 
wrong. Now, surely, annihilation would not be, on many 
occasions and for many persons, a perfect sanction. Are 
there not many persons in the world around us who would 
choose annihilation after death, rather than deny themselves 
unlawful gratifications ? Besides, what retribution would then 
be in store for the crime of suicide ? 

III. Some have pleaded for the existence of another state 
of probation after death. But such a theory only shifts the 
difficulty without solving it. For, if at the end of the second 
probation some souls should persevere in their wickedxiess, 
shall there be a third trial, — and a fourth, and so on, forever ? 
As the series of trials cannot go on without end, and as it is 
likely that some souls would persist in malice through multi- 
plied probations, these souls must at last enter upon a fixed 
state of disappointment and despair. Hence, if this state 
must be entered upon finally, there is no reason why the first 
trial should not be decisive. In the second place, such an 



Law the Rule of Human Acts. 



67 



arrangement would take from the punishment sanctioning the 
law its deterrent force. If, despite the present widespread 
belief of immediate retribution after death, so many are hope- 
lessly wicked, how much more grievous and wicked would be 
the violations of the law if men were convinced that, in the 
next life, they should have an opportunity of averting the 
everlasting doom of sin ! 

112. Moreover, since the soul by its nature is immortal 
(Ment. Phil, No. 213 et seq.), it would be unreasonable to 
admit the possibility of the soul's annihilation. 

Should it be objected against us, that eternal punishment is 
repugnant to the infinite mercy of God, we should answer 
that the justice of God is infinite as well as His mercy. Be- 
sides, eternal punishment is not only a vindication of right or- 
der, it is also deterrent and remedial. The consideration of that 
terrific retribution is calculated to keep to the narrow path of 
virtue many who are sorely tempted to stray therefrom, and 
to call back those who have left it for the perfidious ways 
of iniquity. 

A suspicion may sometimes lurk in the mind that eternal 
punishment, though God has an absolute right to inflict it, is 
after all an excess of rigor and therefore unjust, because there 
would be no proportion between an eternity of suffering and 
the temporal duration of man's evil deeds. The difficulty 
arises from our failure to comprehend the malice of sin. The 
gravity of an offense is to be measured not by its duration 
only, but especially by the dignity of the person offended. 
Now the dignity of God is infinite ; accordingly, an offense 
against His Sovereign Majesty is objectively infinite, and 
demands an infinite compensation. This a creature cannot 
give, because it is essentially finite ; the nearest approach to 
an equivalent is an everlasting retribution. 



BOOK II. 



THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF INDIVIDUALS. 



113. Thus far we have considered human acts in their re- 
lation to our final beatitude, and the natural law as directing 
these acts to their appointed end. We shall next proceed to 
apply this law to man's rights and duties. In the present book 
we shall treat of the rights and duties of man viewed as an 
individual. In the last book we shall treat of his social rights 
and duties. 



68 



CHAPTER 1. 



RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN GENERAL. 

114. To say that a man has a right to a thing, means that 
he has a certain power over it. Evidently, however, physical 
power does not of itself constitute a right. The highwayman's 
power over the traveler's money gives him no right thereto. 
A right, then, belongs to the moral order. It is an inviolable 
moral power belonging to one man, which, therefore, all other 
men are bound to respect. 

115. In every right four things are to be taken into account: 
(a) the subject, i. the person possessing the right; (b) the 
term, including all those who are bound to respect the right; 
(c) the title, or reason on which the right is founded ; (d) the 
matter, or that to which the subject has a right. The matter 
may be my own act or the act of another person ; that is, I 
may have the right to perform a certain act or to require the 
performance or the omission of an act on the part of another. 
Thus in N.'s right to the house which he owns, N. himself is 
the subject, all other persons constitute the term, his payment 
of the purchase money agreed upon is the title, and the owner- 
ship of the house is the matter. He has a right to occupy the 
house, to prevent others from dwelling in it, or to require the 
party who leases it to pay the stipulated rent. 

116. A right possessed by one person involves, on the part 
of another or of others, the obHgation to respect that right. 
This obligation is called a duty. We may therefore define 
duty in the abstract as a moral bond or obligation of doing 

69 



70 The Rights and Duties of Individuals, 



or omitting certain acts in favor of another person. The act 
itself that ought to be done or omitted is the concrete duty. 
Every duty then supposes a corresponding right, and every 
right a duty : right and duty are correlative and inseparable. 
Hence brute animals can have no rights, for they have no 
duties or moral obhgations, since by their irrational nature 
they are incapable of voluntary acts. We are under obliga- 
tion to abstain from cruelty to animals, not because they 
have rights, but because such conduct is unworthy of our 
rational nature. Insane persons and infants have rights 
radically, which all are bound to respect ; yet by reason 
of their mental helplessness they are exempt from perform- 
ing duties. 

117. Every duty or obHgation supposes that some one who 
has power to bind the consciences of men has imposed the 
obligation. Now, moral acts, we know from the preceding 
book, are such as are in conformity with the moral law, which 
has God for its author. As every moral obHgation is neces- 
sarily associated with a moral act, it depends, immediately or 
remotely, for its binding force upon the moral law and the 
Divine Author of the law. Therefore, the true rights and 
duties of man come from God ; and they cannot be correctly 
understood if considered apart from their dependence upon 
God. 

118. Rights and duties are inseparable; yet it may be 
asked, which is prior ? Do the duties which rest upon us 
precede in the order of nature and of supposition the corre- 
sponding rights, or is the converse true ? 

I. Absolutely, or in the formal concept of right and 
duty, right is prior to duty. Right is a moral power 
existing in one person, which gives rise to an obliga- 
tion in another. Consequently, the right is the cause 



Rights a7id Duties in General. 71 



of the obligation, and every cause is prior, in the order 
of nature and of supposition, to its effect. 

2. Since God cannot be bound or Hmited, He has no 
duties towards His creatures, although He possesses 
sovereign rights over all creation. 

3. Hence, man has no rights with regard to God; he 
has duties only. These duties, which God has im- 
posed, confer upon him a right to the means required 
to attain the end of his existence. Thus man's depend- 
ence upon God is a duty prior to all his rights, and, at 
the same time, it is the source of all his rights. Once 
God has deigned to bestow upon us the right of exist- 
ence. He owes it to His own infinite attributes to per- 
fect His gift by endowing us with all the rights neces- 
sary for our existence as men. 

4. A man's God-given rights impose obligations or 
duties on other men to respect his rights. Hence, in 
the relations of men with one another^ right is prior to 
duty. 

119. Eights are variously divided into connatural and 
acquired^ alienable and inalienable, perfect and imperfect. 

1. Connatural rights are those which are inseparable 
from the nature of man as a person. Such are the 
rights to hfe and limb, to personal integrity, to liberty 
of action within just limits, to specific equality as a 
member of the human family. Acquired rights come 
to a man in virtue of his own exertions, or of acts done 
by others in his favor; for example, rights to property, 
to franchise, to office, are acquired rights. 

2. Inalienable rights are those which a man cannot re- 
nounce or transfer to another, because they are neces- 
sary to the attainment of his last end. All other rights 



72 The Rights and Duties of Individuals. 



are called alienable. " We hold these truths to be self- 
evident," says our Declaration of Independence, " that 
all men are created equal ; that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain inalienable rights ; that 
among them are hfe, liberty, and the pursuit of happi- 
ness." 

3. Fei'fect or strict rights are of such a kind that the 
corresponding duties are matters of commutative jus- 
tice. Imperfect rights are not so definite; they are 
founded not on justice but on claims of gratitude or of 
honor, or on some similar title. 

120. Rights in conflict. Rights cannot stricdy be said to 
conflict. We may meet with conflicting claims to the same 
thing, or apparent rights in conflict, but of these only one can 
be a real right. For, by the nature of a right, its existence in 
one person imposes an obhgation upon all others to respect 
that right. Consequently, conflicting rights is a contradiction 
in terms, because " I am bound to respect something" and "I 
am not so bound " are evidently contradictory propositions. 
When two claims conflict, the right disputed must be decided 
to belong to the claimant that has the true title, or at least 
the better title. Such a decision is not always easy, especially 
as men are naturally prepossessed in favor of their own in- 
terests, and on this account they are often forced to make 
use of arbitration and law courts. 

121. The following principles regarding conflicting 
claims are obvious : of two claims otherwise equal that 
should prevail — 

I. Which is more necessary for the attainment of man's 
last end : thus, the right to life takes precedence of 
that to property. Hence, if a man who is suffering 
extreme poverty has instant need of food, he possesses 



Rights and Duties in General. 73 



the right to supply his need from the provisions of 
others who are not in equal or greater need. 

2. Which concerns the good of the greater number. 
For this reason, the common good takes precedence 
of private good, as when a citizen has to expose his 
life in defense of the State. 

3. Which is more probably genuine : thus, a man pos- 
sessing an object which he acquired in good faith can 
continue to hold it till a better claim be proved. 

122. Various classes of duties correspond to the various 
classes of rights : to the natural rights of one person corre- 
spond the natural duties of others ; to acquired rights, adven- 
titious duties; to imperfect rights, imperfect duties. Positive 
duties which are based on positive or affirmative precepts of 
the law, oblige us to perform certain acts; while negative 
duties, which are based on negative precepts, oblige us to 
abstain from certain acts. Positive duties do not require us 
to act at every moment, but only at certain times ; negative 
duties, however, obHge us to abstain at all times from the 
forbidden acts. 

We have duties to God^ to ourselves, and to our 7ieighbor. 
These three classes of duties we shall examine severally in 
the three following chapters. 



CHAPTER II. 



OUR DUTIES TO GOD. 

123. Our duties to God take precedence of all other duties : 

(a) Logically, because God is the First Cause, upon whom we, 
as contingent beings and effects of His creative power, depend 
for the beginning and continuance of our existence. Upon 
this dependence are founded all our rights and duties, (b) 
Morally, because God is our last end ; and all morahty con- 
sists in directing our acts to our last end. 

124. Religion, objectively considered, is the sum total of 
all our duties to God. It is not a thing of human invention, 
but, as Cicero observes : "It is to be found in every land ; 
for nature knows how to worship God, and no man is igno- 
rant of the law by which it is enjoined." 

Considered subjectively, religion is the moral virtue by which 
man renders due homage to God as the first beginning and 
last end of all things. Hence, to acknowledge our entire 
dependence on Him is the primary act of this virtue. We 
acknowledge the dependence of our entire existence by adora- 
tion, of our intellect by faith, of our will by love. These, 
accordingly, are the three fundamental duties of rehgion. 
Though God has no need of these acts for Himself, still He 
is the author of the moral order by which these acts are 
enjoined, and He owes it to His own sanctity to exact the 
observance of the moral order. 

74 



Our Duties to God. 



75 



Article I. Adoration. 

125. Thesis I. All men are bound to render to God the 
worship of interior and exterior adoration. 

Proof. Reason dictates that a subject or dependent show- 
honor to his ruler, and that such honor be proportioned to the 
ruler's dignity and the subject's dependence. But all men 
depend in every respect upon God, their Creator and Sover- 
eign Lord, the Ruler of the Universe, the Master of life and 
death. Moreover, God is worthy of infinite honor. There- 
fore man owes God the greatest possible honor, such honor as 
is incommunicable to any created being. 

The honor rendered in acknowledgement of God's sovereign 
dominion is called adoration. This, we maintain, ought to be 
both interior and exterior. 

1 . Interior adoration. We owe God the reverence and 
honor of our highest faculties, /. of our intellect 
and will. But operations of these faculties are in- 
terior; they are not, in themselves, perceptible by 
the senses. Therefore, we owe God the worship of 
interior adoration. 

2. Exterior adoration. Man owes God the homage not 
of a part of his being, but of his whole being. His 
body, as well as his soul, is entirely dependent upon 
God, and should, therefore, contribute by outward 
or bodily action to the extrinsic glory of God. (No. 
22.) Besides, on account of the close union be- 
tween soul and body, interior reverence naturally 
finds expression in external action; and outward acts, 
in their turn, promote interior reverence. As outward 
action falls under the senses, our external reverence 



76 The Rights and Duties of Individuals. 



helps our fellow-men to elicit and express the reverence 
and honor which ihey, too, owe to God. 

126. Men are not isolated individuals, but they are, as we 
shall prove later on, naturally social beings. Hence, in this 
connection, we may insert a thesis on the worship which men 
in their social capacity owe to God. 

Thesis II. Men are obliged to render public worship to 
God. 

Proof I . Society is natural to mankind ; hence it comes 
from the Author of nature. Society, therefore, no less than 
private individuals, is dependent upon God, and owes Him 
the worship due to His infinite Majesty. Consequently, 
men are obliged, as members of society, to render to God the 
homage proper to society, which is the worship of public ador- 
ation. 

Proof 2. The public acknowledgment of God's supreme 
dominion over all created things is necessary for the welfare 
of civil society ; so much so, that a notorious infidel has said : 
" If a God did not exist, we should have to invent one for the 
public good." On this public acknowledgment are based, in 
great measure, the sanctity of oaths, the binding power of 
contracts, the strength of the marriage bond, the fidehty of 
subjects as well as the integrity of rulers, and consequently the 
stability of governments and civil constitutions. Hence, those 
who attack the worship of God are dangerous enemies of 
mankind, for they are endeavoring to sap the foundations of 
society. 

127. The vices directly opposed to religion are impiety, 
idolatry, and superstition. Impiety is the refusal to give 
supreme honor to God. If it takes the positive form of direct 
dishonor to God, it is called blasphejfiy. Idolatry consists in 
worshiping a creature with an adoration due to God alone. 



Our Duties to God. 



77 



By superstition we mean certain practices, with a religious in- 
tent, that are irrational or unworthy of their purpose. 

128. The principal acts of adoration are prayer and sacri- 
fice^ which have been practised by all nations from their be- 
ginning. The special forms that both should assume have 
not been determined by nature. Of course, God had the 
right to determine such forms by a supernatural Revelation 
and to make them obhgatory upon all His subjects. No act 
of ours is sufficient by itself to regain the favor of our Creator 
if we have once lost it by sin ; we could never know, except 
from a supernatural source, how to obtain the Divine pardon. 

Article II. Faith in God's Word. 

129. Thesis III. All men are obliged to accept Divine 
Revelation, when it has been made known to them, and to be- 
lieve the mysteries which it may contain. 

Explanatio7i. We know indeed that a supernatural Reve- 
lation has been given to mankind. This, however, it is the 
province, not of Philosophy, but of Theology and kindred 
sciences to prove and discuss. Prescinding, therefore, from 
the actual state of things, we examine, from the standpoint 
of natural reason, what man's duties are in regard to Revela- 
tion if the latter should be made. 

Fart I . Man is obliged to accept Divine Revelation. Proof. 
God is the Supreme Lord and Master of all His creatures. 
He has the right, therefore, to enjoin upon us the acceptance 
of certain truths which natural reason by itself is incapable of 
discovering, and to command the performance of certain acts 
of worship. This right connotes, on our part, the duty of 
accepting such truths and of performing such acts, when 
God's will in these matters shall have been made known to us. 



78 The Rights and Duties of Individuals. 



Now this is to accept Divine Revelation. Consequently, we 
are obliged to accept Divine Revelation when it has been 
made known to us. 

Part 2. Man is obliged to believe in revealed i7iysteries. 
Proof. A mystery is a truth which human reason cannot com- 
prehend. We may understand the meaning of the subject 
and the predicate of the proposition in which the incom- 
prehensible truth is enunciated ; we may know that such a 
predicate belongs to such a subject, but we cannot perceive 
how or why they are thus connected. Even in the natural 
order, many of the physical phenomena are incomprehensible 
truths, and may, therefore, be called, in a certain sense, nat- 
ural mysteries. Revealed or supernatural mysteries are those 
truths which can be learned only by Divine Revelation ; for 
example, that the three Divine Persons are one God. Now, 
God's infinite knowledge necessarily includes truths which 
surpass our finite understanding; such truths He is surely 
able to make known to us, and He has the right to demand 
our belief in the same as an homage of our understanding. 
Therefore, we are under obligation to beheve the mysteries 
which God may be pleased to reveal. 

130. Objections. 

1. It is unworthy of a man to believe what he does not 
understand. Answer. If such belief were without a 
sufficient reason, yes; but if it is supported by the 
best of reasons, namely, the infaUible authority of 
God, belief i& truly worthy of man, and the contrary 
course would be most unreasonable. 

2. Dogmatic teaching enslaves the intellect. Answer. 
An entire reliance upon authority in every science 
would be detrimental to intellectual development. But 
to reject the momentous truths of Revelation, because 



Our Duties to God. 



79 



they come from authority, would be more unreason- 
able than to refuse behef in the existence of the 
Roman Empire, because we must depend ultimately 
for our knowledge of this historic fact upon human 
testimony. 

3. The knowledge of mysteries is useless. Answer. 
On the contrary, it is most useful ; besides giving us 
an occasion to honor God by the homage of our intel- 
lect, it wonderfully and consoHngly expands oiu: knowl- 
edge of God and of our own destinies. 

4. Dogmatic teaching begets intolerance. Answer. 
Truth begets a theoretic intolerance, or a firmness of 
conviction which is intolerant of error. But we deny 
that such a state of mind, whether it rests upon au- 
thoritative teaching, or upon demonstration, causes 
practical intolerance, or an unjust interference with 
civil and religious liberty. The persecution of the 
Church in recent times, carried on in many lands by 
the opponents of Revelation, shows what begets in- 
tolerance. 

131. If God deigns to bestow a Revelation upon us. He 
must necessarily give us the means of recognizing it as 
such. Chief among these means are miracles and prophecies. 
Miracles are effects perceptible by the senses, which tran- 
scend the powers and the order of all nature. We have 
demonstrated (Ment. Phil., Cosmol., Chap. III.) that miracles 
are possible, and can be known as such with certainty. 
Prophecies are accurate predictions of such future events as 
depend upon free causes, and cannot be known in advance 
with certainty, except by the omniscient God. 

132. Thesis IV. Miracles and prophecies are infallible 
proofs of a Divine Revelation. 



8o The Rights and Duties of Individuals. 



Explanation. In this thesis we maintain that if, unmis- 
takably, miracles have been worked or prophecies been made 
in confirmation of a doctrine, that doctrine is thereby known 
to be approved by the Creator as His own Divine Revelation. 
The immediate inference from the thesis would be that such 
a doctrine must be accepted by all men. 

Proof. A true miracle can be wrought by God alone. 
Hence, it is a Divine seal, stamped as it were upon the doc- 
trine, in express confirmation of which the miracle is worked. 
The Divine origin of such a doctrine, therefore, is infaUibly 
true, because it is impossible for God to affix His seal to a 
falsehood. 

A prophecy is an accurate prediction of a future event 
that is not dependent upon necessary causes. But God alone 
is the author of such a prediction, for He alone can possess 
such knowledge. Therefore, prophecies made in confirma- 
tion of a doctrine which is pubhshed as coming from God, 
are infallible proofs that such a doctrine is a Divine Reve- 
lation. 

133. God is at perfect liberty to choose the manner of His 
Revelation. As a matter of fact, however. He has chosen 
to manifest it to the vast majority of men, not hnmediatety, 
i. (?., by directly acting upon the intellect with an overpower- 
ing illumination, but mediately, i. e., through the medium of 
other men whom He has commissioned to pubhsh His re- 
vealed truths. Thus, the evidence of Revelation does not 
overmaster the rational faculties, but leaves a man free to 
accept it, and, in this manner, to increase his merit. This 
acceptance is an act of the highest prudence, while the rejec- 
tion of Divine Revelation would be unreasonable and a griev- 
ous wrong. Indeed, from man's complete dependence upon 
God, and his consequent duty to reverence the Divine teach- 



Our Duties to God. 



8i 



ings and to accept them with loving promptness, it follows, 
logically, that every one who conceives a well-grounded sus- 
picion that a Divine Revelation has been made, is obliged in 
conscience to inquire into the matter with more than ordinary 
dihgence. 

1 34. Thesis V. Indifference in the matter of religion is a 
grievous wrong. 

Proof. This indifference may be theoretical or practical. 
Theoretical indifference is an opinion that all systems or 
forms of religion, though contradictory to one another, are 
equally pleasing to God and useful to man. This doctrine 
is false, and an insult to God. It is false, because all truth, 
and, a fortiori, revealed truth, is one and not self-contradic- 
tory. It is an insult to God, because it represents Infinite 
Truth as pleased with error. Practical indifference is a re- 
fusal to give God the homage which man owes Him essen- 
tially (Thesis I.). As both kinds of indifference imply a great 
moral disorder, they are both grievously wrongo 

135. It is evident: 

1. That God cannot make contradictory revelations. 
Therefore, there can be only one true religion in the 
world ; for all systems of religion contradict one an- 
other on some points of doctrine. 

2. That God cannot be glorified or pleased by false- 
hood. In this, as in other matters, He overlooks mis- 
takes that are caused by invincible ignorance. Never- 
theless, once a reasonable suspicion concerning this 
matter exists in the mind, a man is obhged to do his 
utmost in order to discover the truth about super- 
natural Revelation, namely, whether a Revelation has 
been made and where it may be found. 

3. That, if God has made a Revelation to direct men to 



82 The Rights and Duties of Individuals. 



their last end, He must, in His infinite wisdom, have 
provided reliable means to distinguish it from all false 
systems usurping its place. 

136. Objections. 

1. One does enough, if he is an honest man. Answer. 
A man who does not practise religion is not an hon- 
est man, for he defrauds God of the worship which is 
justly His due. 

2. Among so many jarring creeds, it is impossible to 
discover the true religion. Answer. Still, one form 
of religion is divinely true, which alone can be pleas- 
ing to God. Now, God's providence and goodness 
are doubted by thinking that the true form of religion 
is beyond the reach of an earnest mind seeking the 
truth and at the same time humbly asking God's aid 
to find it. 

3. No one should change his religion. Answer. Cer- 
tainly not, unless his religion is false. 

4. Then every man on earth ought to set about inquir- 
ing into the truth of his religion. Answer. Only 
those need inquire who have good reason for doubt- 
ing the truth of their religion. 

137. History attests and Theology confirms the facts, that 
a Revelation was made to mankind in the very beginning ; 
that this was subsequently amplified and developed by fur- 
ther revelations ; that it was finally perfected by the teach- 
ings of the Son of God Himself, and that this Christian 
Revelation has been entrusted, in its completeness, to an in^ 
fallible Church, to be preserved and expounded xmtil the end 
of time. These are truths beyond the reach of Philosophy. 
Nevertheless, Reason leads us by the radiance of her own 
natural hght to the portal of supernatural religion, and is 



Our Duties to God. 



83 



there met by a Heavenly guide, with a brightness of illumina- 
tion so dazzHng that all natural hghts in its presence must 
pale to dimness. In that sacred temple, across whose thresh- 
old she may pass with man, Reason finds many truths above 
her grasp, which she calls mysteries, yet none are opposed to 
her own inherent principles. There she may abide in peace 
under the guidance of the Divine Spirit, who rules there. 

138. Was a Divine Revelation necessary for mankind? 
That form of Revelation which declares the Beatific Vision to 
be man's supernatural destiny and teaches him the supernatu- 
ral means to secure it was not necessary for the attainment of 
a merely natural end. Absolutely or intrinsically considered, 
the latter could be attained by reason unassisted supematu- 
rally: it would be physically possible; but, for the over- 
whelming majority, such an event would be morally impos- 
sible. This, too, is the lesson taught by History on its every 
page. The nations of the earth, even the most highly civi- 
lized, had fallen, despite the teachings of primeval Revelation, 
into the grossest idolatry. Besides, how strangely and wildly 
some of the most rarely gifted minds have erred in matters of 
the greatest importance ! In our own times also we are made 
painfully aware of the deplorable tendency of self-sufficient 
souls to mistake the truth respecting man's duties to God. 
False philosophies, — Pantheism, Positivism, Agnosticism, Ma- 
teriahsm, — are, alas ! too widespread and too notoriously 
prominent in the world of thought to leave us ground foi 
thinking that mankind could have reached even a natural end 
without the assistance of a supernatural Revelation. 

1 39. Although there should exist many philosophical teach- 
ers holding perfectly correct doctrines on the duties of man, 
still, countless multitudes could not, by this natural means 
alone, become truly enhghtened. Such enhghtenment can be 



84 The Rights and Duties of Individuals. 



accomplished in only two ways, by reasoning and by proclaim- 
ing truths with infalhble authority. In neither way, however, 
could the desired effect be brought about for the masses. It 
could not be done by reasoning, since few, comparatively, 
would be able to follow the required processes of thought. Nor 
could authority be of avail, in the hypothesis of a purely natu- 
ral order. Other men, holding false doctrines, might claim 
equal authority, and then how could the dispute be settled by 
natural means to the satisfaction of the people ? What natu- 
ral sign would mark the authoritative teachers of mankind and 
distinguish them from the propagators of error? 

Article III. The Love of God. 

140. Love is an act of the will by which we tend to good. 
We render to God the due homage of our will by loving Him 
above all things, just as by valuing His word above all other 
testimony we offer Him the homage of our understanding. 
Our love is well ordered when it tends towards an object ac- 
cording to the measure of true good which the intellect per- 
ceives in that object. Now, God is the highest good, not 
merely relatively, but absolutely the highest good, for He is the 
Infinite Good. Therefore, if we love God according to the 
measure of His goodness, we must love Him as the Supreme 
Good, and for His own sake, because He deserves infinite love. 
This perfect love for God is the love of benevolence or 
friendship ; a friend being one to whom we wish well, not for 
our own satisfaction only, but for his sake. 

141. Yet we also understand that God is the source of im- 
measurable good for us. This happens in many ways, but 
chiefly because our ultimate happmess consists in possessing 
Him for eternity, To love God for our own sakes is a 



Our Duties to God, 



8s 



love of desire or hope. It is well ordered, however, since it 
fulfills the requirements stated above. Our intellect, indeed, 
perceives that God is not only the highest good in Himself, 
but also the good most conducive to our own happiness. 
Still, this love is imperfect ; for, in tending towards God, it 
does not regard the highest good, namely, God's supreme ex- 
cellence. Moreover, to be acceptable to God, our love for 
Him, whether perfect or imperfect, must always be a love of 
p7'eference^ that is, a love which prefers God to all things 
else. We need not, however, constantly perform acts of 
love for God, this duty being founded upon the positive 
precepts, which oblige us to act only at certain times. 



CHAPTER III. 



OUR DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 

142. Strictly speaking, we do not owe duties to ourselves, 

since a duty is a moral bond obliging us to respect the rights 
of others. In many cases I can remit the debt due me from 
my neighbor and thus dispense him from certain duties 
towards myself, but I cannot free myself from one of those 
duties which I am said to owe to myself. Such duties, how- 
ever, we do not really ow-e to ourselves but to God, for we 
belong to him absolutely and entirely ; hence, we are His prop- 
erty and His servants. To Him we owe the duty of taking 
care of ourselves and of reasonably promoting our own good. 
Such, in Moral Philosophy, is the meaning of the expression 
our duties to ourselves. 

143. What duties then do we owe to ourselves? Evi- 
dently in this matter we are obliged to observe the most gen- 
eral principle of the moral law, " do that which good order 
requires." Now, the first requirement of good order is that 
we tend toward the end for which we have been made. In 
brief, therefore, my duties to myself consist in directing my 
voluntary acts in such a manner as to attain my last end. In 
detail : 

I. My last end and the way to reach it are made known 
to me through my iiitellect ; hence I have a duty to 
develop my intellect in order to perceive, with in- 
creasing clearness, the best means for attaining my 

86 



Our Duties to Ourselves. 



87 



end, and, consequently, for understanding the law of 
God and its application to myself. 

2. The moral order regards free acts, or acts of the 
will ; hence, I ought to strengthen the will by train- 
ing it to follow the guidance of reason. 

3. But this implies that I must control my passions, 
which tend to hinder my will from obeying such guid- 
ance. 

4. To accomplish all this and to fill the place allotted 
to me by Providence, I am bound in duty to take 
reasonable care of my life and the health of my body j 
besides, I must endeavor to acquire such temporal 
goods as may help me to lead a moral life. 

5. For like reasons, I must, to some extent, protect my 
honor or reputation. 

144. Thesis VI. Suicide is never allowed. 

Proof. Suicide is the taking away of one's own life. But 
this- is a usurpation of God's supreme dominion over life and 
death, and hence a grievous violation of the moral order. 
God has an absolute right to every moment of my existence 
and to all the honor I can give Him by fulfilling His sovereign 
will, even by patiently enduring the ills which He permits to 
befall me. Since, therefore, suicide is a great moral disorder, 
it can never be allowed. 

Objections. 

1. Courage is praiseworthy; it is exhibited in suicide. 
Answer. The man who commits suicide, is rash, not 
courageous, in attempting what he has no right to do, 
and, as Plato says in his dialogue called Phaedo, he 
is a moral coward in running away from his post. 

2. Of two evils we ought to choose the less grievous ; 
but suicide is an evil less grievous than a life of sin. 



88 The Rights and Duties of Individuals. 



Answer. There is here no matter for choice ; we are 
not forced to sin ; an act is not sinful, unless it is free. 
Besides, we are never permitted to do evil that good 
may result therefrom. 

3. We must be willing to sacrifice our lives in order to 
possess God the sooner. Answer. We must be will- 
ing to die when God wills it and in the manner that 
pleases Him, but not in a way that would be a viola- 
tion of His divine right. Such a violation would 
deprive us forever of the possession of God. 

4. A criminal might be condemned to kill himself, as 
was the case with Socrates. Answer. No authority 
can oblige a person to do what is, in itself, morally evil. 

145. Yet we may at times expose our lives to imminent 
danger, provided, as in the case of evil indirectly willed (No. 
51), we do not directly intend our death, and the good to be 
thereby obtained is worthy of so great a risk. No one has a 
right to expose life or limb or health for a trifle, such as vain 
glory or the gratification of mere curiosity. But a sufficient 
reason might be found in the needs of our religion or of our 
country, the advancement of science, the rehef of persons in 
distress, or in any other truly noble cause, when important 
results are to be attained which cannot be secured without 
such a risk. 



CHAPTER IV. 



Our Rights and Duties Towards our Fellow-Men. 

146. Man has duties towards God and towards himself ; 
in regard to his fellow-men he has both duties and rights. 
We are still speaking of man as an individual and not as a 
member of society. According to this view we shall next 
consider his duties to other men and his right to possess 
property. 

Article I. The Love we Owe our Fellow-Men. 

147. Thesis VII. We 77iust love our fellow-men as we love 
ourselves. 

Explanation. We do not say as much or as intensely as we 
love ourselves, for this would be impossible, but " as our- 
selves," that is, in a similar manner, by wishing them good 
things of the kind we desire for ourselves. 

Proof. Right order, which is the foundation of all morality, 
requires the creature to conform his will to the will of the 
Creator. Now, the Creator wills the good of all men, namely, 
that they shall, of their own free will, attain their last end, 
and that they shall have all the necessary means to do so. 
This same, therefore, we must desire for our fellow-men; 
and this is to love our fellow-men as we love ourselves. 

Right order requires also that every one shall make it his 
first duty to work out his own salvation ; he is immediately 
and directly responsible for this. Hence, he must seek pri- 
marily to procure with most special care all things tending to 

89 



90 The Rights and Duties of Individuals. 



this object, which is his own greatest good. Consequently 
every man must love himself more than he loves other men. 

My love for other men is based on the fact of our common 
nature. All other men have the same specific nature as my- 
self, but not the same identity or individuality ; therefore, my 
love for all other men must be the same specifically, or of the 
same kind, as my love for myself ; but it need not, in truth it 
cannot, be so intense, because I cannot be so completely iden- 
tified with another person as with my individual self. 

148. But according to the foregoing principle, does not 
heroism, by which men sacrifice themselves for the good of 
others, violate the rule of well-ordered love? Even here 
the principle holds true ; for, though the hero may risk or sac- 
rifice his life to save another person, yet he thereby endeavors 
to gain for himself a higher good than life. His heroic act of 
charity merits a greater reward in the next world than a pro- 
longed life of ordinary virtue. Hence, he really seeks his 
own greater good, preferring a spiritual good to one that is 
temporal. 

149. From the argument of the preceding thesis, it is ap- 
parent that, even in the natural order, our love for our fellow- 
men is based for its motive upon our love for God. Hence, 
we perceive that all our rights and duties are referred directly 
or indirectly to our dependence upon God. 

. The dictates of this general love may be thus expressed : 
" Never do to others what you would not wish them to do to 
you," and " do unto others as you would have others do 
unto you." The negative dictate of this law obliges always; 
the positive dictate obliges us to act on special occasions 
only, when others are in uncommon need of assistance. Our 
duty to render such assistance becomes urgent when they are 
in extreme necessity. 



Our Rights and Duties etc. 91 



150. We are obliged to love all men; therefore, we mnst 
love our enemies. True, we may take whatever precautions 
sound reason approves, in order to protect our right against 
those who seek to injure us, but our object in so doing must 
be justice or the expediency of public or private good, and not 
personal revenge. It is not lawful to hate our enemies, for 
hatred is never a means to redress the wrong we may have 
suffered; nor are we allowed to injure them, unless the injury 
be done in self-defense (No. 164), and without violating the 
order of civil society. Nay even, we cannot rightfully ex- 
clude enemies from that general internal love which we owe 
to all men. They may, it is true, have done nothing to 
deserve such favor; yet, in common with ourselves, they are 
members of the human family, and made in a special man- 
ner to the image and likeness of God. 

151. Whom are we to love most ? Evidently, we ought 
to love those most who are most closely united to us by ties 
of nature, religion or civil society. Community of nature be- 
ing the bond of love between man and his fellows, the more 
two parties have naturally in common, or the nearer they ap- 
proach to identity by relationship of any kind, the greater 
ought to be their love for each other. Special effects of 
this love ought to be determined by the particular kind of re- 
lationship : to blood relations, we owe, especially, natural 
goods; to our brethren in the household of the Faith, spiritual 
goods; to our fellow-citizens, civil protection. 

Article II. Our Duties Regarding the Minds 
AND Wills of Others. 

152. Duties to others founded on the mutual relationship 
of our minds are violated by all falsehood and, particularly. 



92 The Rights and Duties of Individuals. 



by the propagation of false principles. Duties arising from 
the relationship of our wills are violated by bad example or 
scandal, which tends to deprave the wills of others. 

153. A falsehood, or lie, is speech contrary to one's mind. 
By a falsehood, a contradiction is willfully established between 
a person's thoughts and the received expression of those 
thoughts. For this reason, a falsehood contains a moral dis- 
order and is essentially wrong. 

Lying must be distinguished from equivocation and mental 
reservation. 

154. Equivocation consists in using an expression readily 
susceptible of two meanings, one false, the other true, which 
the listener or reader can, and often will, understand wrongly. 
Thus we read (Gen. xii. 13), that, on entering Egypt, 
Abraham instructed Sarai to call herself his sister, the Hebrew 
word for sister being often used to denote a near female rela- 
tive. He did this because his life would not have been safe 
if she were known to be his wife. In the matter of liceity, 
equivocation is generally classed with mental reservation 
which is not purely mental. 

155. " Mental reservation is the unexpressed qualification 
of a statement affecting or entirely altering its meaning as un- 
derstood by the person addressed, generally so that the uttered 
statement is untrue, though with the qualification it is true." 
(Standard Dictionary, 1894.) 

It consists, therefore, in withholding a circumstance by 
which a statement is qualified in such a manner that the state- 
ment is false as it stands, although it is true if joined to the 
qualifying circumstance. When it is strictly mental, i. e., 
when there is nothing either in the words or in the circum- 
stances that can prevent the hearer from being deceived, it is 
equivalent to a lie and therefore essentially wrong. But when 



Our Rights and Duties etc. 93 



the reservation is not strictly mental^ it may be allowed at 
times j yet not without weighty reasons, else speech would be- 
come unrehable and social confidence would be impaired. If, 
however, reservation were never lawful, the common good or 
great private good would often have to be sacrificed without 
sufficient reason, for it may often happen that important 
secrets cannot be protected without mental reservation. One 
example will suffice : a man to whom an official secret has 
been intrusted may answer, if interrogated on the subject, 
that he does not know, meaning thereby that he does not 
know the matter in such a way as to be able to communi- 
cate it. 

The objection may be raised that mental reservation is 
always wrong because it leads others into error, and, con- 
sequently, inflicts an injury upon them. We answer that he 
who uses a mental reservation,- as an unavoidable means, in- 
tends directly to save a private person or the public from 
injury ; and that, in so doing, he is not the cause but the justi- 
fiable occasion of error in the mind of the rash questioner. 

156. Thesis VIII. A lie is i7itrin sic ally evil. 

Proof I. It is intrinsically evil to use a thing contrary to 
its natural end. But the natural end of speech is to com- 
municate our thoughts to our fellow-men, and a lie is the con- 
trary of the thoughts of him who utters it. Therefore, a He is 
contrary to the natural end of speech and is intrinsically evil. 

Proof 2. The universal shame attached to lying is an evi- 
dent sign that, by the common consent of mankind, it is held 
to be wrong in itself. This is made clearer by the applica- 
tion of the simple text, " Do not do unto others, etc." Does 
any person wish to be deceived ? Lying, then, is an evil to 
the intellect which no one wishes to suffer, for no one wishes 
to be deceived. 



94 The Rights and Duties of Individuals. 



Proof 7,. Man is by nature a social being; hence it is the 
will of the Author of Nature that he shall hve in society. 
Therefore, whatever tends to subvert human society is intrin- 
sically wrong. But lying tends to do this, because it weakens 
mutual confidence, which is essential for human society. 

157. Objections. 

1. That cannot be wrong which all civilized nations 
allow in their courts of justice; but they allow the 
guilty to plead " not guilty." Answer. " Not guilty," 
pleaded in a criminal court, is an accepted technicality 
meaning *'not proved guilty." 

2. That is not wrong which is related by Holy Scrip- 
ture concerning virtuous men ; but it is there related 
that Jacob said, " I am Esau, thy first-born (Gen. 
xxvii. 19). Answer. Jacob regarded himself, after 
purchasing Esau's right of primogeniture, as legally 
Esau the first-born. Besides, Holy Scripture does not 
approve all the deeds which it chronicles of good men. 

3. Our Blessed Saviour Himself declared that He was 
not going up to Jerusalem, and yet eventually He 
went thither (John vii. 8). Answer. Our Lord did 
not go up to Jerusalem on that particular festival day 
of which He was speaking at the time, but He went 
up on the third or fourth day afterwards. 

4. But He denied that He knew when the end of the 
world should come (Mark xiii. 32). Answer. Our 
Lord spoke mystically as man and not as God ; so 
He was understood by His disciples, as in other like 
passages, e. g., " My doctrine is not mine, but His 
that sent me." 

158. Thesis IX. IV^ are obliged to refrain from giving 
scandaL 



Our Rights and Duties etc. 



95 



Explanatioji. Our duty towards the will of our fellow-man 
amounts to this : that, in charity, we ought to aid him in the 
attainment of his highest good, and, in justice as well as in 
charity, we must never deter him therefrom. We may so 
deter him, and thus become accessory to another's wrong- 
doing, in various ways, and especially by bad example, all of 
which we include under the general term, scandal. For scan- 
dal may be given by any word or deed not entirely right, 
Vv'hich is an occasion of wrongdoing on the part of others. 

Proof. We are obhged to will that others should attain 
their last end (Thesis VII.). But to give scandal is to will 
the contrary, because it tends to lead men away from their 
last end. Therefore, we are obHged to refrain from giving 
scandal. 

Article III. Duties Regarding the Lives of Others. 

159. Taking away another man's life is homicide. This, 
we shall see further on, may in special cases be justifiable, 
namely, in a just war (No. 263), in the infliction of the death 
penalty by the civil authority (No. 249), and in self-defense 
(No. 164). When homicide is not justifiable yet has extenu- ^ 
ating circumstances, it is known as manslaughter; when 
committed with malice and full deliberation, it is called mur- 
der. In the law, murder is defined as " the kilhng of a man 
with malice prepense or aforethought." 

160. The material world has been created for mankind; 
not for this or that individual man, not for any special class 
of men, but for every man and for all men. Each and every 
man is created for God and for his own final happiness, which 
is to be found in the everlasting possession of God. Con- 
sidered in this light, z. <?., according to their nature, all men 



96 The Rights and Duties of Individuals. 



are equal and independent of one another. It is not with 
man as with the brute creation. All other things have been 
made for him ; he can, therefore, dispose of them for his own 
advantage, and he has the right of hfe and death over irra- 
tional animals. But man has been made for God alone; 
consequently, to God alone belongs the right of life and death 
over man. Besides, since man is bound to tend towards his 
last end, he has a natural right to the means necessary for 
this purpose. Now, life is such a means; it is the founda- 
tion or the indispensable condition of all other means. There- 
fore, every man has a right to life, which all other men are 
bound to respect. 

161. Thesis X. Murder is a great wrong. 

Proof. The violation of most important rights is a great 
wrong. But murder is such a violation : it is therefore a 
great wrong. Murder is a violation: i. Of God's right over 
human life. 2. Of the murdered man's right to his own life, 
the foundation of his other rights and duties, and the means 
necessary to attain or increase his final beatitude. 3. Of the 
rights of society to one of its members, and to pubhc peace 
and order. 4. Of the rights that bereaved relatives and 
friends have to the love and society of the murdered man. 
Though some of the latter evils may not exist in special cases, 
nevertheless the chief disorders are present in every murder. 

162. Objections. 

1. An act is good when its object, end, and circum- 
stances are good ; but such would be the case in, say, 
the murder of a persecutor of the Church. Answer. 
The object of the act, or the thing done (No. 47) is 
wrong, for it is a usurpation of God's absolute right 
over the life and death of man. 

2. How then can it be right to kill a man in war? 



Our Rights and Duties etc, 97 



Answer. The thesis treats of murder, but not of 
justifiable homicide. We shall see (No. 263) that 
God confers upon the State the right of waging a just 
war. 

3. David killed the young man who had slain Saul. 
Answer. David acted in this case as a sovereign pun- 
ishing crime. 

4. Moses by his private authority slew an Egyptian. 
Answer. Moses was the divinely appointed deliverer 
of the chosen people. God, the master of life and 
death, inspired him to begin his task in this manner. 

5. Inspiration cannot be claimed for Mathathias, who 
put an apostate to death by his own authority (Mach. 
ii. 24). A?iswer. Mathathias was high-priest and 
judge, and, as such, the executive of the Jewish law, 
which ordained death without trial to the introducef 
of idolatry. 

163. Thesis XI. Under certam conditions it is lawful^ in 
self-defense^ to kill an unjust aggressor. 

Explanation. The conditions are: i. Real danger of los- 
ing life, or of suffering great bodily injury, or of losing im- 
portant possessions, the latter often being as necessaiy as 
hfe or limb. According to the general opinion, a woman 
may kill an assailant when his death is necessary in defense 
of her chastity. 2. No other way of escape. 3. No direct 
intention of killing the aggressor, but only of defending one's 
self. 4. That no greater injury be intentionally inflicted than 
necessity requires. 5. That violence be used only when the 
danger is imminent. 

Proof \. Our right to live involves a right to use the 
means necessary for life, provided such means do not violate 
the rights of others. But, in the case of unjust aggression 



98 The Rights and Duties of Individuals. 



the death of the aggressor may be the only means for saving 
one's Hfe; nor are the rights of others thereby violated. 
Between the assailant and defendant arises a conflict of 
claims to life, in which, evidently, the right of the defendant 
prevails, while that of the assailant is suspended for the time 
being. The precedence of right belongs to the defendant, 
who has not willingly exposed himself to the danger, and is 
merely repelHng an attack; but it cannot belong to the 
assailant, who is not acting from a motive of self-defense, 
and can cease from the attack or could have abstained from 
beginning it. 

Proof 2. The thesis is a dictate of common sense, as 
Cicero declares in his plea for Milo. 
164. Objections. 

1. The end never justifies the means. Answer. The 
means employed in self-defense are not evil; the de- 
fendant intends by his physical act, which is not in 
itself evil, not the death of his aggressor, but his own 
defense, and he violates no rights. 

2. God's right as master of life and death is violated. 
Answer. It is violated by the aggressor, who forces 
the defendant to strike the deadly blow. 

3. We must love our enemies. Answer. Well ordered 
charity does not require us to love our enemies more 
than we love ourselves, nor even to love them with 
equal intensity. 

4. But, if this last principle is true, we should be bound 
in duty to kill the aggressor ; yet this doctrine is re- 
pugnant 10 charity. Afiswer. We are obliged to em- 
ploy only ordinary means for the preservation of Hfe. 
As homicide is certainly an extraordinary means, we 
are not obliged to make use of it, although we have a 



Our Rights and Duties etc. 99 



right to do so. A man may waive this right, unless 
held back by imperative duties to others, and prefer, 
by a heroic act of charity, to lose his life rather than 
cut off his assailant while the latter has all his sins 
upon his head. 

5. The foregoing does not apply, if the aggressor is an 
insane person. Answer. Though not an unjust ag- 
gressor formally, yet he is such materially. Hence 
the common opinion is that, in most cases, the killing, 
in self-defense, of an insane person is not against the 
natural law. 

6. Then infanticide is not wrong, if it is necessary to 
save the mother's life. Answer. The unborn child is 
not an unjust aggressor, either formally or materially. 
Hence, the right of the mother who has caused, in 
some sense, the conflict of claims to life, must yield 
to the right of the child. 

Article IV. Duties Relating to the Honor of 
Others. 

165. Honor is the esteem in which a man is held by 
his fellow-men. Considered radically, or in its cause, it is a 
m^n's real excellence. Since all men have naturally, as beings 
endowed with rational faculties and destined for an exalted 
end, a certain high excellence, all men are naturally entitled 
to a certain honor. Still, as all men are not gifted with equal 
excellence, they are not all entitled to equal honor. A per- 
son may lose some of his claims to be honored or respected 
by others. It may be necessary for the common good, or 
even for some considerable private good, that the vices of an 
individual be exposed and his honor thus lessened. 



lOO The Rights and Duties of hidividuals. 



Honor is unjustly impaired by: i. Ifisult, or contumely, 
consisting in open, deliberate expressions of contempt ; 2. 
Calumny^ or false accusation; 3. Detraction^ or the disclosure 
of another's secret faults to any one who has not a right to 
know them. The last two faults are still further specified as 
offenses against another's good name. 

166. Thesis XII. // is tmlawfiil to impair afiother's 
honor, and necessary to make a??ie?ids for its violatiojt. 

Proof. We are obliged to love others as we love ourselves ; 
but to lessen another's honor is not to love him as we love 
ourselves, for we would not have others do this unto us. We 
wish our honor to be respected, (a) as something valuable for 
its own sake and prized as such by noble minds ; (b) as a 
protection of our rights, for a man in bad repute is more apt 
to sulrer wrong and has little if any influence towards con- 
ciliating favor. 

A man is obliged to make good the damage or loss which 
he has caused to another's honor or good name. Since justice 
demands that every one shall have his due, the honor unjustly 
taken away is due to him from whom it has been taken and 
must, as far as is possible, be restored. 

167. Duelling, a practice handed down from the pagan- 
ism of northern Europe, was once extensively used as a 
means for protecting or recovering personal honor. Happily, 
it has fallen into contempt and consequent disuse. 

168. Thesis XIV. Duelli7ig is opposed to the natural law. 

Proof. A duel is a fight between two parties with murder- 
ous weapons, undertaken by private euthority and according 
to previous appointment. Now, such an act is intrinsically 
wrong, and therefore opposed to the natural law. The act is 
intrinsically wrong, because it has the malice both of suicide 
and of murder, i. A principal in a duel exposes his life 



Our Rights and Duties etc. 



101 



without a just and reasonable cause, and he does this dehber- 
ately and by pre-arrangement. 2. He dehberately seeks the 
hfe of a fellow-man on his own private authority and with- 
out being forced by necessary self-defense. 
169. Objections. 

1. David is praised for his duel with Goliath. Answer. 
A single combat, authorized by the civil power as a 
means of warfare, is not a duel in the sense here at- 
tached to the word. 

2. A duel may be necessary to avoid the imputation of 
cowardice. Answer. It would be moral cowardice to 
do a wrong action through human respect. 

3. It is lawful to slay the unjust assailant of a man's 
honor, since many value honor more highly than 
life. Answer. Life can sometimes be defended 
only by striking down the unjust aggressor; but this 
is not true of a man's honor or good name. More- 
over, the esteem in which one man is held by others 
is not more precious than life, though this is true of 
honor considered radically or in its cause, /. <f., per- 
sonal excellence and virtue. 

4. According to the general opinion, a woman may kill 
the assailant of her honor, or virtue, if there be no 
other means of escape. Answer. Honor in this case 
means more than a good name ; it means bodily chas- 
tity, which its owner has a right to defend as a price- 
less possession (No. 163, i). 



CHAPTER V. 



RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP IN MATERIAL 
PROPERTY. 

170. Ownership is the right to dispose of property at 
will, and to exclude others from its use. By property, we 
mean the external material goods of the earth, which men 
can divide amongst themselves. 

Article I. Validity of Titles to Ownership. 

171. Thesis XV. We have a right to own property. 
Explanation. The ownership here spoken of is not abso- 
lute: it is dependent on God. 

Proof. We have a right to Hve, indeed we are bound by 
duty to our Creator to preserve our lives ; hence we have a 
natiu-al right to the means necessary to preserve life. But the 
ownership of property, the holding, using, and disposing 
at will of material goods to the exclusion of other men, is a 
necessary means for the preservation of life. Therefore, we 
have a right to own property. 

172. Thesis XVI. We have the right to increase or lay 
yp property. 

Proof I. Our right to life not only exists for the present 
hour or day, but it also extends into the future ; hence we 
have the right to the ordinary means for prolonging our hves 
by providing betimes for future wants, such as sickness, old 

102 



Ownership in Material Property. 103 



age, or the dependence upon us of other persons. Now, this 
impHes a right to increase our property beyond present needs. 
Therefore, we have a right to increase or lay up property. 

Proof 2. All men, considered specifically, or according to 
their common nature, are equal ; therefore, no one is bound 
either to labor for another or to surrender the results of his 
labor without just compensation. Yet this a man would be 
forced to do, unless rights to property were lasting ; because, 
if a claim to property had been estabUshed, and that claim 
could not continue, the labor which the claimant had ex- 
pended in obtaining or developing the property would pass 
without compensation to another man. 

173. The principles explained in the preceding paragraphs 
apply to landed property just as well as to other material 
goods of a less stable character. Yet the right of private in- 
dividuals to own land has been, of late years especially, vigor- 
ously denied, as unjust and opposed to the natural law. This 
doctrine, or land theory, has had for its most prominent 
champion in our own country Mr. Henry George, who de- 
clares (Progress and Poverty, B. VL, C. II.) that private 
ownership in land is the chief source " of the unjust and un- 
equal distribution of wealth apparent in modern civilization." 
He finds only one remedy: ''We must make land common 
property." His reasonings are as ingenious as his claim is 
bold and his language forcible ; but they are full of sophistry. 
He begins by granting that if the remedy is a true one it 
must be consistent with justice. But he fails in his earnest 
attempt to prove this for his land theory. In striving to 
establish the justice of his claim, he does not hold the teach- 
ing of the Communists that any kind of private property is 
unlawful. On the contrary, he refutes this teaching with 
much ability and force. "What constitutes/' he asks (B. 



I04 The Rights and Duties of hidividuals. 



VII., C. I.), "the rightful basis of property? What is it 
that enables a man to justly say of a thing, ' It is mine'? 
From what springs the sentiment which acknowledges his ex- 
clusive right as against all the world ? Is it not primarily 
the right of a man to himself, to the use of his own powers, 
to the enjoyment of the fruits of his own exertions ? Is it 
not this individual right which springs from and is testified 
to by the natural facts of individual organization — the fact 
that each particular pair of hands obey a particular brain and 
are related to a particular stomach ; the fact that each man 
is a definite, coherent, and independent whole — which alone 
justifies individual ownership ? As a man belongs to him- 
self, so his labor when put in concrete form belongs to him. 

"And for this reason, that which a man makes or pro- 
duces is his own, as against the world — to enjoy or to de- 
stroy, to use, to exchange, or to give. No one else can 
rightfully claim it, and his exclusive right to it involves no 
wrong to anyone else. Thus there is to everything produced 
by human exertion a clear and indisputable title to exclusive 
possession and enjoyment, which is perfectly consistent with 
justice, as it descended from the original producer in whom it 
vested by natural law. The pen with which I am writing is 
justly mine. No other human being can rightfully lay claim 
to it, for in me is the title of the producer who made it. It 
has become mine because transferred to me by the stationer, 
to whom it was transferred by the importer, who obtained 
the exclusive right to it by transfer from the manufacturer, in 
whom by the same process of purchase vested the rights of 
those who dug the material from the ground and shaped it 
into a pen. Thus my exclusive right of ownership in the pen 
springs from the natural right of the individual to the use of 
his own facultiesi." 



Ownership in Material Property, 105 



The theory, however, proves too much. If the principle 
were true that right to ownership can be estabHshed only by 
transforming labor, man could own nothing, for he can pro- 
duce nothing without material to work upon. The iron or 
gold of which the pen is made is not produced by man; 
hence, in the very first instance, appropriation by occupation 
must be admitted as a true title to the raw material. Mr. 
George is, therefore, entirely mistaken when he goes on to 
say : " There can be to the ownership of anything no right- 
ful title which is not derived from the title of the producer." 
In his elaborate development of this false proposition, on 
which his theory of the injustice of private ownership in land 
chiefly rests, the same fallacy is ever recurring, namely, the 
confusion of productioji with any exercise of the human facul- 
ties. The explorer does not produce the desert land which 
he discovers ; and yet he acquires a clear title to it on Mr. 
George's own principle that he exerts his faculties in its ac- 
quisition. Mr. George's theory is, therefore, unsound; he 
totally fails to prove the injustice of private ownership in 
land. His attacks on land owners are not justified, and 
are consequently unwise. For, as he himself says : " That 
alone is wise which is just, that alone is enduring which is 
right." 

1 74. Thesis XVIII. Mere first occu^pancy is by itself a 
valid title to ownership. 

Explanation. Occupation consists in taking possession of 
something that does not belong to another person, and that 
can be an object of ownership. This means of acquiring 
ownership can be employed at present to only a very 
limited extent, since land and nearly all movable property 
belong to individuals, or companies, or governments. 

Froof. The principle that a man is entitled to possess 



io6 The Rights and Duties of Individuals. 



what he first occupies, provided it be the property of no 
other person, is universally admitted as a dictate of common 
sense. The only thing opposed to it is the doctrine of Com- 
munism, that all goods are by nature positively common to 
all men. But this doctrine is absurd, for a man would be 
thereby made slavishly dependent upon all other men, with- 
out whose permission he could not justly appropriate any- 
thing for his personal use. The child or the man, savage or 
civiHzed, that catches a wild fowl or fish, that finds a valua- 
ble stone belonging to no one, that gathers wild fruit, will 
justly claim ownership as a right by priority of possession. 
There is no reason why this principle should apply to mov- 
able goods only and not to land as well, provided he who 
finds a piece of land ownerless marks it by some external 
sign as his property, thus indicating his intention of keeping 
it and of excluding all others from the possession of it. 

175. In modern times occupancy of a new land is effected 
by some state or government, which thus becomes the first 
owner. Next, individuals acquire possession by complying 
with certain conditions determined by the civil power. In 
this country, lands are held in virtue of original grants made 
either by the United States directly, or by other governments 
that controlled tracts which afterward came under the juris- 
diction of the United States. These latter grants were con- 
firmed later on by the present government. Once the con- 
ditions placed by the civil power are complied with by the 
occupants, their rights are fixed, and both justice and the 
common good demand that they be kept inviolable. The Con- 
stitution of the United States provides that no private prop- 
erty shall be taken for public uses without just compensation. 
In this, the Constitution only enunciates the natural right of 
private owners ; and therefore no amendment of the Consti- 



Ownership in Material Property. 107 



tution could ever confer upon the government the right freely 
to confiscate the land. 

176. Yet a state might hold landed property in common, 
as was done to some extent among the Irish clans, and later 
on in the French Colony of Louisiana. But, as a rule, it is 
far more expedient to encourage private industry by allotting 
portions of the land to private persons, or permitting them to 
take possession according to certain formalities that the State 
will determine for the common good. Nearly all nations 
have, ii'x their early history, acted on these principles ; and 
thus the division of land by occupancy, yet with public sanc- 
tion and according to public regulations, is said to have 
been made jure gentium. This term does not mean inter- 
national law, but the law of the nations in this sense, that it 
is the prevalent legislation of all nations in accordance with 
the exigencies of natural rights. 

177. The state retains two restrictions on private owner- 
ship, founded on the requirements of the common good: i. 
The right of taxation, that is, the imposition of a burden 
proportionate to the protection bestowed, and not any tax at 
will ; for justice requires a proportion between what is given 
and what is received. 2. The right of eminent domain, e., 
the right of taking private property for public uses when 
necessary, with compensation made to the owners. 

178. Thesis XIX. A grant of unoccupied laftd, made by 
civil society to private parties, on proper conditions, founds a 
just claim to ownership. 

Proof 1 . Society can make such laws as promote its end — 
the general welfare of the community — provided it does not 
violate any prior rights. But such assignments, or grants, 
made on proper conditions, contribute to the general welfare 
and violate no prior rights. For such a measure promotes 



io8 The Rights and Duties of Individuals. 



enterprise, industry, and public spirit, without which a high 
degree of civiHzation would be difficult, if not impossible. 

Proof 2. A State can dispose of its property for the com- 
mon good. This it does by allotting lands as a reward to 
soldiers who have fought for their country, or for the pur- 
pose of encouraging settlers to clear and improve the ground, 
or as an inducement to corporations to make roads, build 
bridges and other public works, and thus open up the coun- 
try to trade and travel. 

179. Thesis XX. Communism and Socialism are unjust 
and injurious. 

Explanation. Communism denies the right of private own- 
ership and declares that all property is by nature positively 
common. Socialism demands that all productive property 
shall be given over to the State, which would thus become 
sole proprietor of land, manufactories, railroads, etc., and sole 
distributor of the compensation due to every individual mem- 
ber of the commonwealth for his labor. Now we maintain 
that Communism and Socialism, if introduced as general sys- 
tems in the present order of things, would be unjust and in- 
jurious. 

Proof. The fundamental principle of Communism is false, 
namely, that by nature all goods were intended for mankind 
to be positively common, so that no one could justly appro- 
priate to himself anything beyond immediate pressing wants, 
without the consent of the other members of the community. 
The absurdity of this view is manifest from the unnatural 
dependence in which man would be thereby placed. Another 
false principle made use of by both systems is the absolute 
and entire equahty of all men. In the abstract and before 
the law, all men are said to be equal ; but in the co?icrete, no 
two men are exactly equal. No two men have equal powers 



Ownership in Material Property, 109 



of body and mind, equal abilities for government or trade, 
the same tastes and dispositions, even the same rational 
wants. 

Both systems would begin by depriving men of the fruit of 
past labors ; both would confiscate the earnings of one man 
for the benefit of others without compensation, thus violating 
a great natural right. Moreover, it is impossible for either 
system, judged on economic grounds, to last, or to attain 
even a fraction of the fanciful plenty so freely promised by 
its advocates. The latter seem to base their calculations on 
the Utopian dream, that, in the new Communistic or Socialistic 
Republic, men shall lose their selfishness and be free from 
their passions, and will freely practise heroic self-denial and 
self-forgetfulness ; that, in other words, men shall be trans- 
formed into angels. Yet these same leaders generally ignore 
or repudiate religion, the wellspring of self-sacrifice, and aim 
at sweeping away the rights of Church and family. 

Article II. Violations of Ownership. 

180. The violation of the right of ownership, if committed 
secretly, is called theft ; it is called robbery, if the act is done 
openly and with physical force. Such violations disturb the 
balance of equality which justice demands for all the mem- 
bers of the community. The balance cannot be properly re 
stored except by the restitution of the property unjustly 
acquired. What was stolen continues to belong to the one 
from whom it was taken, and must be given back to him. 
Res clamat ad dominum, " property calls for its owner," is an 
important axiom of jurisprudence. Even if the owner cannot 
be found, it is not fair that the thief should retain what he 
has stolen : fraus sua nemini patrocinari debet^ " no one 



no The Rights and Duties of Individuals. 



should reap any beflefit from his fraud." He must part with 
his ill-gotten goods, disposing of them as he may presume the 
owner would direct, if he could be consulted; for instance, 
by giving them or their value to the poor. 

1 8 1. If damage has been done willfully to the property of 
another, reparation of the damage must be made before 
equality can be restored. This duty rests, in the first place, 
upon the chief perpetrator of the damage ; and, secondarily, 
upon those who have voluntarily aided him, physically or 
morally, to inflict the injury. Such aid or co-operation may 
be given in various ways, viz. : by taking part in the material 
action ; by command, advice, consent ; by sheltering or con- 
cealing ; by sharing in ill-gotten gains ; and even by not 
warning, not preventing, or not making the guilty known 
when one is, in justice, bound to do so. 

Article III. Various Modes of Acquiring 
Property. 

182. The chief modes of acquiring property are the fol- 
lowing : 

1. First occupancy: that is, taking possession of any 
material object that is really without an owner. 
(No. 174.) Domestic animals, even when they have 
strayed far from their owner, remain his property; but 
wild animals, though captured and tamed, if once 
they have regained their native liberty, are considered 
as belonging to no one till captured again, when they 
become the property of their new captor. 

2. The finding of lost articles. These have an owner 
to whom they must be returned, if he can be dis- 
covered with reasonable effort. If, however, the owner 



Ownership in Material Property, iii 



cannot be discovered, the articles become the property 
of the finder. When hidden treasures of great value 
are found in civihzed lands, their ownership or ap- 
portionment is settled according to existing laws that 
have been enacted for such cases. The goods of those 
who die intestate, and without natural heirs, are to be 
disposed of as the laws direct. 

3. Accession is a title to new property that is added 
to my former possessions, either naturally, e. by 
birth, as with the young of cattle, or by alluvion, as 
by deposits of soil on a river bank; or accidentally, 
or even designedly, as when another plants or builds 
on my grounds, or in other ways improves my prop- 
erty. In these instances, disputed claims may arise 
which the civil law is to decide. 

4. Prescription is a title to ownership of property 
based on the fact that it has been held in quiet and 
dona fide possession for the space of time appointed 
by the law. This supposes: i. That the property is 
such as can be lawfully acquired by a private person. 
2. That the person in possession has honestly con- 
sidered it all along as his property. 3. That he has 
remained in undisputed and uninterrupted possession 
during the required time. 

The common good demands that claims t© property 
reaching back beyond a reasonable period should be 
disregarded, in order that ownership may be settled 
on a soHd basis. 



112 The Rights and Duties of Individuals. 



Article IV. The Transfer of Property by Contract. 

183. OwTiership has been defined (No. 170) to be the 
right to dispose at will of material, external goods. Now, 
the right to dispose of an object at will involves the right to 
transfer it to another person. This act of transfer begins 
in the owner's will, is continued in the expression to the 
other party of this act of his will, and is completed by the 
latter's acceptance of the ofTer. This consent, externally 
manifested, of the two parties concerned, agreeing to the 
transfer of rights, is called a contract. 

184. A contract is gratuitous, or one-sided, if only one 
party gives up a right to ownership, the other party accept- 
ing the proffered benefit without any cost to himself. This 
is the case in free gifts amongst the living or in the behests 
of the dying. In either instance, the equality implied in 
natural justice requires the person benefited to make the 
compensation of gratitude to the donor. 

185. A man has a right, derived not from ci\dl legislation 
but from the natural law, to dispose of his property by his 
last will. Yet he cannot do it in such a manner as to vio- 
late the rights and just claims of others. Hence, the father 
of a family has no right to alienate his entire property in 
favor of extems, if in so doing he should leave his wife 
and children destitute. If he dies without making a will, 
they have a right, founded on the natural law, to inherit his 
property. The share that each member of the family shall 
receive is usually determined by existing civil laws. 

186. Inviolability is due to last wills, not only by reason 
of the right which the testator has to dispose of his prop- 
erty, but also on account of the common good of society. 
Few men would care to exert themselves beyond the efforts 



Ownership in Material Property. 113 



necessary for present needs, if they could not dispose of 
the property acquired by their toil for the benefit, after their 
death, of those who are nearest and dearest to them, or of 
objects and institutions the success and continuity of which 
they had greatly at heart during life. 

187. All contracts in which both parties assume an obliga- 
tion, or in which both yield some right for the benefit re- 
ceived, are called onerous. The rights thus exchanged or 
transferred need not be those of ownership ; yet, of whatever 
kind they may be, the principle of equality between what is 
given and what is received determines the justice of the 
transaction. This principle, however, is not to be too strictly 
interpreted. If, for example, I take a fancy to an article of 
little intrinsic value in the possession of another and induce 
him to let me have it at a high price, the bargain is just. 
Though materially no equality exists between the price and 
the thing purchased, still there may be an equality formally 
between what I pay and the value that, of my own free 
choice, I set on the article. But this supposes that the excess 
of the price is assented to freely on my part. If another 
takes advantage of my special need and forces me to pay 
more than the commodity is worth, he does me an injustice, 
and the contract is unjust. 

188. To be valid or binding, every contract, whether it be 
gratuitous or onerous, must be attended with the following 
conditions: 

1. The contracting parties must be co7npetent persofis — • 
/. <f., in the full possession of reason ; hence, infants, 
insane and intoxicated pei:sons are not competent; 
minors are legally incompetent — /. their contracts 
are usually not recognized as valid before the law. 

2. The matter of the contract must be appropriate — 



114 The Rights and Duties of Individuals. 



i. e., the rights transferred must be really capable of 
transference, and must belong to those who exchange 
them. Hence, no one can vahdly bargain to do a 
thing that he has no right to do. 
3. Proper fori7i must be observed. Both civil and 
ecclesiastical authority may, each in its own province, 
appoint certain forms, the non-observance of which 
renders some contracts null and void. The natural 
form essential to every contract is the true, full and 
mutual consent of the contracting parties. This 
supposes that both have a sufficient knowledge of 
what they are agreeing to. Hence, if one of the 
parties seriously misunderstands the contract, he is 
not bound to stand by it. Contracts made by minors 
can frequently be rescinded or annulled by their 
parents or guardians, because minors are supposed to 
act with insufficient knowledge. 

Article V. The Wages of Laborers. 

189. The relations between laborers and their employers 
ought to be such as to conduce to the benefit of both parties. 
This cannot be the case unless full justice be done on each 
side. It is therefore of great importance to understand in 
this matter the golden mean between the exactions of grind- 
ing capitahsts and the unreasonable demands of Com- 
munists and Socialists. 

By wages, we understand the compensation agreed upon 
by the workman and his employer for the former's ser- 
vices to the latter. We shall first consider such an agree- 
ment merely as an onerous contract, money or its equiva- 
lent being exchanged for work. Each party has a right to 



Ownership in Material Property. 1 1 5 



that which he gives in exchange; and if the compensation 
is proportionate to the services rendered, the contract is just. 
The services thus contracted for cannot be of use to the 
employer, as productive property, except in their results. 
Accordingly, whatever profit he can derive by the combina- 
tion and direction of such labor above that which the wage- 
earners themselves could have won by their individual exer- 
tions is his gain; whatever he loses thereby is his loss. 
They have no part in the management; consequently, it 
would be unreasonable for the laborers to claim, in addition 
to the stipulated compensation, the right to divide with 
their employer the profits of his management. 

Their mutual relations — we are not speaking of co-operative 
associations — are not those of partnership ; else the losses, as 
well as the profits, would have to be shared in common. 

190. How shall we determine the proper amount of wages 
to be paid to each, laborer ? The answer to this question is 
not easy, especially for particular cases. The following prin- 
ciples, however, are of general application: 

1 . To preserve the balance of equality, which ought to 
exist in every onerous contract, between what is given 
and what is received in return, a laborer who, by 
superior skill or industry, renders more valuable service 
than others, is entitled to higher wages. 

2. The laborer who is called upon to expend imiisual 
exertion, by performing more painful or more pro- 
tracted toil, by exposing life or limb or health to more 
than ordinary danger, by devoting an uncommonly 
long time to the task of preparing and qualifying him- 
self for his position, is entitled to a compensation ex- 
ceeding the ordinary wages. 

3. The chief difficulty is encountered in fixing the 



1 1 6 The Rights and Duties of Individuals. 



amount of wages for ordinary service. This must be 
the standard or basis of wages. For other kinds of 
service there ought to be higher pay ; but what shall 
we give for ordinary service? Labor, many answer, 
is like merchandise, and its owner, the laborer, is en- 
titled to that only which his labor will bring in the 
market; and hence, whatever he agrees to accept, 
even though forced by stress of need or competition 
to sell his toil for a pittance, that is the proper 
amount. Now, this view is erroneous and unjust. 
Labor is not common merchandise ; it is the wear 
and tear of life in rational beings, every one of whom 
has an inalienable right to his life — not the life of a 
beast of burden, but the life of a man. Hence, he 
has the right to all that is necessary to maintain 
humafi life, not only in his own person, but also in 
those who are naturally dependent upon him for the 
means of subsistence. The wages, therefore, which 
an employer is bound in justice to pay to the man 
that labors for his interest as faithfully as a human 
being can be fairly expected to labor, ought to be suf- 
ficient to support the workman and his wife and chil- 
dren with decency and reasonable comfort. This is 
the minimum quantity of wages.* 

* " The labor of the working-man is not only his personal attribute, but it is 
necessary; and this makes all the difference: the preservation of life is the 
bounden duty of each and all, and to fail therein is a crime. It follows that 
each has a right to procure what is required in order to live ; and the poor can 
procure it in no other way than by work and wages. I,et it be granted, then, 
that, as a rule, workmen and employer should make free agreements, and, in 
particular, should freely agree as to wages ; nevertheless, there is a dictate of 
nature more imperious and more ancient than any bargain between man and 
man, viz., that the remuneration must be enough to support the wage-earner in 
reasonable and frugal comfort. If, through necessity or fear of a worse evil, the 
workman accepts harder conditions because an employer or a contractor will 
give him no better, he is the victim of force and injustice." — Pope I^eoXHI., 
Encyclical on lyabor, 1891. 



Ownership in Material Property. 117 



191. Can wage-earners justly form organizations to pro- 
tect themselves against exacting capitalists ? — in other words, 
are labor unions lawful? A right to an end imphes a 
right to the means necessary to attain that end, if such means 
do not violate the rights of others. Now, laborers have a 
right to fair wages ; therefore, they have a right to the just 
means necessary to obtain fair wages. But organized asso- 
ciation on the part of workingmen is often necessary ; it is 
often the only means of securing fair wages from overreach- 
ing employers Such association does injustice to no one. 
Therefore, workingmen can, with justice, have recourse to 
labor unions as a means of self-protection. 

Are strikes illicit ? Men have a right to refuse working 
for unfair wages. Their places may be taken by others, and 
the latter cannot justly be prevented from doing so, except 
by moral suasion. Of course, employers also have a right 
to form unions, in order to protect themselves against un- 
reasonable demands of their employees. 

192. If the common good is injured by the general stoppage 
of work attendant on strikes and lock-outs, the most proper 
remedy is to be sought in the intercession and arbitration of 
fair-minded and disinterested persons. On general principles, 
it is not desirable that the government should meddle with 
peaceful disputes of citizens, as long as private means are at 
hand for bringing about a good understanding. Boards of 
arbitration are usually the best agency for restoring health 
and vigor to the whole industrial system.* 

* "In these and similar questions, however, such as, for example, the hours of 
labor in different trades, the sanitary precautions to be observed in factories, 
workshops, etc., in order to supersede undue interference on the part of the state, 
especially as circumstances, times and localities differ so widely, it is advisable 
that recourse be had to societies or boards, ... or to some other method of 
safeguarding the interests of wage-earners, the state to be asked for approval 
and protection."— I^eo XIII., E;ncyclical on I,abor. 



1 1 8 The Rights and Duties of Individuals, 



Yet no general or lasting cure can be effected, except by 
animating the members of both classes with the spirit of 
justice and mutual love. Now, this cannot be secured with- 
out a sound education, which itself implies the doctrines of 
the true religion. 



BOOK III. 



SOCIAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES. 



CHAPTER 1. 

SOCIETY IN GENERAL. 

193. Men, we know from observation, are not by nature 
isolated individuals. They are associated in many ways : 
as members of families, as belonging to a tribe, as dwelling 
close to one another in hamlets and towns, as fellow-citizens 
of a political State. This relation of men to one another 
gives rise to a most important class of rights and duties, 
which we shall study in the present book. 

A society is the u7iion of several or many persons for the 
purpose of obtaining a common end by the use of commo?t means. 
Sociality, in the strict meaning of the term, is distinctive of 
man, since only rational beings can direct means to an end. 
Brutes can never be social, though they may sometimes be 
gregarious; some species may simulate society by instinc- 
tively acting in concert for a common good. 

194. The nature of each society is specified by the end 
for which it was established. Religious society, the noblest 
of societies, because its end is noblest, promotes the wor- 
ship of God; domestic society was instituted for the sals^Q 

119 



I20 Social Rights and Duties, 



of family life ; the end of civil society is the welfare of the 
nation ; inteimatioiial society forwards the prosperity of many 
nations bound together for the protection of their com- 
mon interests. Besides, there are innumerable societies of 
less importance than the far-reaching associations mentioned 
above, such as benevolent, commercial, literary and scientific 
societies. It need hardly be mentioned that no society is 
lawful that is detrimental to the common good, or to the 
welfare of a higher society. 

195. We may ascertain the rights of any society in par- 
ticular by examining the end for which it exists. If the end 
is lawful, the means to that end are law^ful, provided such 
means violate no prior right. Hence, an obvious right of a 
society is to direct its members in the use of the proper 
means. Moreover, since the society is either necessary for 
the members or is entered of their owm free will, it has the 
right to enforce upon its members the use of the common 
means. 

196. Thesis I. Authority is necessary to society. 

Proof. Authority is the mo7'al power of directing men's con- 
duct and of enforciiig such directio7i. Now, such a power is 
necessary for the end of society. For the members must often 
be informed regarding the nature of their duties and the man- 
ner of performing them ; men are free and are naturally in- 
clined to seek their own individual advantage, often to the 
detriment of the common good ; they may sometimes find it 
advances their own selfish interests to hinder others from 
performing their duty. Hence, unless a society has the 
power to direct its members and to enforce such direction, it 
cannot attain its end. 

197. From these explanations it is clear that authority 
is to be exercised only for the good of the society. The 



Society in General. 



121 



ofGlce of a person in authority is a public trust, and not 
merely a personal privilege ; it demands, therefore, prudence 
and fidelity. The extent of his authority depends upon the 
nature of his trust, and the importance of the end and of 
the several means required to attain the end. The applica- 
tion of compulsion beyond just limits is called tyranny. 

198. All mankind constitute a universal society, of which 
God Himself is the founder, ruler, law-giver, and judge. 
This universal association fills all the requirements of a so- 
ciety (No. 193): it is {a) a union of rational beings placed 
here upon earth, {b) for the common purpose of rendering 
glory to God and securing their own eternal happiness, {c) 
which purpose is to be accomphshed by the observance of 
the same natural law under the authority of the one Supreme 
Law-giver. 

199. Thesis II. Society is fiatural to man, and therefore 
the institution of God. 

Proof T. The constant and universal fact of human society 
must have a proportionate cause, which can be no other than 
the human nature which God has given to each and every 
man. Moreover, the need which all men have of assistance 
from other persons in order to attain the end of their exist- 
ence is an unmistakable sign that this need or exigency of hu- 
man society is natural to all men, and consequently has been 
implanted in human nature by the Sovereign Author of 
nature. 

1. The infant needs its parents for its very existence 
and for the preservation of its life. 

2. The child must be sustained and educated by 
others. 

3. The youth requires the guidance and control of ma- 
turer minds. 



122 Social Rights and Duties. 



4. The full-grown man and woman generally need each 
other's assistance to lead a life of intelligence and 
comfort, of mutual love and abiding happiness. 

5. Old age would be miserable indeed without the sup - 
port and love of a younger generation. 

Proof 2. Man's higher powers, his splendid faculties of 
intellect and will, were surely not bestowed upon him to he 
dormant and neglected, but to be developed and put to use. 
Now, even if man could, unassisted by his fellows, preserve 
his life against wild beasts and the elements, yet without the 
society of other men he could rise only a little above idiocy. 
Long and intimate association with polished minds is indis- 
pensable for advance in the sciences and arts. Besides, in 
the normal state of things, man's wonderful powers of speech 
and hearing make society a necessary element of human hap- 
piness. 

Proof 3. Some of man's noblest tendencies, which were 
certainly given to him for a purpose, find no exercise except 
in human society ; such are benevolence, pity for the unfor- 
tunate, admiration of virtue and of heroism, self-devotion to 
the common good, and similar dispositions, which are called 
the social virtues. Nor will the general society of human 
kind afford proper play for these tendencies ; a closer asso- 
ciation in particular societies is evidently required, in which 
mutual example and encouragement incite to generous deeds 
of self-sacrifice and of devotion to a great cause. 



CHAPTER 11. 



DOMESTIC SOCIETY. 

Article I. The Nature and Purpose of Domestic 
Society. 

200. The form of society most ancient and most necessary 
for the human race is the family or domestic society. It 
originates in marriage, which is defined to be : The union of 
a man and a woman, involving their living together in undi- 
vided intercourse. Marriage is the institution of the Creator 
Himself. He made woman to be man's companion, not his 
slave — "A help like unto himself" (Gen. ii. 18). The quali- 
ties of the two sexes were not to be identical, but to be simi- 
lar and supplementary; wisdom, strength, and firmness pre- 
dominating on the one side, deference and tenderness on the 
other; while mutual love and fidelity were to join both parties 
in the one indissoluble union of wedlock : " Wherefore a man 
shall leave his father and mother and shall cleave to his wife, 
and they shall be two in one flesh " (Gen. ii. 24). 

201. The primary ends of marriage are the generation 
and education of children, whereby the human race is per- 
petuated and elevated to a becoming standard of intellec- 
tual and moral excellence. 

I. This perpetuation of the race is evidently intended 
by the Creator, who not only bade our first parents 
increase and multiply and fill the earth" (Gen. i. 
123 



124 Social Rights and Duties. 



28), but He also implanted in the natures of men and 
women such inclinations and needs that this design 
can never be frustrated. 

2. Yet it is not necessary for this purpose that every 
one shall enter the state of marriage ; but exceptions 
in this matter may be expedient, even apart from 
supernatural considerations. 
The intellectual and moral elevation of mankind is far 
more important than its numerical increase. This principle 
has been acted upon by countless heroes of all times, who 
have sacrificed their lives in youth or vigorous manhood for 
the advance of truth and science, for the honor and liberty 
of their country, or for the spread of civilization. An army 
is highly benefited by the presence of magnanimous leaders ; 
mankind likewise is elevated by the example of intrepid souls, 
and particularly of those who sacrifice for a great religious 
motive the pleasures and comforts of marriage and lead a Hfe 
of perpetual continency. In this career, the most perfect 
among the sons of men has set Himself as the pattern, and 
millions have followed His example. However much the 
low-minded and sensual may sneer at such a practice or deny 
the possibility of its long continuance, the experience of 
God's saints and innumerable chosen souls makes it manifest 
that such a life is possible, and, with special supernatural 
graces, comparatively easy. 

202. The secondary end of marriage is the direct good of 
the contracting parties, their peace, mutual love, and union 
of mind and heart. This condition of things results partly 
from similarity of tastes and dispositions; but it depends 
chiefly upon the practice of the social virtues, especially of 
an enduring conjugal love, by which each party is prompted 
to further the happiness of the other. Yet in its primary and 



Domestic Society. 125 



secondary ends, marriage is subordinate to the last end of 
man, his everlasting beatitude. 

Article II. The Unity and Indissolubility of 
Marriage. 

203. The two chief properties of marriage are unity and 
indissolubility. One man and one woman are joined in 
wedlock, promising, as the old formula correctly expresses it, 
to take each other as husband and wife, " for better, for 
worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness and health, till death 
do us part." To the unity of marriage are opposed polyandry^ 
or plurality of husbands, and polygamy^ or the plurality of 
wives. To indissolubility is opposed divorce. 

204. Polyandry is destructive of the very idea of order in 
domestic society, because, if man is to retain his natural 
headship of the family, it would give several heads to the same 
family. Besides, polyandry defeats both the primary and the 
secondary ends of marriage. Even if in this condition of 
affairs children were born, it would be very difficult, if not 
impossible, to tell who was the father of each particular child, 
so that the education of such practically fatherless offspring 
would be incomplete and neglected. And can we imagine 
that domestic peace and love could find place in such a 
household ? Consequently, polyandry is entirely opposed to 
the natural law. 

205. Polygamy, though it does not make the generation 
and education of the children impossible, is directly opposed 
to the secondary end of marriage, for it is the unfailing cause 
of jealousy, strife and domestic unhappiness; it degrades 
woman from her true rank to the condition of slavery. 
Hence, polygamy is a violation of the natural law, though 



126 Social Rights and Duties. 



not to so great an extent as polyandry. History shows that 
polygamous nations have advanced very slowly, if at all, in 
civilization, and that amongst them the increase of popula- 
tion has not equaled that of monogamous nations. 

To the objection that God permitted polygamy to the patri- 
archs of old, we answer that God never approved the prac- 
tice. He tolerated it for a period, until, in the fullness of 
time. His holy will was more luminously declared, and the 
original unity of marriage was re-estabhshed. Even if God 
did allow plurality of wives in past ages, it does not follow 
that the practice may be adopted without His special dis- 
pensation. He alone controls the rights of all parties, and 
He alone could prevent the evils that must result naturally 
from a polygamous union. 

206. Indissolubility is the second property of marriage, 
that is, the marriage contract is of such a nature, that, once 
entered upon, it continues in force until the death of one of 
the contracting parties. A lasting union it was meant to be 
from the beginning : " Wherefore a man shall leave his father 
and mother and shall cleave to his wife" (Gen. ii. 24). 
This property is violated by divorce, which consists in an- 
nulling or breaking the marriage contract, so that each of the 
contracting parties may marry again during the lifetime of 
the other. 

Divorce is opposed to one of the primary objects of mar- 
riage, namely, the proper education of the children. The 
latter have a natural right to the support, the supervision, the 
good example, the abiding love of both their parents, to 
whom, in return, they owe lasting reverence, love, and gratitude. 
Yet these duties, which are established by the natural law, 
divorce makes impossible of fulfillment. It turns the mutual 
love of husband and wife into mutual hatred ] the children 



Domestic Society. 



127 



cannot cling to both parents, and thence results a house 
divided against itself, a byword of disgrace. 

Moreover, if divorce were foreseen as possible, how easily 
would mutual distrust be aroused, to be followed by domestic 
discord. " If," says the Rev. Joseph Rickaby, S. J. (Moral 
Philosophy, p. 276), "a divorce a vinculo were a visible object 
on the matrimonial horizon, the parties would be strongly en- 
couraged thereby to form illicit connections, in their expecta- 
tion of having any one of them ratified and sanctified by 
marriage. Marriage would be entered upon hghtly, as a 
thing easily to be done and readily undone, a state of things 
not very far in advance of promiscuity." 

207. It is sometimes objected that the unnatural conduct 
of one of the contracting parties may make the continuation 
of family life a moral impossibility, and that in this case 
divorce is the less of two evils. Such a state of affairs may 
indeed render it impossible for the parties in question to live 
together; nevertheless divorce is not therefore admissible. 
An escape from the difficulty may be had, without violation 
of law or of right, by a temporary separation, a toro, "from 
bed and board," as the arrangement is termed, which may be 
indefinitely prolonged according to need. Yet this measure 
differs from a separation a vinculo, or the annulment of the 
marriage contract. Among baptized Christians, for whom 
marriage is a sacrament figuring the spotless and irrevocable 
espousals of the Son of God with His Church, every valid 
marriage that has been consummated is absolutely incapable 
of annulment : " What God has joined together, let no man 
put asunder" (Matt. xix. 6). 

208. Marriage is, therefore, by its nature, a bond that can 
be loosened only by death. It may be asked whether divorce 
is essentially wrong, /, e.^ whether it is so opposed to the 



128 Social Rights and Duties, 



natural law as to be inadmissible under any conditions. We 
know that in the time of the Old Testament, God allowed or 
tolerated it for some special cases in the midst of general cor- 
ruption. But toleration of a measure is immensely diflerent 
from approval of the same. Besides, it is one thing for God, 
the Sovereign Master and Guardian of rights, to dispense 
from a law, and quite another thing for the civil authorities 
to grant a similar dispensation in a matter that does not 
come within their jurisdiction. The civil powers do not 
create the family, nor can they without injustice bring about 
its destruction. 

209. Thesis III. The rights of domestic society are not de- 
rived from civil society. 

Explanation. To Catholics it is evident that civil society 
cannot without sacrilege usurp control over matrimony, 
which is a sacrament instituted by Christ. But we are here 
considering the subject in the light of natural reason, pre- 
scinding from the special dignity to which we know by 
Revelation the marriage contract has been elevated. 

Proof I. The individuals composing a State must have 
existence before the State can exist, and these individuals 
have, by their nature, the right to form domestic society. 
Add to this, the institution of marriage and the entire consti- 
tution of the family are antecedent, historically, to the forma- 
tion of civil society. Consequently, the rights of the family 
cannot be derived from civil society ; and therefore the latter 
can advance no title to control or modify rights which it did 
not originate. 

Proof 2. Every rightly constituted society can justly claim 
only such powers as are necessary for the attainment of its 
own distinctive end, and it can claim no powers that infringe 
upon prior rights. But to attain its ends — the public peace 



Domestic Society. 



129 



and the protection of personal rights — the State has no need 
of jurisdiction over marriage, the education of children, or 
other matters pertaining naturally to the family or the indi- 
vidual, and this, too, by a right prior to the rights of the 
State. On the contrary, by depriving individuals or families 
of their natural rights, which it is bound to protect, civil so- 
ciety contradicts its own end. 

Proof 2i- A nobler society cannot be subject in the matter 
of its inherent and distinctive rights to a society that is less 
noble. But domestic society is nobler in its ends and object 
than civil society, and therefore cannot be subject to the 
latter in the matter of its essential rights. The end of do- 
mestic society is the propagation, and, especially, the educa- 
tion of the human race for time and eternity, whilst the end 
of civil society is happiness in this world ; hence, the advan- 
tages it secures are less intimately connected with the true 
happiness of men than those aimed at by domestic society. 

2 1 o. The State has a right as the guardian of public de- 
cency to forbid such marriages as are opposed to the natural 
law. Though it can have no jurisdiction over the substantial 
features of marriage, it may assert control in the matter of 
certain external forms or accessories, in order to insiu-e the 
protection of individual rights, such as the settlement of 
property and the rightful succession to titles and privileges. 
Hence the State may demand a record of valid marriages, 
and for this purpose may require compliance with legal 
formalities, e. g., of registration, provided the burdens thus 
imposed be reasonable and for the common good. Should it 
be objected that the State has a right to regulate contracts, 
and, therefore, the marriage contract, we reply that the State 
has no right over contracts that are in their nature prior to 
its existence. In so far as civil consequences are involved in 



I30 



Social Rights and Duties. 



family matters, the State is bound to protect natural rights, 
but it cannot create or control them. Except in cases of 
gross violation of strict rights among members of a family, 
the presumption is against State interference in the concerns 
of domestic society. 

Article III. Parental Authority. Education. 

211. The temporal and eternal happiness of men, as well 
as the prosperity of civil society, depends chiefly, in the 
natural order, on the perfection of domestic society. Now 
an essential condition for the welfare of every society is 
a proper exercise of its authority ; since in this manner the 
necessary means are directed to the end for which the society 
exists. Hence, in discussing principles of domestic society, 
we must first decide in whom the authority of the family 
resides. 

Thesis IV. The husband is 7iaturally the head of the family. 
Proof \. The universal practice of all races of men shows 
that this is a dictate of common sense. 

Proof 2. He to whom the other members of the family 
look naturally for protection, support and direction, is in- 
tended by the Author of natm-e to possess authority in the 
family, or to be its head. Now, such a one, in the normal 
state of affairs, allowance being made for occasional and par- 
tial exceptions, is the husband, the father of the family. For 
{a) the husband is properly the founder of the family, the pri- 
mary cause of its existence ; woman was created to be a help 
and companion to man. {b) It is he who, as a rule, is expected 
to provide for the family its means of support, {c) On ac- 
count of his superior strength of mind and body, all look to 
him for direction in doubt, and for defense in danger, {d) He 



Domestic Society. 



is to represent the interests of the family abroad, the wife 
being detained at home habitually by duties which she can 
best perform. (<?) Nature's gifts have been so divided be- 
t^^ een husband and wife that reason, which is the faculty for 
ruling, is more dominant in the former, love and sympathy in 
the latter. He is the head, and she the heart ; but the head 
should direct the heart. 

2 12. The wife and mother, who is not a menial, but the 
helpmate and companion of her husband, shares his parental 
dignity, and is likewise entitled to a share in his authority 
over the family. She is naturally the centre of domestic 
affection, the dispenser of the comforts provided by the 
father, the mistress of the home, subject indeed to his pru- 
dent direction when important occasions make such direction 
necessary, yet possessing the right to manage her own do- 
main. From her lips the children will receive direction and 
warning, and her loving hand will correct their faults. The 
father will, if need be, firmly support her authority, and by 
word and example teach the children to venerate their 
mother. 

213. Education is the most important duty of parents 
towards their offspring. It consists in the well-proportioned 
development of the child's faculties to prepare him to make 
efforts for himself in order to secure happiness in this world 
and the next. Bodily development is first in the order of 
time; moral and religious education is first in the order of im- 
portance ; for rehgion and morality lead to the highest and 
most lasting happiness. Cultivation of the intellect in some 
degree is necessary for all men, though there can be no uni- 
versal standard in this matter ; the extent of the mental train- 
ing to be given to the child must depend largely on the 
position in life which he may be reasonably expected to hold 



132 



Social Rights and Duties. 



in after years. Book-learning is not the measure of personal 
happiness or of public usefulness ; but attainments in the 
moral order, whether they be accompanied with scholarship 
or not, are an unfailing source of happiness to their possessor 
and of valuable service to other men and to the State. 

214. Religion is the most important element of education. 
The child has the right to be prepared for all the most im- 
portant duties of life. Now, among these latter, the worship 
of God takes precedence of all others, and is to be most 
solicitously provided for. Nor can the principles of morality 
be inculcated without dogmatic religious teaching; for men- 
will not observe the natural law unless they know that it has 
a proportionate sanction. But to teach the existence of such 
a sanction is to teach rehgion. All parents of sound judg- 
ment are constantly teaching their children principles of 
natural rehgion, and no one who possesses a sufficient un- 
derstanding of this important subject, can honestly disagree 
with Washington's declaration : " Howsoever great the in- 
fluence of a pohte education is said to be on certain minds, 
reason and experience by no means allow us to expect that 
morality shall prevail in a nation if rehgious principles be 
excluded." 

When, moreover, parents are blessed with supernatural 
truth and grace, they would be exceedingly cruel to their 
child if they denied him what they themselves consider to 
be the most precious and necessary possession on earth — the 
knowledge of God's revealed religion. Hence, the Christian 
education of their children is the most sacred duty of 
Christian parents. 

■ 215. Enemies of revealed religion have, especially in re- 
Cent times, advocated an unreasonable system of education, 
which recalls the harsh and unnatural training in vogue 



Domestic Society. 



»33 



amongst the ancient Spartans — namely, State control of 
education. They maintain that the State should assume 
the office of educating the young without regard for the nat- 
ural rights of parents. By this means, the youth of the land 
could be imbued with the poHtical principles of the ruling 
power or party, and, especially, they could be indoctrinated 
with irreHgion and be induced to look with complete indif- 
ference, if not with abhorrence, upon the Faith of their an- 
cestors. This system finds favor with certain political writers 
and leaders who aim at extending and centrahzing the civil 
power; with self-seeking demagogues who scheme for a 
control of patronage in the system of State education ; with 
Socialists who would destroy individual liberty and make 
the State all-powerful ; and with many well-meaning, though 
deluded men who, not perceiving the wrong and the danger 
of such a course, prefer State control of education as a 
cheaper and less troublesome method, and even as a safe- 
guard against what they fancy to be the subversion by the 
Catholic Church of the liberties of the land. 

216, Thesis V. The education of children belongs by right 
to their parents. 

Explanation. This right belongs to parents primarily and 
per se ; per se — e., by the very fact that they are parents, 
though per accidens it may pass to others, as, e. g., when the 
parents are dead, or if they are wholly unfit to exercise 
this right; piimarily — /. <?., they possess this right before all 
others, and are responsible for the education of their chil- 
dren, even when they delegate part of their right to others 
who thus acquire a secondary right. 

Proof \. They who have a natural and indispensable duty 
to educate the young have the natural right to fulfill that 
duty. But parents have such a duty ; therefore, they have 



134 Social Rights and Duties. 



the natural right to educate their children. That parents 
have such a duty is evident from the primary object 
of matrimony, which is not merely the generation of chil- 
dren, but especially the education of new members of 
the human family in a manner worthy of their rational 
nature. 

Proof 2. The child has on his part an inalienable right to 
the means necessary for attaining his last end. Since educa- 
tion of some kind is such a means, he has a right to educa- 
tion. Now, surely this is not a vague, abstract right, but it is 
something determinate, and connotes determinate persons who 
are under positive obligation to care for that right. Such 
persons nature clearly points out ; the parents are naturally 
the most closely related to the child ; in them nature has im- 
planted the enduring, patient love required for such a work ; 
the child is naturally disposed to revere and love his parents 
and to receive their instructions and corrections with ready 
docility. 

Proof 2^. If education belonged by right to the State rather 
than to the parent, the former would have to perform all the 
functions of education, the feeding, clothing, and housing of 
the children no less than the office of instructing them in let- 
ters, morality, and rehgion. But such functions do not come 
within the range of the State's duties ; attempts to assume 
them would be justly denounced as usurpations of personal 
rights. In particular : [d) Who does not feel that the State in. 
its agents has no right to invade the home circle and there 
assume control, setting aside the wishes of parents and chil- 
dren ? (^) The State is utterly incompetent, especially in a 
population of mixed creeds, to teach dogmatic rehgion ; and 
yet without dogmatic religious teaching, morality is apt to be 
little more than a name. 



Domestic Society. 



135 



217. Objections. 

1. The State must control whatever bears on the 
public good ; but such is the education of children. 
Answer. This principle, if followed out, would make 
us a nation of slaves ; for it would destroy every per- 
sonal right. Almost every act bears immediately or 
remotely on the public good; thus the State could 
regulate all details of food, clothing, and lodging, the 
choice of trade or profession, the selection of husband 
or wife; these matters, inasmuch as they affect the 
well-being of the citizens, are related to the common 
good. Accordingly, we reply to the objection : The 
State must control whatever bears on the public good 
— provided it does not go beyond its own province 
and usurp inalienable private rights, for the protection 
of which the State has been instituted. 

2. The State is bound to secure what is so necessary 
for the public good as education. Answer. The 
State has no right to meddle in private matters that 
are well enough provided for. Its duty in such cases 
is to come forward and lend further assistance when 
private efforts are inadequate to avoid a great public 
evil or to procure a great pubhc good. Now, educa- 
tion — especially that which s called elementary edu- 
cation — can be well enough imparted by parents and 
those whom they choose as aids in this work. The 
State may laudably encourage and assist private 
efforts : to be a patron of education is an honor ; to 
usurp its functions is injustice. 

3. But the State needs intelligent voters. A?tswer. 
The man in our times who cannot read and write is 
sxurely at a disadvantage ; nevertheless, it is possible 



136 Social Rights and Duties. 



for one to be very intelligent without book-learning. 
The State needs honest, conscientious voters ; to ob- 
tain these, it must encourage sound religious instruc- 
tion, but it need not control any form of educa- 
tion. 

4. But the State should defend the rights of children ; 
hence, it has a right to pass compulsory school laws. 
Answer, i. The duty of defending children's rights 
could, at best, only entitle the State to compel parents 
. ^ to educate their children. 2. The education to which 
children have a strict right, is that which will fit 
them to attain their happiness in this world and the 
next. Now, this does not require a certain fixed 
amount of book-learning. Therefore, if parents choose 
to teach their child a trade, the latter has no further 
right to education that the State may defend. 
218. The duties of children toward their parents are those 
of love, gratitude, honor, and obedience. Flowing directly 
irom the mutual relations of parents and children, the first 
three of these duties remain always in full vigor. In regard 
to the duty of obedience, three periods of life are to be 
distinguished : 

I. During the years of imperfect judgment, while the 
child constantly needs support and wise direction, he 
must allow himself to be trained by his parents with 
perfect docility. Hence, at this period, he owes them 
obedience in all things that are not opposed to the law 
of God. He must submit to his parents' correction 
and chastisement, in the infliction of which love ought 
to rule, accompanied by prudence, moderation, and 
firmness. 

3. When the judgment is matured, yet the son pr 



Domestic Society. 



137 



daughter remains under the parental roof, the parents 
are to be obeyed in all things pertaining to the man- 
agement of the home and the general good of the 
family. They must continue to watch over the morals 
of their children, to warn and reprove them whenever 
necessary, and even to enforce compliance with the 
laws of good behavior. They ought to assist their 
children to make a wise and prudent choice of a state 
of Hfe, though they have no right to prescribe or dictate 
the state of hfe to be chosen, or the partner to be 
selected in marriage; nor can parents object to the 
adoption of a holier career in the religious or eccle- 
siastical state, unless they be in pressing need of their 
children's support. Man's first and highest allegiance 
is due not to his parents, but to God, and he has 
a perfect right to obey the Divine call to a hoHer 
manner of life. " He that loveth father or mother 
more than Me, is not worthy of Me." (Matt, x., 37.) 
Hence, it is apparent, also, that parents cannot right- 
fully prevent their children from embracing the true 
Faith. 

3. When the grown-up son or daughter withdraws 
from the parental home, the duty of obedience ceases, 
but not the duties of love and reverence for parents, 
and of respect for their wisdom and advice. More- 
over, all must assist their parents in case of need, and 
ever be to them a source of honor and consolation. 
219. A complete family usually includes servants, who 
differ from other wage-earners by being permanently em- 
ployed in domestic occupations. As such, they become 
inmates of the house, and, in a certain sense, members of the 
family. From this fact special rights and duties arise in 



138 Social Rights and Duties. 



their regard with respect to the other members of the house- 
hold ; e. g., they may be entrusted with delegated authority 
over the children of their employers. It is their duty to have 
the good of the family sincerely at heart : and, on the other 
hand, they are entitled not only to their salary, but also to 
special love and care, particularly in times of illness. Every 
one is bound by the natural law to see to the moral and 
physical welfare of those belonging to his own household. 

220. We know from history that at the dawn of Chris- 
tianity nearly half the human race was in a state of slavery. 
In the mildest meaning of the term, a slave is a human being 
bound for life to work for his master without other remu- 
neration than his support, possessing no rights except those 
that are inalienable. Lialiejiable rights are such as are in- 
timately connected with the attainment of our last end. 
They are the rights to life, limbs, health, surroundings favor- 
able to morality, and in general all those aids to eternal hap- 
piness of which a man cannot justly deprive himself, since 
bv so doing he would infringe God's rights to his service. 
Slavery thus limited may, perhaps, in certain special circum- 
stances, contain no violation of strict right, and, therefore, 
no injustice; yet, it ever has been an evil, usually far greater 
than squalid poverty ; and it has occasioned countless 
abuses of the most deplorable kind. Hence, the Church has 
always labored — and with unfailing success — to mitigate and 
finally to suppress it. To the general satisfaction, slavery has 
disappeared from all Christian lands. There is no reason, 
therefore, for treating the subject further. 



CHAPTER III. 



CIVIL SOCIETY. 

2 21. Civil society may be defined as a union of many such 
persons as are their own masters, sui juris^ joined together 
for the purpose of protecting their rights and securing their 
temporal happiness. In the present chapter we shall con- 
sider the nature and the origin of civil society, and the 
exercise of civil functions. 

Article I. The Nature and the Origin of Civil 

Society. 

2 2 2. The nature of civil society can be best understood 
from a detailed examination into its constituent notes, namely: 
I. Its end or purpose, 2. The units composing it, 3. The 
authority governing it, 4. The means employed to obtain 
its end. 

§ I . The End of Civil Society. 

223. I. We have seen in a preceding chapter (No. 199) 
that society, or association of some kind, is natural to man, 
and, consequently, that it is an institution of God. The 
society first in the order of nature is the family, or domestic 
society, and next in order comes civil society, or the State. 

The necessity of civil society is obvious : when many 
families live in proximity, they are forced to have intercourse 
of some sort with one another. In the course of time it will 
come to pass, as each family has chiefly its own interests at 

139 



140 Social Rights and Duties. 



heart, that many of these families will not be moderate in 
their aspirations, their claims, and their efforts at aggran- 
dizement. Hence, unless they be united for the purpose of 
securmg public peace and the protection of personal rights, 
they will be frequently at variance, and even in deadly strife 
with one another. 

224. The preservation of peace among its members is the 
primary end of civil society. United by a common bond, 
men can render great assistance to one another in securing, 
with comparative ease, the comfort and happiness of all; 
and opportunities for the development and exercise of the 
human faculties are thus afforded which would be impossible 
without such an association. The complex end of civil so- 
ciety is clearly stated in the preamble to the Constitution of 
the United States, which reads thus : "We, the people of the 
United States, in order to form a more perfect union, estab- 
hsh justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the com- 
mon defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the 
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain 
and estabhsh this Constitution for the United States of 
America." 

225. Civil society, we repeat, is natural to man, and, 
consequently, owes its institution to the Creator. It is natu- 
ral, because it is the outcome of man's natural tendencies and 
is necessary for the development and appHcation of his high- 
est powers. Without civil society, men could not lead hves 
worthy of their rational nature and their ultimate destiny. 
The theory of Hobbes and of Rousseau, that man is natu- 
rally a savage, perpetually at war with his fellow-men, and 
that society is an afterthought, something artificial super- 
added to his nature, is as opposed to histoncal facts as it is 
degradmg to the human race. 



Civil Society. 



§ 2. The units of which civil society is composed. 

226. When certain families have entered into association 
for mutual aid and protection, the domestic relations in each 
family are manifestly not altered thereby : the family con- 
tinues to be a natural society ; each family is a moral person, 
the father acting for all the members. Hence the units com- 
posing civil society are not individual men, women, and 
children, but the families, or the heads of families. The 
wives and children are indeed members of the State, though 
not directly ; they are members of the families that make up 
the State, and they are represented in the State by the heads 
of the families to which they severally belong. It is neither 
necessary nor desirable for the common good that the State 
should deal directly with them, ignoring the natural organiza- 
tion of the domestic society. Unmarried men, who are prop^ 
erly qualified by age and civil condition, /. <?., who have at- 
tained their majority and are their own masters, siii Juris, 
share with heads of families in the enjoyment of civil 
rights. 

§ 3. Civil Authority. 

227. That the common good may be attained, the mem- 
bers of which civil society is made up often stand in need of 
direction, and sometimes of compulsion. The power thus to 
direct and compel is called civil authority; it is, as it were, 
the soul or animating principle of the body poHtic. What 
rights should belong to this authority must be inferred from 
its purpose, which is the attainment of the end of civil 
society. Civil authority, therefore, is to possess all those 
rights which are necessary to direct, and even compel, the 
citizens to tend towards the end of the State, /. e,, public 
peace, the protection of rights, the more perfect attainment 



142 



Social Rights and Duties, 



of happiness for all, provided the means employed be con- 
sistent with individual rights. 

228. But may not the common good require the sacrifice 
of individual or private rights ? As the common good con- 
sists principally in the defense of the private rights of indi- 
viduals and famihes, it cannot require such a sacrifice. 
Exceptions in this matter are more apparent than real. Yet, 
aside from the forfeiture of personal rights or privileges for 
certain misdeeds, cases may arise in which individuals or 
families have to forego private advantages in order to serve 
the common good : as when a citizen is called upon to ex- 
pose his life for the defense of his country. In this case his 
right is not violated; the State does not take away his life, 
but it obliges him to expose himself to danger for a greater 
good, in accordance with the demands of duty. 

229. In levying taxes, the State distributes the common 
burden of expenses incurred for the public good. The right 
of eminent domain (No. 177) suspends a private right ac- 
cording to the principles explained in a preceding book 
(No. 121). The tendency of certain agitators in politics and 
political economy is to extend the powers of the State beyond 
all just limits, to the prejudice of private rights. This ten- 
dency, whether it is manifested in the advocacy of unjust 
taxation, in special class legislation, or in meddling with 
parental rights of education, is directly at variance with the 
purposes of civil government, and opposed to the spirit of our 
Constitution. Civil government exists for the welfare of the 
people and the protection of private rights. When, therefore, 
the government usurps the rights of individuals, it becomes a 
form of tyranny, quiet submission to which is not patriotism, 
but slavery. 

230. Whence comes the authority of the State ? The 



Civil Society, 143 



question may refer to civil authority in the abstract or in the 
concrete. Civil authority i7i the co7icrete regards the partic- 
ular form of government which a particular State or nation 
has come to assume. It is evidently a matter of historical 
fact : certain events have brought about the assumption of 
that manner of government. 

Supposing now that a State or government exists, we may 
inquire whence it derives authority; /. the right to govern 
its subjects. This latter is a consideration of authority in the 
abstract, and is an ethical question. 

231. Thesis VI. Civil authority is derived from God, and 
can impose conscientious obligations. 

Proof. As in every society (No. 196), so in civil society, 
authority is necessary ; it is the very form or animating prin- 
ciple of civil society (No. 227). Now, God is the founder 
of civil society, since it is natural to man ; and God neces- 
sarily wills that everything He makes shall possess all powers 
necessary for the purposes for which He made it. But au- 
thority is necessary for the purpose of civil society ; therefore, 
it possesses this authority from God. 

From this principle, it follows that civil government can 
impose obligations in conscience. Authority means the 
moral right to govern. Now, such a right imphes on the 
part of the governed the moral obligation to obey. Never- 
theless, the authority thus bestowed is limited to those pur- 
poses for which it was intrusted to the State — namely, to 
procure the end of civil government by just means. Hence, 
an unlawful use of authority imposes no moral obligation. 

232. It has been much debated whether civil authority 
comes immediately from God to the ruler, or through the 
medium of the people, by whom it is intrusted to the rulers. 
Certainly, it can hardly be said that such authority resides 



144 



Social Rights and Duties. 



with an unorganized multitude ; yet, as soon as the commu- 
nity has become an organized body, it has the moral power 
of civil government. It may intrust this power to one or 
more persons, and it may place restrictions upon these both 
with regard to the time and the manner of exercising the 
authority thus bestowed. 

233. One thing is certain — namely, that civil authority 
is not a mere collection of private rights intrusted by all 
the individuals of a community to the management of one 
or more chosen members. The civil power has the right to 
inflict the death penalty (No. 249) in punishment of enormous 
crimes. But such a right could not belong to a merely 
voluntary association of individuals, since they cannot give 
to any person or persons a right which they do not possess. 
Therefore, civil authority is not a mere collection of private 
rights. This principle is further explained in the following 
thesis : 

234. Thesis VII. The doctrine of the social contract main^ 
tained by Rousseau is illogical. 

Explanation, According to the fanciful theory of the "so- 
cial contract " devised by Jean Jacques Rousseau, the citi- 
zens, when they obey the authority of the State, obey them- 
selves or fulfill their own commands ; for civil authority he 
declared to be nothing else than the free union of individual 
wills. He supposed that the members of a community have 
agreed to intrust the exercise of their individual rights to one 
or more men, who thus become their agents for the adminis- 
tration of these associated rights, just like the agents of a 
business firm, and who may be, like such agents, dismissed 
at the pleasure of their employers. As forms of government 
have existed from time immemorial, the supposed contract 
must have been entered into by our remote ancestors. 



Civil Society. 



H5 



Proof I. Either the citizens are bound by the agreement 
of their ancestors to a civil compact or they are not so bound. 
If such an obhgation exists, they do not render obedience to 
themselves, as Rousseau would have it, but to their ances- 
tors; hence, they would be bound by a will not their own. 
If, however, no such obligation exists, then there is no civil 
authority at all ; for that is no authority which every one is 
free at any moment to set aside. There can be no true right 
to command where there is no corresponding duty to obey. 

Proof 2. This theory could never explain the right, ad- 
mitted by all nations, of inflicting capital punishment ; for no 
one can give to another what he does not himself possess — 
the right to take away his life. 

§ 4. The Means Employed by Civil Authority. 

235. The means employed to obtain the end of civil gov- 
ernment are of three kinds: 

1. Acts commanded as necessary for this end, such as 
the payment of taxes, or the raising and equipment of 
armies in time of war. 

2. Acts forbidden as injurious to private rights or to 
the common good. On both these points there is need 
of great care that, by the promotion of certain lawful 
objects or the protection of certain rights, other rights 
be not violated, especially those of a more sacred char- 
acter; this would defeat the very purpose for which 
civil government exists. 

3. The organization of the government, or the civil 
pohty which is to direct the means to the end. 

236. There are various forms of organization: 

I. The monarchical, in which all civil power is vested 



146 Social Rights and Duties, 



in one man, whether he be called king or emperor or 
by any other title. 

2. The aristocratic^ in which power is vested in a few 
individuals or famihes. 

3. The dejnocratic, in which the people hold the power; 
it is then usually administered by representatives 
whom the people have chosen. These are the simple 
forms of government organization. Mixed forms are 
those in which the simple forms are variously com- 
bined. In the British Government, for instance, the 
supreme power is vested in the crown — king or queen 
— and in Parliament, which consists of the House of 
Lords, as the aristocratic element, and the House of 
Commons, as the democratic element, the members 
of the latter House being elected by the people. 

237. Practically, that form of government is the best for 
any people which is best adapted to obtain for them the end 
or purpose of civil power; that form, namely, which, account 
being taken of the character, traditions, and various circum- 
stances of the people, is best suited for the defense of their 
private rights, for the maintenance of peace at home and 
abroad, and for the development of the country's resources ; 
which will thus contribute to the common happiness on earth, 
and enable every member of the community to attain his last 
end. 

Article II. The Functions of Civil Government. 

238. To fulfill its purposes, civil government must exercise 
three functions, namely : the legislative^ in the making of 
laws; the Judiciary, in the application of the laws to particular 
cases; the executive, in carrying laws and judgments into effect. 



Civil Society. 



H7 



All three functions may be exercised by one person or body 
of men ; but in this country they are intrusted to three dis- 
tinct departments : the legislative to Congress, the judiciary 
to the law courts, the executive to the President. 

§ I. Legislation. 

239. Since the State derives its authority from the moral 
law, it can, as we have shown, bind its subjects in conscience 
to observe its enactments (No. 231). In order to possess 
this binding force, such enactments must be just {ibid.) ; 
therefore, they must fulfill all the conditions required for just 
laws (No. 81). Hence, one readily perceives how false, 
when applied to legislative acts, the common saying may be, 
"The voice of the people is the voice of God." An unjust 
law enacted, even with perfect unanimity, by an entire nation 
would have in itself no binding force ; a fortiori^ it has no 
such power if passed by a mere majority. In fact, a majority 
may be just as tyrannical as a despotic monarch. Since laws 
are, by their nature, directions for future acts, they cannot 
justly brand an action as guilty which before the passage of 
such laws was considered innocent ; nor can they justly in- 
crease the punishment for an act already committed. Hence, 
the Constitution of the United States forbids the enactment 
by Congress of ex post facto laws. 

240. Though the civil authority has power to bind the 
conscience, yet not every purely civil law imposes such obliga- 
tion. For laws have no greater binding effect than their 
authors intend to impose ; nor can the obligation exceed the 
requirements of the common good. Some laws accomplish 
all the purposes for which they were enacted, if the trans- 
gressor is obliged to pay the appointed penalty when caught 



148 Social Rights and Duties. 



in the forbidden act ; and the legislator is often content with 
this kind of sanction without being willing to lay a moral ob- 
Hgation on the conscience. Such laws are styled merely 
penal laws. In practice, it is often not easy to determine 
which laws are merely penal. Evidently, however, those 
laws oblige in conscience the violation of which would be 
positively injurious to the common good. 

241. The office of legislation is to direct the acts of the 
citizens to the attainment of the end proper to civil society. 
That end includes public order, defense of private rights, and 
development of material and mental resources for the com- 
mon good. Hence, legislation must take care — 

1. To ward off physical evils from the country, e.g., 
contagious diseases. Therefore it has power to use 
the means necessary for such purpose, e. g., the enact- 
ment of sanitary regulations, the estabhshment of 
quarantine, etc. 

2. To ward off 7Jioral evils, such as the dissemination 
of false doctrines that weaken morality, undermine 
society, and attack natural religion. Hence, too, the 
State has a clear right to put just restrictions on 
license of speech and of the press. The public prof- 
anation of Sunday, indecent theatricals, houses of 
debauch tend to degrade the standard of public and 
private morahty, and, consequently, are subject to 
legislative action. On the other hand, religion, the 
chief safeguard of morals, ought to be at all times 
countenanced and actively protected. 

3. To protect individual rights, such as the rights of 
minors, of orphans, of those concerned in contracts, 
in last wills, etc. 

4. To forward material improveme7its, such as high- 



Civil Society. 



149 



ways, bridges, watercourses, harbors, and all such 
works generally as are useful to the country at large 
and too vast for private enterprise. 
5. To promote 7ne7ital development, by encouraging 
education and assisting educational institutions, espe- 
cially those devoted to the teaching of the highest 
branches; for education contributes largely to the 
common good, and higher studies in particular, though 
pursued by the few, redound to the welfare of the 
people generally. 

242. In many undertakings the State ought to aid but 
not to supplant private enterprise, assuming the lead when 
individuals and corporations can advance no further, subsi- 
dizing important works that affect the general welfare, with- 
out exercising a monopoly or competing with private efforts. 
The tendency of Socialism is to substitute State control for 
private enterprise in many departments of business, without 
any benefit to the common good. Thus, instead of being a 
protector, the State would become a usurper of private rights, 
and in this way defeat the purpose of its existence. 

§ 2. The Judiciary. 

243. The task of the judiciary is twofold: 

1. To settle disputes between rival claimants: this is 
done in the civil courts. 

2. To prosecute, in criminal courts, persons charged 
with violating the law, and, in case of their conviction, 
to award the penalty appointed for the transgression. 
The settlement of civil disputes is often submitted by 
the disputing parties to arbiters chosen by themselves. 
An arbiter differs from a judge in this, that the latter 



150 Social Rights and Duties, 



acts in virtue of the sovereign power of the State, and, 
therefore, possesses authority over the parties con- 
cerned, while an arbiter has no rights in the matter 
under dispute except such as are conceded to him by 
the Htigants. From the decision of the lower courts 
appeal may be made in important cases to higher 
courts. But there must be, in the nature of things, a 
supreme court, from whose decision there can be no 
appeal. Though even this higher tribunal may err, 
nevertheless the pubhc good requires that its decisions 
shall be final. 

244. The courts are guided by existing laws, the expe- 
diency of which is no matter for their consideration ; their 
work is the interpretation and apphcation of existing laws to 
special cases. Yet certain courts are sometimes called upon 
to decide whether a given enactment is truly a law, whether 
it has all the requirements of a just law (No. 81). If an 
enactment is evidently unjust or is openly at variance with 
the Constitution of the country, it is not a law, and judges 
cannot justly enforce it. 

245. The preservation of public order, one of the primary 
functions of civil society, necessitates the punishment of 
social crimes. Now, a social crime is an outward disturb- 
ance of civil society by the violation of a strict right of our 
fellow-men. Evil acts in which injury is done to those per- 
sons only who freely take part in them, do not violate a strict 
right of any man, and are, therefore, not subject to the pun- 
ishments of civil authority. 

It is for the legislative power to appoint the punish- 
ment of crimes, for the judiciary to award the punishment 
in individual cases, for the executive to inflict it, or, in 
exceptional circumstances, at the discretion of the official 



Civil Society. 



holding the necessary authority, to remit or commute the 
penalty. 

246. Thesis VIII. Civil society has the right to punish 
social crimes. 

Proof. Every natural society has a right to those means 
which, in the ordinary course of events, are necessary for it 
to obtain its ends ; but the punishment of social crimes is 
such a means for civil society. Therefore civil society has 
the right to punish social crimes. 

247. Let us consider how and why such punishment is 
necessary in order that civil society may attain its end. 

1 . That end is the maintenance of social order. To 
secure this, it is necessary that advantage and pleasure 
be consequent on the observance of order. But the 
criminal disturbs the order of things by seeking to 
make advantage and pleasure consequent upon dis- 
order. Accordingly, justice requires, for the restora- 
tion of right order which he has disturbed, that he 
shall lose advantages or feel pain. For this purpose, 
then, various kinds and degrees of punishment are 
needed to match the various kinds of evil doings and 
the various grades of guilt. Hence, one purpose of 
legal punishment is expiation. 

2. The end of civil society is likewise to guard rights 
from violation ; but this cannot be done unless offend- 
ers be punished in a manner to deter others from fol- 
lowing their evil example; the penalty should, for this 
purpose, be proportioned to the crime. 

3. The criminal himself needs correction, i. e.^ by the 
bitter medicine of pain he is to be induced to give up 
his vicious practices, and kept from disturbing the 
social order in the future. 



152 Social Rights and Duties. 



248. Thus a threefold reason exists for the infliction of 
legal punishment; it is expiatory^ deterreiit^ and ??iedicinal. In 
domestic society, punishment is primarily medicinal for the 
correction of the offender, yet at times it may be deterrent 
for others. In civil society, punishment is chiefly expiatory 
and deterrent, and it need not be medicinal. 

249. Thesis IX. Civil society has the right to inflict the 
death penalty for enormous crimes. 

Explanation. We know from Revelation that God has 
bestowed this right upon civil authority; we maintain here 
that it belongs to civil society by the principles of natural 
reason. 

Proof. The means employed by civil society must be suffi- 
cient to attain its end. Now, in many cases, nothing less than 
capital punishment is sufficient to attain that end. For, (a) 
There are criminals so depraved and so indifferent to other 
forms of punishment that the death penalty alone can deter 
them from committing enormous crimes, [b) Some crimes, 
such as deliberate murder, treason, or parricide, disturb social 
order to such an extent that capital punishment alone ap- 
proaches a proportionate atonement. 

250. Objections: ^ 

1. Man is too noble a being to be slaughtered as a 
warning to others. Aftswer. Such certainly he is if 
he has done no wrong; not, however, if he has degraded 
himself by a monstrous crime. 

2. The present doctrine would justify " Lynch law," 
and mob violence, which are evident evils. Answer. 
A mob has no authority to inflict death : civil society 
receives such authority from God, its founder. 

3. Everyman has an inahenable right to his life; there 
fore the State cannot condemn him to death. Answer, 



Civil Society. 



153 



When we say that a right is inahenable, we mean that 
no one can take it away except God and one dele- 
gated by Him for that purpose ; now the State has a 
commission from God to inflict the death penalty for 
enormous crimes. 

4. In some States the death penalty has been abohshed; 
therefore it is not necessary. Answer. That conse- 
quent does not follow from the antecedent. It is not 
clear that the purposes of civil government are suffi- 
ciently attained in those States. If they are, it is 
owing to special circumstances, and constitutes an ex- 
ception to a general rule. 

5. Desperate men are not restrained by fear of the 
death penalty. Answer. Nevertheless it is the most 
potent restraint that the State can use ; besides, such 
men are prevented by the prompt infliction of the 
penalty from multiplying their enormities. Moreover, 
few criminals have been found so hardened as not 
eagerly to desire a commutation of capital punishment 
to imprisonment for life. 

§ 3. The Executive. 

251. In addition to the legislative and judicial depart- 
ments, a country requires for its government executive officers^ 
an armed force^ and a treasury for the remuneration of public 
services. Those officials whose duty it is to carry the laws 
into effect form the executive department, which is in some 
respects dependent upon the two other departments. The 
President of the United States is the chief executive officer of 
the nation ; at the same time he is at the head of the legisla- 
tive department, holding the power of veto and giving vahdity 



154 Social Rights and Duties. 



to the enactments of Congress by affixing his signature 
thereto. The President is also the official embodiment of 
the majesty and authority of the nation. 

252. The public officers ought to be chosen or appointed 
from those who, by their knowledge, ability, fidelity, and 
integrity, are well qualified to procure the common good. 
The practice of distributing offices as the spoils of party 
victory among the unworthy and incompetent, is a gross 
violation of distributive justice and a serious injury to the 
State. 

253. The treasury is suppHed either by direct taxation, 
i. <f., by taxes imposed on the property of the individual citi- 
zens, or by indirect taxation, i. e., revenues and duties paid 
for manufactured and imported goods. The right of taxation 
is based upon the need of the government to defray pubhc 
expenses incurred for the common good ; hence, the taxes 
levied should not exceed these expenses. The assessment 
of taxes for each class of the citizens ought, as far as is prac- 
ticable, to be proportioned to the benefits received therefrom. 
Thus, each citizen receives from the State an equivalent for 
the taxes he pays, and no one is forced to labor for another 
without just compensation. This rule does not prevent the 
taxation of the rich to supply assistance to the needy poor. 
The honest poor have a right, as human beings, to Hve in 
decent comfort, and, if they cannot succeed in doing so by 
their own exertions, they must be aided by the wealthy mem- 
bers of the community. It is even necessary for the common 
good that no class of the people should be driven by want to 
discontent and desperation. 

254. The armed force required by civil society consists 
usually of: 

I. The police, a body of men who exercise a constant 



Civil Society. 



155 



guardianship over public tranquillity and the rights of 
individuals, 

2. The militia, or civic troops, intended chiefly for the 
protection of the State against the insubordination of 
its own subjects. 

3. The regular army, whose main purpose is defense 
against foreign foes. 

As personal danger naturally accompanies the work of 
armed men, these are bound, when the occasion requies it, 
to expose themselves even to death in the performance of 
their duty. In the use of armed force, nations approach near- 
est to ideal perfection when this use is brought within the 
narrowest limits, while at the same time the public peace is 
vigorously maintained. Accordingly, the people of the United 
States have reason to congratulate themselves that public 
order reigns so extensively, though the army is comparatively 
diminutive, the militia seldom needed, and the police rarely 
compelled to make use of deadly weapons. 



CHAPTER IV. 



INTERNATIONAL LAW. 

255. All the members of mankind naturally constitute one 
universal society (No. 198), of which God Himself is the 
founder, ruler, lawgiver, and judge. In this universal society 
a great variety of rights and duties has place. Thus far we 
have considered those of individuals (Book II.), those of do- 
mestic society (Book III., C. II.), and those which arise in 
civil society (C. III.). Lastly, we are to examine the rights 
and duties which issue from the relations of independent 
civil societies to one another. These rights and duties are 
regulated by international law. 

256. International law is defined by James Madison, 
fourth President of the United States, as " Consisting of those 
rules which reason deduces as consonant to justice, from the 
nature of the society existing among independent nations; 
with such definitions and modifications as may be established 
by general consent " (Wheaton's Elements of International 
Law, C. I.). As a distinct code, it is of modern origin; for 
within recent times intercourse, chiefly commercial, between 
the nations of the earth has attained such proportions and is 
become so intricate that regulations governing it have as- 
sumed vast importance. 

Formerly international law constituted in Philosophy a 
branch of what was called jus gentium^ the law of nations, 
defined by Suarez as " That which is laid down by reason 
among all mankind and is observed by nearly all nations : " 
it treated of both civil and international right. 

156 



International Law. 



157 



257. As now understood, international law comprises two 
parts, indicated in Madison's definition, namely : 

1. What reason requires, /. <?., the natural rights^ and 

2. Such definitions and modifications of this as may be 
estabhshed by general consent, i. e., acquired or con- 
ve?itional rights. The latter may be determined ex- 
plicitly, by contracts among the nations, or implicitly, 
by custom so well established as to be considered 
binding on all civilized countries. 

258. By a nation we here mean an independent civil 
government; the several States of the Union, though sover- 
eign States — possessed of the right of the sword and other 
attributes of sovereignty — are, nevertheless, not so many 
nations, because not independent in many respects ; but all 
together constitute one nation, represented by our central 
national government. Evidently a nation here does not mean 
a race, as it does when we speak of the Celtic nation. Nor 
does it mean a geographical division ; for this may contain 
various nations, e. g., Spain and Portugal. Again, one nation 
may be made up of diverse races, as is the case in Austria or 
Great Britain ; and one race may be divided among various 
nations or governments, as is exempHfied in the Teutonic 
race. 

259. The principles underlying all international law 
are the following 

1. That every man must love all other men (Nos. 149, 

198)- 

2. That every independent civil society is a moral per- 
son, and, as such, possessed of definite rights, which 
must be respected by all other persons, physical and 
moral. For a person is properly a complete substance 
endowed with intellect (Mental Philosophy, No. 55), 



158 



Social Rights and Duties, 



a being, therefore, capable of having rights and duties. 
Civil society, inasmuch as it is complete and indepen- 
dent in its own line, and is a collection of intellectual 
units, is called a moral person ; as such it is the em- 
bodiment of all the private rights pertaining to its 
members. Besides, since civil society is natural to 
man, it has a natural right to exist and to use 
whatever just means are necessary for attaining its 
end. 

260. Since the rights of a nation flow from its essence as a 
complete civil society, all nations stand on an equal footing 

with regard to natural rights. Hence, the greater powers 
have no more natural right to lord it over less potent nations 
than strong men have a right to neglect and abuse the rights 
of infants. In particular : 

1. No nation may enter the territory of another nation 
without the consent of the latter. 

2. One nation has no right to interfere with the inter- 
nal workings of another government. Hence, foreign 
powers have no right to encourage or assist subjects 
rebelling against legitimate authority. 

3. Yet one nation has a right to assist another nation 
if the latter asks such assistance. The principle of 
non-intervention, in the sense that one nation is not 
allowed to render the aid requested by another nation 
in distress, is unjust. In effect, this principle allows 
a robber nation to despoil its victim, and helps rebel 
subjects to oppose lawfully established authority. 

261. The natural rights of a nation, which all are obliged 
to respect, are chiefly as follows : 

I. The right of preserving its existence as a nation. 
Such existence implies four conditions : union among 



International Law. 



159 



the citizens, legitimate authority, independence, the 
dignity of a moral person invested with sovereignty. 

2. The right to maintain civil order among its mem- 
bers. This implies : the dependence of the subjects 
on their rulers, a just administration of the common- 
wealth, concord among the citizens. 

3. The right to acquire new territory, whether by treaty 
or by first occupancy, etc., provided no prior rights 
be violated. 

4. The right of dominion over its water-courses, which 
include such an extent of the adjacent seas as is neces- 
sary for the security and prosperity of its citizens. 
Conflicting claims must be settled by treaties, cus- 
toms, etc. 

5. The right to honorable recognition by other nations 
and by men generally. This implies the sacredness 
of embassies, etc., a right which has always been ac- 
knowledged by all civilized nations. 

6. The right to develop its resources, material and in- 
tellectual, and generally the right to promote all that 
tends to public and private prosperity without preju- 
dice to private rights. 

7. Lastly, the right to manage its own affairs; hence, 
to determine changes in its manner of administration, 
and to settle difficulties with its own subjects without 
interference or contradiction on the part of other 
States. 

262. Nature has established no human authority superior 
to that of national governments; hence, there is no higher 
human power to enforce the observance of the moral law by 
nations and to decide conflicting international claims. A 
universal arbiter to decide contests between nations were 



i6o 



Social Rights and Duties, 



indeed desirable. Such the Supreme Pontiff was among 
Christian nations in the ages of Faith. In special cases, 
he has lately been called upon to act in a similar capac- 
ity, to the great advantage of justice, peace, and civiliza- 
tion. 

263. When arbitration cannot be agreed upon by contest- 
ing nations, recourse is had to war, to which, as a last resort, 
they have an undoubted right. That a war may be justifia- 
ble, these conditions are required: 

1. That a nation's claims are just, important, moderate, 
and certain. 

2. That every reasonable effort has been made in vain 
to settle the dispute by peaceable means. 

3. That war offers a fair prospect of success; for no 
one is justified in choosing the greater of two evils; 
least of all can those in authority do so, for they are 
the guardians of their subjects' rights. 

4. That war be undertaken, as Cicero says, only as a 
m.eans to bring about a just peace. 

264. The manner of waging war should be conformable 
to the approved usages of civilized nations. To be effectiv^e, 
it necessitates destruction of life and property, confiscations, 
sieges, blockades, battles, bombardments, and all the horrors 
unavoidably connected with such measures. But it does not 
justify; 

1. Any useless or wanton violence or destruction by 
which the final settlement is not furthered; for in- 
stance, the direct killing or ill-treating of non-combat- 
ants, such as women and children. 

2. The killing of prisoners or wounded soldiers who 
have no more power to injure. 

3. The use of means universally execrated as unneces- 



hiternatio^ial Law. 



i6i 



sarily cruel, such as envenomed weapons, poisoned 
wells, etc. 

4. The use of means that are in themselves unjust, 
such as lying, perjury, and solicitations to treason. 

5. The continuation of hostihties when a settlement 
has been made possible. 

265. The victorious nation has the right; 

1. To possess the object for which the war was waged, 
and to which it had all along a just claim. 

2. To exact compensation for the damages sustained 
in the war. 

3. To provide for its future security against a danger- 
ous foe. This may even necessitate the permanent 
subjection of the defeated nation. Moderation, jus- 
tice, and humanity must ever prevail. 

266. It is the tendency of Christian civilization to culti- 
vate universal good-will and forbearance, not only among 
Christian nations, but towards all mankind. It has gradually 
removed the most revolting usages of warfare — the useless 
slaughter of the vanquished, the enslaving of the conquered, 
with their wives and children, the wanton destruction of 
property, the lawless plundering and sacking of cities, the 
inhuman treatment of the weak, the aged and the young. 
Thus it has limited, as far as is possible, the horrors of war 
to those actually in arms. This same tendency has intro- 
duced tender care of the wounded, respectful burial of the 
dead, a chivahous treatment of all parties in the midst of hos- 
tihties, and has lessened ill-feeling after the re-establishment 
of peace. Its greatest triumph has been the prevention of 
active hostilities ; so that war is now an exceptional occur- 
rence, whereas it used to be the common occupation of na- 
tions. We may hope that the still wider prevalence of 



l62 



Social Rights and Duties. 



Christian principles and of correct views on the purposes and 
duties of civil society will gradually enable the nations to 
dispense with war altogether, by deferring all international 
contests to the arbitration of the most worthy personage on 
earth, the Vicar of the Prince of Peace. 



Catholic Social 
Platform 



Rev. JOSEPH HUSSLEIN, SJ., Ph.D. 

Associate Editor of "America" 
Lecturer Fordham University School of Social Service 



EXPLANATION 



The following application of Catholic ethics to the social 
question is based on the official pronouncements of the Holy 
See and of the Hierarchy of various countries. Besides 
receiving special ecclesiastical approbation and a very favor- 
able reception in the United States, it was at once officially 
adopted by important diocesan and national federations in 
England. We quote in part from the resolutions unani- 
mously passed in its regard by the Catholic Confederation 
of England and Wales: 

''That the Catholic Social Platform, issued under the 
Imprimatur of the Archbishop of New York, should be 
recommended to all constituent bodies: (i) as an excellent 
general statement of Catholic social principles; (2) as a 
useful basis of discussion of those principles; (3) as a 
means of directing Catholic thought on correct lines." 

The scope of the Platform was thus briefly outlined by 
a representative Catholic publication: "What Father Huss- 
lein does is to give a statement of Catholic social principles 
in a form which brings out most conspicuously their con- 
structive aspect, free from all prepossession of party poli- 
tics." 

Of special assistance are the references in footnotes to 
the various chapters of Father Husslein's two books, "The 
World Problem" and "Democratic Industry," which were at 
once introduced into both Catholic and non-Catholic insti- 
tutions of higher learning. Each clause of the Platform 

165 



Explanation. 



contains a crystallization of ethical principles or a summary 
of historic facts connected with these, whose complete de- 
velopment can be found in the chapters to which the student 
is directed. 

"A Catholic Social Platform" was published at New York, by P. J. 
Kenedy & Sons, 1919; and at Oxford by the Catholic Social Guild, 1920. 
The two books to which reference is made throughout are published by 
P. J. Kenedy & Sons in the United States, and by Burns, Oates & 
Washbourne, London. 



A CATHOLIC SOCIAL PLATFORM 



Civil society, no less than religious, is imperiled. It is 
the sacred duty of every right-minded man to be up in de- 
fense of both the one and the other. — Leo XIII, "On the 
Condition of the Working Class," 1891. 

Something more is needed than temporary arrangements 
or local readjustments. The atmosphere must be cleared 
so that, however great the difficulties which presently block 
the way, men of good will may not, through erroneous pre- 
conceptions, go stumbling on from one detail to another, 
thus adding confusion to darkness of counsel. — American 
Bishops' "Pastoral Letter," September, 1919. 

There is a place for every man and woman in this work, 
— Cardinal Bourne, "The Nation's Crisis," 1918. 

Preamble 

I. True modern democracy first arose beneath the fos- 
tering care of the Church, derived its principles from the 
great Catholic thinkers of the Middle Ages, found its ex- 
pression in many of the early Catholic city-democracies, 
was actively maintained in its rights of self-government 
during the wars of the twelfth century by Pope Alexander 
III, has been continuously exemplified since the thirteenth 
century in the Catholic cantons of Switzerland, and was 
most brilliantly defended in the theological schools of the 

x67 



1 68 A Catholic Social Platform. 



seventeenth century. The Reformation doctrine of the 
Divine right of kings was ever strenuously opposed by the 
Church.^ 

2. All true democracy, as an embodiment of the brother- 
hood of man, must be based on the fundamental doctrine 
of the Fatherhood of God.^ 

3.. Its aim is not the abolition of classes, from which 
universal happiness is vainly expected by some to flow. It 
freely acknowledges "the diversity of gifts that man re- 
ceives, with the consequent inevitable difference in posi- 
tion, learning, acquirements and possessions which have 
ever characterized, and must always characterize the mem- 
bers of the human race." (Cardinal Bourne.) ^ 

4. The perfect social ideal is found only in the Christian 
cooperation of all classes and of all individuals, as members 
of one social body, under the governance of lawfully ap- 
pointed authority, whose power, however conferred by the 
people, is ultimately derived from God.^ 

5. Democracy in education took its beginning in the 
great system of public schools created by the Church (Third 
and Fourth Lateran Councils, 11 79 and 12 15), and in the 
vast medieval universities fostered by her, with their gilds 
of masters and scholars.^ 

6. With the "Great Pillage," the suppression of monas- 
teries and the confiscation of gild funds devoted to religion 
and charity, pauperism arose for the first time as an ex- 
treme form of destitution, national in extent. The one 
power that by its very teaching and influence, as exemplified 

1 "Democratic Industry," Ch. XXVI. 
""Ibid., Ch. V. 

8 "The Nation's Crisis." (Pastoral letter on Social Reconstruction, 1918.) 
*"The World Problem," Ch. XXV. 
6 "Peraocratic Industry," Ch. XXIII. 



A Catholic Social Platform. 169 



in the gilds at their perfection, could have preserved the 
working classes from the degradation to which they were 
subjected, was set aside. Hence the "rapacious usury" that 
followed, so that, as Pope Leo XIII described the condi- 
tions existing in his own day: "A small number of very 
rich men have been able to lay upon the teeming masses of 
the laboring poor a yoke little better than slavery itself." 
(On the Condition of the Working Classes.) ^ 

7. The chief aim of Christian social endeavor, or "Chris- 
tian Democracy," is, in the words of the same Pontiff: "To 
make the condition of those who toil more tolerable; to 
enable them to obtain, little by little, those means by which 
they may provide for the future; to help them to practise 
in public and in private the duties which morality and 
religion inculcate; to aid them to feel that they are not 
animals but men, not heathens but Christians, and so to 
enable them to strive more zealously and eagerly for the 
one thing which is necessary: the ultimate good for which 
we are all born into this world." {Ibid.) 

What doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world and 
suffer the loss of his own sovd. (Matt. xvi:26.) ^ 

False Social Systems 

8. Socialism is no solution for the evils which have 
followed the Reformation. Far from satisfying the legiti- 
mate desire of the worker for a personal share in produc- 
tive ownership, it would ultimately deprive all alike of 
such ownership, subjecting the laborer hopelessly to a 
bureaucratic control, both tyrannical and inefficient. So- 

^Ibid., Ch. XXVIL 

^ "The World Problem," Ch. XXV; "Democratic Industry," Ch. XXVIH. 



170 A Catholic Social Platform. 



cialism is more or less complete in proportion as it aims at 
this abolition of private productive ownership.^ 

9. Individualistic capitalism, understood as a system in 
which the means of production are in the hands of a few 
men of wealth, inspired merely with a passion for the 
utmost gain and unrestrained by due legal restrictions, is 
equally pernicious.^ 

Christian Democracy 

10. The Church of Christ has not been founded to teach 
any particular system of sociology or economics. She con- 
demns whatever is morally false in the existing practices 
or theories and commends whatever form of social order, 
based upon the natural law and the Gospel, wisely answers 
the needs of any given period. She is not for any single 
generation, but for all time, while economic conditions are 
fluctuating perpetually.^^ 

11. Yet it is the duty of Christians, particularly at the 
present moment, not to overlook the social dangers that 
imperil civilization; and it is possible for them to build up 
on her principles, teachings and traditions a true system of 
democratic industry which shall answer all the needs of their 
day. On no other foundation can a sound social order be 
erected.^^ 

12. Equally opposed to the unnatural abolition of private 
productive ownership under Socialism, and to its restric- 

8 "The World Problem," CU. III.; "Democratic Industry," Ch. IV. 
»"The World Problem," CC. IV, XXI. 

lo/HJ., Ch. XVII; "Democratic Industry," CC. V, VIII, etc. 

" "The Catholic's Work in the World," Ch. XXXV. Attention may be 
called to this work by the same author as suggesting many practical forms 
of Catholic social endeavor, supplementing the "Platform" by mapping out 
the field of charitable and religious undertakings. 



A Catholic Social Platform. 



tion to a few men of wealth under capitalism, the true social 
system advocates instead the widest diffusion of the pos- 
session of productive as well as of consumptive property, 
that as many as possible of the workers can hope, by just 
means, to become sharers in it. And this personally, and 
not merely in the name of a communistic common- 
wealth 

13. Such possession will satisfy the aspirations of men, 
lift them above the position of wage-earners only, and 
help to their full and harmonious development, insuring the 
stability of the new social order/^ 

14. Such was the consummation most closely attained 
when Catholic gildhood was in its prime and the influence 
of the Church effective; when the apprentice might hope, 
by industry, skill and virtue, to become a master; when each 
lived for all and all for each. Such is the Catholic ideal.^* 

Democratic Industry 

15. The old organizations cannot be restored as they 
were. But it is possible, in the words of Pius X: "To adapt 
them to the new situation created by the material evolution 
of contemporary society in the same Christian spirit which 
of old inspired them." 

16. Such, in a material way, are the cooperative trade, 
credit and agricultural societies intended for self-help and 
to eliminate a wasteful system of distribution. Such are the 
attempts at cooperative production, where the entire enter- 
ic "The V^orld Problem," Ch. XVIII; "Democratic Industry," CC. I. 

XIX, etc. 

13 "Democratic Industry," CC. XXIX, XXX. 
^'Ibid., CC. XVIII, XXII, XXV. 
^^Ibid., Ch. XXVIII. 



172 



A Catholic Social Platform. 



prise is owned by the workers who alone receive both wage 
and profit, and where each worker is personal owner of 
shares and participates, directly or indirectly, in the man- 
agement.^^ 

17. Such, too, though less completely, are the various 
plans in which the workers own a considerable part of 
the voting stock. And such in fine, to a greater or less 
degree, are all copartnership arrangements by which the 
workers share in the corporate stock and reasonably par- 
ticipate in the industrial management: the regulation, 
through their shop gilds, of hours, wages, discipline, pro- 
cesses of production, etc.^'' 

18. Since every business is constituted of money-capi- 
tal and labor-capital, it is unreasonable that the former 
alone, as under capitalism, should have the entire power 
of control and the latter be subjected to a state of com- 
plete dependence. Men are more than money, and persons 
more precious than machinery .^^ 

19. But for the lasting success of any economic plans, 
religion is essential. The gilds were able to maintain their 
spirit of democratic industry in proportion only to their 
religious zeal. With this they waxed or waned. Without 
certain disaster, religion can never be dissociated from eco- 
nomics.^^ 

The Public Good 

20. While keeping clearly in sight this vision of the true 
city, which is to be constructed after no merely speculative 

18 "The World Problem," CC. XIX, XX., "Democratic Industry," CC. 
XXIX, XXX. 

i^"The World Problem," Ch. XIX; "Democratic Industry," Ch. XVIII. 
""Democratic Industry," Ch. XVIII, etc. 
^^Ibid., CC. XIV, XXVII. 



A Catholic Social Platform. 173 



model, we must not forget the intermediate measures that 
are not, however, to be confounded with the ultimate goal.^*^ 

21. Adequate government regulation should prevent the 
accumulation of excessive gains in the hands of a few, the 
monopolistic control of commodities, and the abuses that 
may arise in such public service monopolies as are under 
private operation.^^ 

22. Monopolies or combines are guilty of injustice when 
in the articles of common use they exceed the highest prices, 
that would obtain in the market were it freely open to com- 
petition, presuming in each instance the previous payment 
of a just wage. They may offend against charity by not 
lowering this price as well when notable hardship is inflicted 
upon the poor. All "cornering" must be prevented abso- 
lutely and all unfair business methods.^^ 

23. State ownership should not be introduced where State 
control suffices. The farther an industry is removed from 
a public service utility or a natural monopoly, the greater 
the presumption in favor of private ownership, cooperative 
or otherwise.2^ 

24. Since it is the duty of the State to see that natural 
resources are turned to good account for the support and 
welfare of all the people, "the State or municipality should 
acquire, always for compensation, those agencies of produc- 
tion, and those agencies only, in which the public mterest 
demands that public property rather than private owner- 

20 The social education of both capital and labor, and the renewal of 
Christian faith are the two vital conditions for the attainment of our ulti- 
mate goal. 

'-^Ihid.. Ch. XII. 

22 "The V^orld Problem," CC. V, VI. 
^Ubid., Ch. XVIII. 



174 



A Catholic Social Platform. 



ship should exist." (Irish Bishops' Joint Pastoral, "The 
Labor Question," 19 14.) 

25. Unjust restrictions should not be placed on those, 
who to the general benefit are acquiring legitimate pros- 
perity under private enterprise.^^ 

26. Taxation should bear most upon those who are able 
to contribute most to the common good, but should not 
be made a means of confiscation. Special protection should 
be given to the small share-holder and a wider diffusion of 
shares made possible, within the limits of justice. The 
words of Pope Leo XIII must be borne in mind: "The right 
to possess private property is derived from nature, not from 
man; and the State has the right to control its use in the 
interest of the public good, but by no means to absorb it 
altogether. The State would therefore be unjust and cruel' 
if under the name of taxation it were to deprive the private 
owner of more than is fitting." (On the Condition of the 
Working Class.) 

Labor Measures 

27. Until a larger social justice reigns, minimum wage 
laws must enable every male worker to support a family in 
Christian decency. Every adult woman worker must be 
enabled to live respectably by her earnings alone. Enough 
should gradually be paid to make it possible for every 
worker to provide for the future out of his or her own 
wages, without need of State insurance. In this way only 
can industry be said to be properly supporting those en- 
gaged in it.^^ 

=*"The World Problem," CC. Ill, XXI. 

Ibid., Ch. XVIII. 
'^Ibid., Ch. XXI. 
>Ubid., Ch. IX. 



A Catholic Social Platform. 175 



28. As exceptional business enterprise and efficiency, 
directed towards the greater common good, is entitled to 
an exceptional reward, so labor also should be remuner- 
ated in proportion to its contribution to industry.^^ 

29. By workers we understand all engaged in mental as 
well as in manual occupations, in the service of distribution 
or production, from manager to messenger, although the 
need of State protection for the former may be insignifi- 
cant,^^ 

30. As the State must come to the aid of the consumer 
in as far as the general welfare requires, so too it must 
safeguard labor's rights: religious, moral, physical and eco- 
nomic. In like manner the rights of every class must be 
duly protected by it to whatever extent the common good 
demands.^*^ 

31. The duty of labor is to give a fair day's work, as 
the duty of the employer is to provide a fair wage and 
proper working conditions, from a religious and moral, as 
well as from a material and sanitary point of view. Wages 
as well as profits should be kept within the limits of the 
public good.^^ 

32. Strikes are permitted for a grave and just cause,* 
when there is hope of success and no other satisfactory 
solution can be found, when justice and charity are pre- 
served, and the rights of the public duly respected. Yet con- 
ciliation, arbitration and trade agreements are the natural 
means to be suggested in their stead. Hence the utility 

Ibid., p. 97. The bestowing of exceptional rewards for exceptional 
services, whether rendered by capital or labor, is for the common good, 
stimulating enterprise and production. But this does not warrant profiteer- 
ing or excessive gains to the public detriment. 

Hence the absurdity of the so-called "Dictatorship of the Proletariat." 
80 /bid., Ch. VIII. 
^Ibid., Ch. X. 



17^ A Catholic Social Platform. 



of public boards for this purpose. As in the strike, so in 
the lock-out, a serious and just cause is required, and the 
rights of the workers and of the public must be respected. 
Charity is far more readily violated in the lock-out than in 
the strike, because of the greater suffering likely to be in- 
flicted on the laborer deprived of his work than on the 
employer.^^ 

' 33. Justification of the sympathetic strike will rarely be 
found, while the presumption is overwhelmingly against the 
general sympathetic strike.^^ Blacklists on the part of em- 
ployers that permanently exclude from his trade a worker 
displeasing to them, who honestly seeks employment, are 
opposed to the first principles of justice. 

34. The problem of unemployment should be met by a 
permanent national employment service, acting with the 
cooperation of municipal and private bureaus. Methods 
of preventing or meeting the crises of unemployment should 
be carefully studied. Governments have a serious duty to 
obviate this evil, and provide for the unemployed according 
to their necessity.^* 

35. Hours of labor should be neither unreasonably long 
nor unreasonably short. Sunday labor should be pro- 
hibited, except in cases of real necessity, such as is too often 
merely presumed to exist.^^ 

36. Until labor can properly provide for itself, the State 
should interest itself in housing conditions, particularly 
where there is danger to morals and religion as well as to the 

"2 "The V^orld Problem," Ch. XI. 
^^Ibid., Ch. XII. 
^^Ibid., CC. XIII, XIV. 

3= "The World Problem," Ch. VIII; "Democratic Industry." CC. XIX, 
XX. 



A Catholic Social Platform. "^77 



physical well-being of the worker and of his family. Health 
inspection in the schools and municipal clinics for the poor 
are recommended.^^ 

37. Vocational training is desirable, without neglecting the 
cultural and religious education of our children. "A healthy 
democracy cannot tolerate a purely industrial or trade edu- 
cation for any class of its citizens." Further, ''the opportu- 
nities of the system should be extended to all qualified pri- 
vate schools on exactly the same basis as to the public 
schools. We want neither class divisions in education nor 
a State monopoly of education." (American Bishops' "So- 
cial Reconstruction," Jan. 1919.) 

38. So long as proper wages are not accorded, social in- 
surance is to be favored to whatever extent may be necessary 
to safeguard the laborer in sickness, accident, invalidity and 
old age. It must be clearly understood, however, that there 
is question of a temporary substitute only for an adequate 
wage, which will enable the worker to carry his own in- 
surance and not to be a mere ward of the State. The dig- 
nity of labor must be protected from communistic paternal- 
ism as well as from capitalistic abuses.'^^ 

39. An intelligent penal system will make it possible for 
dependents to live upon the earnings of the imprisoned 
wage-earner. It may also enable the prisoner to lay aside 
something for future rehabilitation."^ 

40. The right of labor organization is no longer in ques- 
tion and never should have been. The worker should see 
that Christian principles are maintained within his union 

36 "The World Problem," Cli. II. 
3^ "Democratic Industry," Ch. XXI. 

28 "The World Problem," Ch. XVII; "Democratic Industry," Ch. IV. 
8" "The World Problem," Ch. XVII. 



178 A Catholic Social Platform. 



and not permit it, through his own carelessness, to be made 
the helpless tool of extremists.^" 

41. It is therefore of the highest importance that Chris- 
tian social education through organization and literature, 
be extended to every single one of our own labor unionists. 
Hence also the imperative need of Christian schools of 
sociology for the training of Christian social leaders.*^ 



Woman Labor 

42. Exploitation of woman and child labor is to be strictly 
abolished, as well as every other form of sweating.*^ 

43. While woman in industry is to receive a minimum 
wage sufficient for her own support, it is reasonable that she 
should moreover be paid according to her service. This 
will imply an equal wage with man for work equal in quan- 
tity and quality, when engaged at the same task with him.^^ 

44. If wife and mother are no longer driven to the fac- 
tory, owing to the husband's inadequate wage, and child 
labor is ended, there will be work for the fathers of families 
as well as for all men and women who must provide their 
own support. So too a widowed mother's pension, to be paid 
as far as necessary, will keep both mother and children in 
the home.** 

45. "Woman," says Leo XIII, "is by nature fitted for 
home-work, and it is this which is best adapted to her 
modesty and to promote the good up-bringing of children 
and the well-being of the family." ("On the Condition of 

"The World Problem," Ch. XVI; "Democratic Industry," Ch. III. 

*^Ihid., CC. XVI, XXV. 

*-Ibid., CC. XXII, XXIII, XXIV. 

*^Ibid., Ch. XXIII. 

*^Ibid., Ch. XVII, 



A Catholic Social Platform. 



179 



the Working Class.) "The proportion of women in industry 
ought to be kept within the smallest practical limits." 
(American Bishops.) They should not be placed at occupa- 
tions unfit, or morally and physically dangerous; it is the 
duty of the State to ensure this right for them and to secure 
for them reasonable hours, sanitary conditions, abolition of 
night work, and the removal of all circumstances injurious 
to sex and maternity.*^ 

Farm Labor 

46. Every just encouragement is to be given to promote 
farm labor and the development of a large class of small 
farm owners.*^ 

47. Cooperative buying, selling and credit associations, 
and cooperative production are here to be particularly recom- 
mended as thoroughly approved by experience. All abuses 
in transportation, working equal hardship on the producer 
and consumer, must be removed, and produce brought to 
the market with the least intervention of middlemen. 

48. Government loans should be made, where needed, to 
enable men to settle upon the land, either as owners or as 
tenants with long-time leases. "It is essential that both 
the work of preparation and the subsequent settlement of 
the land should be effected by groups or colonies, not by 
men living independently of one another and in depressing 
isolation." (American Bishops' "Social Reconstruction.") 
Attention should be given in particular to the facilities of 

^Ubid., Ch. XXIV. 

*^Ih{d., Ch. XV; "Democratic Industry," Ch. VIII. 

«"The World Problem," CC. XIX, XX, VII; "Democratic Industry," 
Ch. XIII. 



i8o A Catholic Social Platform. 



regularly fulfilling religious duties. The problem of the 
farm laborer, too, is to be carefully studied.*^ 

49. The principle of land nationalization is to be strongly 
condemned as unnatural, economically ruinous and un- 
democratic. The rights of the tiller to his soil must be held 
sacred. Keeping inviolate all just property rights, the 
laborer should "be encouraged to look forward to obtaining 
a share in the land." (Leo XIII, "On the Condition of the 
Working Class.") 

Causes of Social Disaster 

50. The roots of the social problem penetrate deep. The 
evils of impurity, birth control and divorce corrupt the in- 
dividual, the home and society. With these are associated 
the inordinate craving after pleasure, the shirking of duty, 
and the wide-spread wastefulness and excess of all classes, 
together with a desire for the utmost gain, regardless of the 
common good.^° 

51. These evils, which naturally flow from a rejection of 
religion, are most intimately connected with all our eco- 
nomic and social disorders, whose last cause it godlessness.^^ 

52. Finally, there is the doctrine that would make of the 
State a fetish to which all human rights, whether of the 
family or of the individual, are to be relentlessly sacrificed. 
Hence follow State autocracy, bureaucracy, Socialism and all 
the endless forms of State paternalism that threaten to sub- 
merge democracy.^- 

*8 "The World Problem." Ch. XV. 
^^Ibid., Ch. XVIII. 

Ibid., CC. II, XT; "Democratic Industry," Ch. IX. 
51 "The World Problem," Ch. XIV. 

« "Democratic Industry," CC. I, IV, XXVI, XXIX, etc. 



A Catholic Social Platform. i8i 



First Principles 

53. The sacredness of all human life must be recognized, 
and the duty of conforming it to the Will of God. 

54. The purity of family life must be restored, and the 
family, as the unit of society, must bravely assume its 
duties and responsibilities in a true Christian spirit. The 
future belongs to those who safeguard the home. 

55. The pagan theory that the individual exists for the 
State and not the State for the individual, must be absolutely 
rejected. 

56. Secularization of education must be opposed as the 
greatest danger to modern society, together with all over- 
centralization and undue State interference, as tending to 
establish the most pernicious of all autocracies. To the 
parent alone, and not to the State, belongs, of itself and 
directly, the responsibility for the upbringing of the child. 

57. The safeguarding of the just rights of Christianity, 
on which the future of civilization depends, is not possible 
without the development of a strong, alert, loyal and intelli- 
gent Christian press. The support and furtherance of this 
is a first duty. The law, on the other hand, should be made 
to prevent the publication of untrue statements and reports, 
and protect from slander all, whether individually or col- 
lectively. 

58. The success of Christian Democracy, which is purely 
social and not political, will finally depend upon the utmost 
organization and concentration of effort. Nor should Catho- 
lics neglect the full use of their political rights in the mea- 
sure in which they are granted to every citizen, since by 
reason of their Divine Faith they "may prove themselves 



1 82 A Catholic Social Platform. 



capable, as much as, and even more than others, of cooper- 
ating in the material and civil well-being of the people, thus 
acquiring that authority and respect which may make it 
even possible for them to defend and promote a higher good, 
namely, that of the soul." (Pius X, "Christian Social 
Action.") 

Conclusion 

59. Besides the rules of social justice, the laws of Chris- 
tian charity should bind together employer and employees, 
and all classes and ranks, into one Christian brotherhood. 
To accomplish this in its perfection, nothing can be of 
greater importance than that all should heed again the 
voice of that Mother from whom the nations have wan- 
dered, who begot them in the unity of a great Christendom 
in the ages of Catholic Faith. Her teachings are the same 
now as they were in the days of the Apostles, and as they 
will remain to the end of time, yet always perfectly adapted 
to every changing period of history. For the promise of 
Christ to her can never be made void: "Behold I am with 
you all days, even to the consummation of the world." 
(Matt. xxviii:2o.) 

60. Hence she alone can never possibly mislead man- 
kind, and there can be no surer hope for true and lasting 
reconstruction than the return of all to her, the one and 
only apostolic Church, the Church of our fathers. 

03 "The VV^orld Problem," Ch. XXV. 



ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 



The numbers refer to the paragraphs. 



Abraham, 89, 154. 
Abrogation of laws, 87. 
Accession, 182. 

Accountability, 54 to 60 ; hinderances 

to, 61 to 67. 
Acquired rights, 119. 
Acquisition of property, 170 to 182. 
Action, external, 52. 
Adoration, 124 to 126. 
Agnostics, 38, 138. 
Alienable rights, 119. 
Anger, 69. 

Arbiter, 243, 262, 266. 
Aristocracy, 236. 
Armed force, 254. 

Authority, 139, 196; parental, 211; 

civil, 827 to 229 ; its origin, 230 to 

234 ; means, 235. 
Aversion, 69. 

Beatific vision, 33. 
Beatitude, 26 to 35. 
Benevolence, love of, 140, 
Binding the will, 54, 56, 117, 240. 
Blasphemy, 127. 
Brave, 79. 

Capital punishment, 233, 249, 250. 
Cardinal virtues, 74. 
Caution, 76. 
Celibacy, 201. 

I 



Circtunstances, 49, 

Civil Society, 221; notes of, 22a; 
end, 223, 224; necessity, 225; 
units, 226; authority, 227 to 234. 

Civilized warfare, 266. 

Clear-sightedness, 76. 

Communism, 179. 

Concupiscence, 65, 78. 

Conflict of rights, 120, 121, 228. 

Congress, 238. 

Connatural rights, 119. 

Conscience, 80, 95 to 106, 240. 

Constitution of U. S., 175, 224, 239. 

Contract, 183 ; gratuitous, 184 ; oner- 
ous, 187; conditions of, 188; 
social, 234 ; protection of, 241. 

Courage, 69, 79, 144. 

Courts of law, 239, 243, 244. 

Cowardice, 79. 

Craftiness, 76. 

Crime, 245. 

Damage repaired, 181. 
Danger, 145. 
David, 162, 

Death penalty, 233, 249, 250. 

Democracy, 236. 

Derogation, 87. 

Desire, 69, 141. 

Despondency, 69. 

Determinants of morality, 46 to 52. 



Alphabetical Index. 



Dispensation, 87. 
Divine law, 82. 
Divorce, 206 to 208. 
Domestic society, 200 to 220. 
Doubtful conscience, 99 to 106. 
Duel, 167 to 169. 

Duties, see " Rights"; to ourselves, 
142, 143 ; to fellow-men, 146 to 149 ; 
to enemies, 150 ; of children, 218. 

Education, 213 to 220, 241. 

Eminent domain, 177, 229. 

Emotions, 68. 

Employer, 189 to 192. 

End, 6 to 8 ; kinds of, 9 to 12 ; last, 
13; mediate, 17, 20; attainable, 
27, 28 ; subjective, objective, ma- 
terial, formal, 24 ; of act, 48 ; and 
means, 48, 164. 

Equivocation, 154. 

Eternal, law, 83 ; punishment, 109 to 
112. 

Evil, 37 to 39, 45. 
Example, 158. 
Excuse from moral law, 85. 
Executive, 238, 251 to 254. 
Expiation, 248. 
Exposing life, 145. 
Ex post facto law, 239. 
External action, 52. 

Faculties, higher and lower, 18, 35 ; 

tend to God, 21 ; need society, 199. 
Faith, 124, 129. 
False theories of morality, 44. 
Fear, 66, 69. 
Filial piety, 75. 
Finding lost articles, 182. 
Formula of natural law, 84. 
Fortitude, 74, 79. 
Friendship, 140. 

Glory of God, 22. 



God, tendency to, 14 ; how ? 15 to 
17; man's last end, 20 to 24, 32, 
41 ; binds us, 54, 55 ; duties to, 122 
to 142. 

Golden mean, 77. 

Good, true, 8, 18 ; kinds of, 19, 40 ; 
and bad, 37 to 39, 42 ; radical 
notion of, 40, 

Goods of earth, 35. 

Government, civil, 235 to 237; func- 
tions, 238 to 254. 

Grant of land, 177. 

Gratitude, 75. 

Habit, 72. 

Happiness, 25 to 35. 
Hate, 60. 
Heroism, 148. 

Hinderances to accountability, 61 to 
67. 

Hobbes, 44, 225. 
Homicide, 159. 
Honor, 143, 165, 166, 169. 
Hope, 69, 141. 

Human.acts, 2, 5, 7,36, 45; law, 82; 

binding, 93, 94. 
Husband, 211. 

Huxley's theory of morals, 38. 

Idolatry, 127, 
Ignorance, 62 to 64. 
Immortality, 112. 

Immutability of natural law, 87 to 
89. 

Impiety, 127. 
Imputable, 53. 

Inalienable rights, 119, 216, 220, 250. 

Indifference in religion, 134 to 136. 

Indifferent act, 45. 

Indirect will, 50, 51. 

Infallibility, 139. 

Infanticide, 164. 

Instinct, 44. 



Alphabetical Index, 185 



Intellect, 143. 
Interest, 87. 

International law, 176, 255 ; defined, 
256 ; parts, 257 ; principles, 259, 
260. 

Intolerance, 130. 
Israelites, 89. 

Joy, 69. 

Judiciary, 238, 243 to 250. 
Jus gentium^ 176, 256. 
Justice, 75. 

Knowledge of natural law, 90 to 92. 

Laborer, 189 to 192. 

Landed property, 173. 

Last, end, 9, 13 to 16 ; will, 185, 186. 

Law, defined, 8j ; requisites, 81 ; 
kinds, 82 ; natural, 83 to 92 ; hu- 
man, 93, 94 ; of nations, 176 ; just, 
239; penal, 240; international, 176, 
255 to 260, 

Laxists, 104. 

Legislation, 238 to 242. 

Leo XIII., quoted, 190, 192. 

Liceity, 104, 105. 

License of speech and press, 241. 

Lie, 153, 156, 157. 

Life, right to, 160. 

Lost articles, 182. 

Love, 69 ; of God, 124, 140, 141 ; due 
to others, 146 to 149 ; due to ene- 
mies, 150; degrees of, 151. 

Madison, 256. 

Magnanimity, 79. 

Mandeville, 44. 

Manslaughter, 159. 

Marriage, 2co; ends of, 201, 202; 

unity, 203 to 205 ; indissolubility, 

206 to 208. 
Materialists, 38, 138. 



Mathathias, 162. 

Mean, golden, 77. 

Means, 48, 164. 

Mental reservation, 155, 157. 

Merit, 57 to 61. 

Minors, 188. 

Miracle, 131, 132. 

Misery, 23. 

Monarchy, 226. 

Moral, good, 19, 39, 40 ; sense, 44. 

Moral Philosophy, defined, i ; found- 
ed on Mental, 3 : divided, 4. 

Morality, 36; essence of, 37 to 43; 
false theories, 44 ; determinants, 46 
to 52. 

Mortification, 78. 

Moses, 162. 

Murder, 159 to i6a 

Mystery, 129, 130. 

Nation, 258. 

Natural law, 82, 83 ; formula of, 84; ^ 
no excuse from, 85 ; precepts of, | 
\ 86 ; immutable, eternal, 87 to 89 ; ' 
known, 90 to 92. 

Necessity, extreme, 149. 

Object of act, 47. 
Occupancy, first, 174 to 176, 182. 
Offices, 197, 252. 
Ought, 39. 

Ownership, 170; titles to, 171 to 179; 
violations of, 180. 

Paley, 44. 
Pantheists, 38, 138. 
Parental authority, 211. 
Passions, 68 to 71, 143. 
Patience, 79, 
Penal law, 240. 
Perfection, kinds of, 35. 
Piety, filial, 75. 
Plato, 144. 
Pleasure. 19. 



1 86 Alphabetical Index. 



Polyandry, 204. 
Polygamy, 205. 
Positive laws, 82. 
Positivists, 38, 138. 
Prayer, 128, 

Precepts, affirmative and negative, 
86. 

Preference, love of, 141. 
Prescription, 182. 
Press, license of, 241. 
Prior rights, 118, 123. 
Private enterprise, 242. 
Probability, 96, 98, 104. 
Promulgation, 81. 

Property, 170 to 174; modes of 
acquiring, 171 to 179 ; transfer of, 
183 to 186. 

Prophecy, 131, 132. 

Punishment, eternal, 109 to 112; 
civil, 247, 248 ; capital, 249, 250. 

Pusillanimity, 76. 

Rashness, 79. 
Reasoning, 139. 

Religion, 75, 124; one true, 136; in 

education, 214. 
Repairing damage, 181. 
Reservation, mental, 155, 157. 
Responsibility, 63. 
Restitution, 180. 
Resurrection, 29, 30. 
Revelation, 129 to 131 ; kinds of, 137, 

138. 

Right and wrong, 37 to 39. 

Rights, of God, 55, 123; of life and 
death, 160 ; of societies, 195 ; of 
domestic society, 209 ; of civil so- 
ciety, 227 to 234; of nations, 259 
to 269, 

Rights and duties, 113 to 116; from 
God, 117; priority of, 118; kinds, 
119, 122; in conflict, 120, 121, 228; 
of children, 216, 217. 



Rigorists, 104. 
Robbery, 180. 
Rousseau, 225, 234. 

Sacrifice, 128. 
Sadness, 69. 
Sanction, 107 to 112. 
Scandal, 158. 
Self-defense, 163, 164. 
Self-distrust, 76. 
Sense, moral, 44. 
Separation a toro, 207. 
Servants, 219. 
Simplicity, 76. 

Sin, mortal and venial, 43 ; punish- 
ment of, 112. 

Slavery, 220. 

Social contract, 234. 

Socialism, 179, 242. 

Society, 193; kinds, 194; authority, 
195 to 197 ; universal, 198 ; natural 
to man, 198 ; domestic, 200 to 
220 ; civil, 221 to 254 ; international, 
255. 

Speech, license of, 241. 

Spencer's theory of morals, 38, 44, 

State, control of education, 215, 
217; rights regarding matrimony, 
210. 

Stoics, 71. 

Strikes, 191. 

Suicide, 144, 145. 

Sui juris, 221, 226. 

Summum bonuin, 109; see "Beati- 
tude." 

Sunday, 241. 

Taxation, 177, 229. 
Temperance, 74, 78. 
Theft, 88,180. 
Theories of morality, 44. 
Timidity, 76. 

Titles to ownership, 171 to 179. 



Alphabetical Index. 187 



Transfer of property, 183 to 186. 


Virtues, 72 to 79. 


Treasury, 253. 


Virtus in medio y 77. 


Tutiorists, 104, 


V ox populi, 44» 239» 




Wages, 189 to 192. 


TTnif^^H ^fot*=»c T'?^ oo>f oort 
UllllcLl old,lcb, i>/3f ^^4i *^39« 


War, 263 to 266. 


Useful, 19, 44. 


Wife, 200, 205, 212. 


Utilitarianism, 44. 


Will, 7, 68, 74 ; indirect, 50, 51 ; last, 




185, 186. 


Vices, 72 ; against religion, 127. 


Worship, 125, 126. 


Victorious nation, 165. 


Wrong, see " Right." 


Violation of ownership, 180. 


Violence, 67, 


Zeno, 71. 





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